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Abstract: This paper develops a framework for analysing political settlements and 
applies it to look at the evolution of the political settlement in contemporary 
Bangladesh. Conventional institutional analysis has not successfully explained why 
developing countries have systematically failed to achieve the ‘Weberian’ 
institutional structures of advanced countries. Conventional good governance reforms 
essentially attempt to assist developing countries to move towards variants of 
advanced country institutional structures. The framework of political settlements 
suggests that this analytical and policy framework is mistaken. The configuration of 
holding power between economic, political and bureaucratic organizations in 
developing countries reflects the low level of development of productive capabilities. 
In general, this distribution of holding power will not support the full enforcement of 
formal institutions. Rather, formal institutions are inevitably modified in their design 
and enforcement so that the distribution of benefits is compatible with the distribution 
of holding power. This framework allows us to look for differences in the organization 
of power within developing countries and the implications of these differences for the 
enforcement and operation of particular institutions that are relevant for 
understanding aspects of development.  
 
Developing countries are characterized by variants of ‘clientelist political 
settlements’ and a typology is developed that shows how variations in the distribution 
of power within and between economic, political and bureaucratic organizations can 
result in significant differences in the constitution of the political settlement. This 
framework is then used to look at the evolution of the political settlement in 
contemporary Bangladesh. The country went from a period of military 
authoritarianism during 1958-71, dominant party authoritarianism from 1971-75, 
clientelistic authoritarianism from 1975-90 and finally competitive clientelism from 
1990 onwards. This evolution is related to changes in the enforceability of critical 
institutions (defined as changes in the growth-stability trade-off facing the 
enforcement of particular institutions). The analysis forms the background for a 
detailed analysis of three particular sectors in contemporary Bangladesh in a 
companion paper entitled ‘Growth, Institutional Challenges and the Political 
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1. Introduction  
Sustaining growth, particularly in developing countries, requires institutional 
solutions to market failures. If the relevant market failures are primarily the result of 
weak property rights, the appropriate solution would be to focus on governance 
reforms that strengthen property rights. This is essentially the approach of ‘good 
governance’ reforms, with their emphasis on property right enforcement, enforcing 
the rule of law, enforcing anti-corruption and improving political accountability. In 
theory progress in these directions reduces the transaction costs of protecting and 
transacting with property rights and thereby directly reduces the severity of market 
failures that may be constraining investment, learning, technology acquisition and 
other processes necessary for growth. While many of these reforms are desirable in 
their own right, theory and evidence from across developing countries suggests that 
these reforms are inadequate for addressing important market failures that developing 
countries face, and in any case these reforms are difficult to implement to any 
significant extent in most developing countries. At the heart of the problem is that the 
analysis of development has paid inadequate attention to the critical problem of how 
the relative power of organizations in that society affects the enforceability of 
different institutional rules. We capture this aspect of development and policy in our 
concept of the ‘political settlement’ which describes a specific distribution of power 
between relevant organizations in a country. The political settlements in developing 
countries make them structurally different from most advanced countries and in many 
cases significantly different from each other. Development requires institutional 
solutions that address the market failures relevant for that country and that can be 
implemented in that particular political settlement.  
 
This interactive analysis of institutions and their implementation brings us back to the 
problem of governance, but in a different way. Implementing solutions to market 
failures keeping specific political settlements in mind focuses policy attention on 
governance capabilities that are likely to be quite different from the capabilities 
required to enforce general good governance requirements. The enforcement of 
institutions of the type that would satisfy ‘good governance’ conditions may be 
infeasible in the typical developing country, but a focus on developing particular 
enforcement capabilities that are feasible in that political settlement and which solve 
important constraints on development can yield significant developmental outcomes. 
Indeed, a closer look at developmental success stories of the past century suggests that 
this was actually how development was achieved in countries that in no case satisfied 
the requirements of good governance. We highlight the different implications for 
policy by referring to ‘governance for growth’ or developmental governance as a 
strategy of developing governance capabilities necessary for addressing market 
failures in specific political contexts. The policy challenge is to identify institutional 
instruments for addressing market failures that can be adequately enforced in a 
particular settlement given existing enforcement capabilities or feasible improvements 
in enforcement capabilities through targeted ‘developmental governance’ reforms.  
 
The significant differences in the performance of similar institutions across countries 
are a challenge for economic theories. One response has been to go beyond individual 
institutions and look at broader ‘social orders’ to explain differences in performance 
between societies (North, et al. 2007; North, et al. 2009). Our analysis also recognizes 
the importance of the macro-political equilibrium in a society and suggests a two-
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stage analysis. Identifying critical aspects of the ‘macro-political equilibrium’ is 
important because it affects the ‘micro’ analysis of particular institutions and 
organizations located within this macro-equilibrium. The analytical frame of ‘political 
settlements’ identifies relevant aspects of the macro-political equilibrium that can 
affect the operation of particular institutions and organizations at the micro level 
(Khan 2010). We define a political settlement as a combination of institutions and a 
distribution of power between organizations that is reproducible over time. Once a 
reproducible macro-political equilibrium emerges, the relative power of different 
organizations is relatively stable and evolves along stable paths. The two-stage 
analysis of political settlements can help to explain why similar formal institutions 
and organizations appear to perform very differently across countries and over time. 
Once a political settlement emerges, the distribution of benefits across organizations 
has to be consistent with the relative power of organizations. Otherwise, organizations 
will mobilize, bargain and put pressure on other organizations and the state to change 
formal and informal arrangements to bring the distribution of benefits back into line 
with their actual relative power. In developing countries, the distribution of power 
between organizations typically does not allow the enforcement of many formal 
institutions (such as property rights) that are modelled on more advanced countries. 
These institutions are informally modified or partially enforced to ensure that the 
distribution of benefits is in line with the actual distribution of power, and many 
organizations informally operate to ensure these outcomes. This insight can help to 
explain why institutions and organizations that appear to be very similar in terms of 
their formal description actually operate very differently across countries. The 
underlying political settlements in every country also evolve over time, but they are 
usually evolving in path dependent ways except at moments of rupture and crisis. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides definitions and identifies the 
challenges of sustaining development. Section 3 summarizes the limitations of the 
‘good governance’ agenda and the importance of focusing on alternative 
‘developmental governance’ capabilities that are derived from an analysis of specific 
political settlements. Section 4 elaborates our framework of political settlements as a 
tool for understanding the efficacy of different policy responses. The subsequent 
sections develop the example of Bangladesh since the 1970s to illustrate how changes 
in the political settlement can affect the choice and viability of growth strategies. 
 
2. Institutions, Organizations and Development  
We define institutions and organizations as in the institutional economics literature 
(North 1990). Institutions are the ‘rules’ that describe how social actors act. Property 
rights that define who can do what with an asset are institutions because they are 
complex sets of rules. The rules describing taxation, subsidization or the regulation of 
economic activities are therefore also institutions, though some economists would 
make a distinction between rules that can be easily changed, which they would 
describe as policies, and reserve the term institution for rules that are more difficult to 
change. Since there is considerable vagueness in what is difficult or easy to change, 
we prefer to describe all social rules as institutions. Some institutions like 
constitutional rules may be procedurally difficult to change or may be deeply 
embedded in supporting culture and values. Others may be more easily changed 
through legislation, like rules about what can be taxed and at what rates. Institutions 
are ‘formal’ if the rules are enforced by the state and ‘informal’ if the rules are self-
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enforced or enforced by non-state actors. Informal institutions are rules that are not 
enforced by formal state agencies. They include behaviour supported by habits, 
customs, cultures and values. But they also include rules (that may appear to be 
formal) but are actually enforced by informal agencies like mafias and patron-client 
organizations or by state agencies acting in informal, personalized ways. Informal 
institutions can therefore also describe formal institutions that have been modified in 
their application as a result of the informal activities and pressures of particular 
interests.  
 
Formal institutions are usually generalized and impersonal, which means that they are 
defined to apply to all individuals or organizations of a particular type. This is often a 
characteristic of rules that are enforced at a social level by a state. In contrast, 
informal institutions are arrangements between specific groups and by definition are 
unlikely to be universal in the sense of being applicable to all individuals or 
organizations of a particular type. For instance, property rights that are protected in an 
impersonal way by state are formal institutions. But if the state is unable to protect the 
rights of all formal property owners and only a few are able to do deals with the 
police to protect their property, the latter are informal institutions in the sense that the 
application of the formal institution has been modified in informal ways. Some 
informal institutions can indeed be generalized in their application, for instance 
informal cultural norms may be widely shared. But in general, informal rules are 
likely to be personalized in the sense that they describe the relationships between 
particular individuals or organizations. Various reasons have been offered to explain 
the dominance of informal institutions in developing countries including the weakness 
of state organizations charged with enforcing formal institutions. If technological and 
bureaucratic capabilities were the primary reasons for poor enforcement, the ‘good 
governance’ reform agenda may have been implementable with some external 
assistance. But developing countries have remained decidedly ‘non-Weberian’ 
regardless of many attempts at strengthening the enforcement of formal institutions.  
 
An example of a formal institution would be the rules for awarding public contracts 
according to formal criteria. If the rules are followed and adequately enforced, they 
are formal institutions. In contrast, informal institutions can be self-enforced rules like 
the rules devised by a group of fishermen to determine the times when each of them 
can fish on the same stretch of river. If these rules are observed reasonably well, they 
constitute a set of self-enforced and therefore informal institutions. The term informal 
also describes the operation of a nominally formal institution whose enforcement is 
partial or modified through other social processes. For instance, if contracts that are 
supposed to be awarded according to formal rules are actually awarded on the basis of 
the private networks and agreements linking the bidding parties with public officials, 
the implicit rules determining who gets the contracts are informal institutions, or a 
combination of formal and informal institutions (for instance if some formal 
qualification criteria also have to be met). The economic consequences of any 
particular formal institution clearly depend not only on what the rules specify but also 
on the degree to which they are actually followed or enforced. Given the importance 
of different types of informal institutions in developing countries, economic and 
social outcomes cannot just depend on the formal rules. The actual behaviour of social 
actors may be quite different as a result of modifications of the formal rules or by the 




Organizations are the agencies that operate under these institutional rules. Firms, 
political parties, trade unions and mafias are all examples of organizations. 
Particularly important organizations from the perspective of governance are the 
bureaucratic organizations of the state that are involved in the enforcement of formal 
rules. Governance capabilities describe the capabilities of these government agencies 
for enforcing formal rules. In general, organizations may operate within the formal 
institutional rules in society, or they may violate these rules, as in the case of mafias 
or many political parties in developing countries. In a Weberian state, the agencies of 
government not only enforce formal rules but they are also bound by the formal rules 
that they collectively enforce. Within the organization there may be further rules 
describing the rights and responsibilities of individual members or subgroups. Internal 
rules constitute internal institutional arrangements and these too may be formal or 
informal. Formal internal rules are general rules that are impersonal while informal 
rules describe patterns of behaviour that may apply to different individuals differently. 
In developing countries, organizations themselves have many elements of informality 
and personalization in their internal operations. In informal organizations leaders are 
likely to be linked to their followers through personalized relationships rather than 
rule-following obligations and responsibilities.  
 
Most organizations pursue both economic and political goals to varying extents but 
some organizations can specialize in one or the other. Specialist political 
organizations organize their members and broader constituencies to achieve political 
goals. Typically they seek to change institutional rules in society in ways that favour 
themselves or particular constituencies. If they act informally, they may simply seek 
to modify the implementation of formal rules without actually trying to change them. 
Changes or modifications in rules create benefits for some groups that can be 
described as ‘rents’. As a result, political activity can be described as rent seeking. 
Rent seeking is not necessarily purely redistributive because changes in institutional 
rules can also have negative or positive effects on productive activity. Thus, the 
‘political’ rent-seeking activities of organizations can create growth-enhancing or 
developmental rents as well as socially damaging one (Khan 2000a, 2000b). 
Economic organizations in contrast are engaged primarily in organizing economic 
activities. But the production of goods and services also involves the production of 
surpluses that have the character of internal rents within productive organizations 
(Alchian and Demsetz 1972). Thus, most organizations are engaged in the search for 
and protection of rents either within or outside the organization. Their activities can 
be described by the rules they actually follow, some of which may be formally 
defined and enforced while others are informal. Their rent seeking activities can have 
positive and negative effects on production, distribution and development. This is the 
overall context that the analysis of institutions and organizations addresses.  
 
A state’s governance capability refers to its ability to enforce formal institutions. 
However, enforcement capabilities may vary quite significantly depending on the 
institution that is being enforced. For instance, the same state may have enforcement 
agencies that are quite effective in enforcing urban property rights but state 
organizations may be weak in enforcing contracts in rural areas. A general 
characterization of a state as strong or weak in terms of its governance capability can 
therefore be unhelpful, particularly in developing countries. ‘Good governance’ in the 
policy literature refers to state capabilities of enforcing formal institutions across the 
board, in particular formal property rights. If all property rights and contracts could be 
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enforced by state agencies, markets would be efficient and socially beneficial 
activities of production and exchange could be based on voluntary contracting 
between individuals and organizations. In other words, there would be few market 
failures, though distributive justice would depend on the initial allocation of rights. 
Many developing countries adopted policies that attempted to achieve generic good 
governance capabilities, particularly in the 1980s and beyond. These policies sought 
to strengthen the technical and bureaucratic capabilities of key governance agencies in 
an attempt to convert countries with significant informality and enforcement 
weaknesses into rule-following ‘Weberian’ states.  
 
But despite these attempts, there are no Weberian states in developing countries in the 
sense that the enforcement of the rule of law is effective enough to constrain all or 
almost all public and private organizations. This is not accidental as there are a 
number of important reasons why developing countries retain significant aspects of 
informality in their institutional operation. First, developing countries have limited 
public finances and effectively enforcing formal institutions is a costly activity. The 
public finance problem is clearly a function of low levels of social productivity that 
limit the fiscal resources available for enforcement activities. Poorer countries have 
smaller productive sectors by definition, so the public resources available for 
enforcing property rights and enforcing contracts are limited to begin with. The 
enforcement of formal institutions like property rights is expensive. The protection of 
property rights (and the associated enforcement of contracts based on these rights) as 
a public good assumes that asset owners can collectively pay for this enforcement. 
This condition does not hold in developing countries. In this and the other 
characteristics discussed below, developing countries clearly vary along a range, and 
advanced developing countries increasingly acquire characteristics of advanced 
countries and gradually improve their enforcement capabilities.   
 
Secondly, the existing structures of formal rights in developing countries are typically 
inappropriate for organizing modern productive activities. The ownership of land and 
assets, the organization of production and other features of the economy have largely 
carried over from a pre-capitalist history. Raising social productivity requires 
transforming and re-allocating pre-existing rights and creating new rights appropriate 
for new economic activities. These processes can result in significant distributive 
conflicts as the relative status and incomes of pre-existing organizations can be 
expected to change significantly. The gradual creation of new rights and organizations 
appropriate for a more productive economy creates new income streams and begins to 
transform the distribution of income and power. But during this period of transition, 
the organizations that are actually powerful in developing countries are typically not 
the formal productive organizations that will eventually dominate once the transition 
is complete. The formal institutional structure adopted by developing countries is 
primarily designed to support productive organizations in the modern sector even 
though these organizations are not yet dominant. Property laws, contract laws and 
corporate laws are derived from advanced country models to support new types of 
productive organizations. But powerful organizations based on other sources of power 
are unable to capture significant incomes under modern formal rules because they 
lack the capital and capabilities to engage in modern productive activities. As a result, 
the full enforcement of property rights in line with the needs of an emerging modern 
economy is likely to result in a distribution of benefits that is significantly out of line 
with the pre-existing distribution of power across organizations. It follows that many 
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powerful organizations in developing countries can only generate incomes 
commensurate with their political power by engaging in the violation of formal rules 
in ways that enable them to claim a share of the social net product.  
 
Thirdly, modern productive organizations are few in number in developing countries 
and indeed this is the most important reason why poor countries are poor. Put simply, 
the organizational capabilities for setting up productive organizations are not yet 
widely available. Organizations that have the capability to engage in productive 
activities in a competitive global market are few in number even if formal institutions 
appear to support these organizations. Missing organizational capabilities can explain 
the well-known paradox that developing country firms using the best available 
machines with workers and managers who appear to have adequate formal skills 
frequently fail to achieve international competitiveness. Their wage advantage is 
typically outweighed by their weak organizational capability to operate competitively. 
Organizational capability is embedded in the routines that individuals within the 
organization follow. The routines supporting efficient teamwork have to be learnt by 
members of the organization but this learning largely involves the acquisition of ‘tacit 
knowledge’. Tacit knowledge cannot be acquired in codified ways, for instance in 
schools and colleges. Rather it has to be acquired through learning-by-doing. As 
organizations experiment with different internal hierarchies, management systems, 
incentive structures and even physical layouts of factories and offices, they grope 
towards achieving embedded organizational capabilities that are appropriate for 
achieving competitiveness.  
 
These experiments, or learning-by-doing processes, are far from simple and constitute 
some of the most important challenges for modernization and development. 
Developing countries face much more significant challenges in acquiring 
organizational capabilities than advanced countries because the latter only need to 
modify existing capabilities as technologies change. Advanced countries already have 
many people who have worked in competitive organizations and developing new 
organizational capabilities involves incremental changes and absorbing incremental 
personnel. In contrast in developing countries, the entire team including supervisors 
and managers may not have worked in modern competitive organizations before. 
Many workers may never even have seen a factory before. Clearly, the learning here 
is much more time consuming and uncertain in terms of the outcome. The cost and 
uncertainty of organizational development in poor countries explains why success has 
often been associated with institutions and enforcement mechanisms that create 
opportunities, incentives and compulsions for organizational learning. This is 
particularly true for achieving growth that is broad-based across different sectors, 
technologies and regions. Specific incentives and compulsions for enforcement are 
required to accelerate the creation of new organizations that can achieve globally 
competitiveness. In a context where formal institutions and policies are difficult to 
fully enforce, solving these problems often requires combinations of formal and 
informal arrangements that assist the achievement of these objectives. 
 
Finally, political organizations also tend to be different in developing countries but 
not because of lower organizational capabilities. But compared to advanced countries, 
they are less likely to follow formal rules and more likely to capture rents that are not 
legally generated. Moreover, their organizational activities are also less likely to be 
financed by resources generated in the modern economic sector. In contrast, in 
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advanced countries the rent seeking of political organizations is likely to be rule-
following and limited to rents available through the redistribution of legal budgetary 
resources or legal changes in institutions. They are also likely to be financed to a 
significant extent by resources coming from modern economic organizations that now 
dominate the economy. An important consequence is that powerful feedbacks operate 
in advanced countries constraining the activities of political organizations such that 
they are more likely to be responsive to the requirements of economic organizations. 
This is not necessarily always beneficial for society as a whole. For instance, the 2008 
financial crisis in advanced countries was largely the result of the economic 
dominance of financial organizations in some countries and the political influence 
they could purchase, allowing them to successfully lobby for increasing levels of 
deregulation. On the other hand, the absence of strong feedbacks from economic 
organizations can also be problematic. Weaker feedbacks mean that political 
organizations can persistently seek rents that are likely to be damaging for the 
economy.  
 
These reasons help to explain why developing countries tend to score poorly in terms 
of the enforcement of property rights, the rule of law and other ‘good governance’ 
requirements. The problem is not just that the enforcement capabilities of formal 
agencies charged with enforcement duties happen to be weak. Rather, the deeper 
reasons explain why these capabilities are unlikely to be strong. Developing countries 
do not have the resources to fully enforce formal institutions, the existing structure of 
formal institutions is typically inappropriate and requires substantial changes, 
economic organizations have limited capabilities to pay taxes and may themselves 
require assistance through informal arrangements and finally political organizations 
have strong incentives and opportunities to engage in informal rent seeking activities 
given the limited rents available through fiscal transfers. Conventional institutional 
theories are also weak in explaining why the same formal institutions appear to have 
such different effects across countries. But by recognizing differences in the macro-
political economy across countries, these differences in the operation of formal 
institutions can be explained. We analyse the macro-political economy as a ‘political 
settlement’. A political settlement is an interdependent combination of organizations 
and institutions in a society that is reproducible and therefore satisfies the minimum 
conditions of economic and political viability. Political settlements can sustain 
different distributions of power between organizations, and this constrains the degree 
to which particular formal institutions can be enforced and the ways in which they 
operate. Thus, differences in the political settlement can explain why similar formal 
institutions appear to perform very differently across countries. But first we look at 
organizations and governance in more detail. 
 
3. Governance, Growth and the Policy Debate  
The discussion about institutions and governance needs to be located in the context of 
the policy debate about governance. If governance agencies in developing countries 
have to improve their capabilities of enforcing institutions, which institutions should 
they try to enforce and how should governance agencies achieve better enforcement? 
Before the 1980s, it was common to assume that developing countries needed to 
address significant market failures constraining learning and technology acquisition. It 
followed that they needed to have governance capabilities to successfully enforce 
broad-based interventions like tariffs and subsidies to overcome important market 
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failures. Strategies such as tariff-based import-substituting industrialization allowed 
extensive growth (the replication of production of a particular type without 
productivity growth). This is a necessary condition for triggering growth in 
developing countries as productivity growth can only follow as a result of learning-
by-doing within the plants that are set up. However, growth is only sustainable if it 
moves from the extensive to an intensive phase with learning-by-doing actually 
resulting in an improvement of productivity so that protection is eventually not 
required. The latter requires the enforcement of rules to ensure that new organizations 
put in high levels of effort in attaining international competitiveness. This was often 
missing, resulting in slow or non-existent growth in organizational capabilities. 
Without the appropriate governance capabilities on the part of states to enforce high 
levels of effort by organizations receiving support, growth strategies were likely to 
fail if start-up plants continued to require subsidies to operate. In these cases, infant 
industries refused to grow up, subsidies proliferated and became a way of life, and 
public sector enterprises made persistent losses.  
 
In contrast, the dramatic success of a small number of East Asian countries in the 
1960s and beyond was based on their ability to manage policy-induced rents using 
both formal and informal enforcement such that incentives and opportunities were 
created for high levels of effort in building new capabilities (World Bank 1993). 
These enforcement capabilities can be described as developmental governance 
capabilities. It would have been reasonable to conclude that if less dynamic countries 
wanted to improve their performance, they would have to strengthen similar 
governance capabilities for correcting market failures. If it was difficult to develop 
these capabilities on an extensive scale, then the range of policies addressing market 
failures would need to be scaled back to be compatible with the enforcement 
capabilities that could actually be developed. Instead, the response from the late 1970s 
onwards was to equate all intervention with the creation of damaging rents and 
therefore to abandon all rent creating strategies. As a result, strategies for assisting 
economic organizations to develop their organizational capabilities or to address other 
market failures were also abandoned. The shift towards liberalization and ‘good 
governance’ strategies was actually even more ambitious in terms of the enforcement 
capabilities that were now required. The new approach assumed that it would not be 
necessary to address market failures because it should be possible to make markets 
more efficient across the board by improving the market-enhancing governance 
capabilities of agencies enforcing property rights and the rule of law. In theory the 
effective enforcement of property rights could reduce market transaction costs (and 
therefore market failures) sufficiently and allow private contracting to solve problems 
of development (Khan 2007a, 2008a). But the theory did not account for the factors 
constraining the enforcement of formal institutions in developing countries.  
 
While many of the good governance reforms are desirable in themselves as goals, 
they are unlikely to be implemented to a significant degree in developing countries 
because of the structural factors discussed earlier that constrain the enforcement of 
formal institutions (Khan 2007b). It is not surprising that an empirical relationship 
between market-enhancing governance and accelerated economic growth has not been 
established. There is a weak positive relationship identified in many regression 
exercises between actual improvements in ‘good governance’ indicators and 
economic growth. But the strength of the relationship is weak, and the regression 
analysis shows that the additional growth that achievable improvements in good 
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governance can offer is limited (Kurtz and Schrank 2007). Deriving important policy 
conclusions from the results of weak multi-country regression results is problematic. 
For one thing, given the two-way causality that everyone accepts between good 
governance scores and economic growth, it is difficult to identify the true strength of 
the relationship in one direction using available econometric techniques.  
 
Another problem is that the data to test these theories is weak and available only from 
the 1990s (Arndt and Oman 2006). Given the limited support from cross-section data, 
supporters of good governance policies (for instance, Kaufmann, et al. 2007) have 
sought support in long-run econometric exercises using instrumental variables such as 
in the work of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002). Here instrumental 
variables that explain where settler colonialism was established are found to correlate 
with high per capita incomes today. The authors claim that this is because settler 
colonialism established stable property rights. But the econometrics only establishes 
that settler colonies did better, it does not establish that they did better because they 
first established stable property rights. Other factors were also correlated with the 
onset of settler colonialism, for instance, the entry of settlers with higher human 
capital (Glaeser, et al. 2004). More significantly for the claims of good governance 
theory, the period of economic transformation in settler colonies was historically one 
of violent property right disruptions (Khan 2009a). These transformations involved 
significant transfers of assets from indigenous populations to settlers. But settler 
colonialism did not first establish property rights that then allowed efficient markets 
to transfer assets from indigenous populations to more efficient users. Rather, settler 
colonies used ‘institutions’ of violence to destroy pre-existing rights by force. 
Paradoxically, these forced transfers allowed them to carry out rapid transformations 
in the organization of production that achieved the growth in productivity that 
subsequently allowed property rights to be adequately protected. But what is of 
interest to developing countries is the process of transformation (and not the end state 
these societies achieved) and that process was neither based on stable property rights 
nor on minimizing social costs. 
 
There is strong evidence of a long-run correlation between the level of social 
productivity and the strength of protection for property rights. But the causal links go 
in both directions. As assets become more productive, they can begin to pay for their 
protection and property rights are likely to be better protected. Equally, everything 
else being the same, if property rights are better defined there will be positive effects 
on contracting possibilities, and therefore on the productivity of assets. The policy 
question however is about feasible governance priorities during the period of 
transformation when asset use and social organization are rapidly changing. The 
transition is a period when traditional societies are becoming unsustainable in the face 
of modernizing processes and exposure to competition and new productive firms and 
sectors are gradually emerging. Far from establishing that good governance was a 
precondition for these transformations, settler colonialism with its extreme disregard 
for the rights of indigenous populations shows that these transformations involved 
considerable injustice and conflict. But the extent of injustice and the human costs 
involved in the settler colonialism lauded by Acemoglu et al. makes them entirely 
inappropriate as models of how to achieve developmental transformations today. 
Thus, neither the cross-section nor the instrumental variable regressions provide 
convincing evidence that countries have made a significant transition from poverty to 
prosperity by first achieving good governance capabilities. We can accept that 
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improvements in good governance capabilities could result in some improvements in 
development performance, but we have no evidence that achievable improvements 
along these dimensions of governance will be sufficient for developmental 
transformations.  
 
The role of governance during these processes of transition has to be understood in 
this context. Structural features of developing countries rule out the achievement of 
good governance conditions to the extent that relevant market failures would 
disappear. At the same time, the models of forced transitions under colonial 
settlement are not desirable either. The role of policy must be to create incentives and 
constraints to move organizations in productive directions within the limits set by 
inherited political settlements. The discussion of developmental governance was for a 
time dominated by the experiences of the East Asian tigers in the 1960s and 1970s 
(for instance Amsden 1989; Wade 1990). Unfortunately, these were also inappropriate 
models for most developing countries because they had exceptional political 
settlements that allowed them to manage an extensive range of interventions and the 
associated rents. Most developing countries do not have these capabilities and are 
unlikely to attain them given their political settlements.  
 
East Asian capabilities are unattainable in most developing countries, but not because 
the East Asian countries had the mysterious ability of ‘picking winners’. This 
common but misleading characterization of East Asian industrial policy implies a 
degree of prescience that neither private investors nor bureaucrats can be expected to 
have, and indeed East Asian countries did not have it. Their success was based on 
supporting investment in areas where new organizational capabilities could be 
developed and having the ex post capability to withdraw support from areas that were 
clearly failing rather than picking ex ante winners in some mysterious way. 
Nevertheless, this governance capability is sufficiently demanding to be out of reach 
for most countries on the scale that a few East Asian countries achieved during their 
rapid transformations. The distribution of power across organizations in most 
developing countries precluded attempts at disciplining organizations benefiting from 
rents. But it was equally futile for them to hope that they could achieve significant 
good governance capabilities in relatively underdeveloped societies. The only realistic 
strategy for most developing countries must be to build developmental governance 
capabilities on a more modest scale, taking into account the market failures they face, 
and the constraints on institutional enforcement set by their political settlements.  
 
4. Economic organizations and their capabilities  
Economic organizations refer to firms involved in the organization of economic 
activity. They include organizations involved in production in industry and agriculture 
but also financial organizations like banks and other service providers. Economic 
development is nothing but the transference of economic activity out of traditional 
low productivity organizations to modern high capability ones that are able to 
organize production in globally competitive ways. But the capabilities enabling 
organizations to be competitive are difficult to achieve. Economists used to think that 
competitive production was simply a function of selecting technologies that were 
appropriate for the factor prices and skills of the country. It is now clear that the 
organization of competitive production requires significant capabilities embedded in 
organizational routines and the ability of personnel within the organization to operate 
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these routines. Acquiring these organizational capabilities is much more difficult than 
acquiring machines or workers with the right formal skills. Indeed, significant market 
failures can prevent organizations from acquiring the required level of organizational 
capabilities to operate even the simplest technologies. Without strategies of 
developing these capabilities, opening up access to markets through liberalization is 
insufficient for sustaining development. Nor are low wages alone sufficient for 
ensuring that organizational capability will be built up by foreign or domestic 
investors.  
 
The problem for developing countries is that even when a workforce with the 
appropriate formal education is available for particular production processes, most of 
them are unlikely to have been employed in a competitive organization operating 
these technologies before. Indeed, by definition, much of the workforce in developing 
countries has never worked before in any high-capability competitive organizations. 
Learning organizational routines is much easier for one or two people joining a high-
capability organization that is already competitive. This is why immigrants from 
developing countries coming to advanced countries with the appropriate formal 
education but no experience of modern organizations nevertheless typically learn to 
function within modern organizations quite rapidly. The learning is much slower, 
more uncertain and requires much greater effort when the organization as a whole has 
not evolved the routines that enable it to be competitive. The problem is only slightly 
easier for foreign investors in developing countries because they presumably know 
what a capable organization looks like, but even they have to invest a lot in imparting 
that knowledge to local workforces, supervisors, supplier networks and so on. This 
also requires considerable learning-by-doing by foreign investors to understand local 
problems and conditions. Moreover, given that foreign companies are likely to have 
more advanced technologies, they do not necessarily have an advantage in setting up 
organizations with competitive capabilities in developing countries (though they may 
in some sectors and technologies).  
 
Building organizational capabilities when the organization itself has not achieved 
these capabilities requires significant additional investments on top of the investments 
in machines and labour because while the learning is taking place, the organization is 
not as profitable as it should be and is possibly making losses. But the success of 
these investments depends critically on all the stakeholders putting in high levels of 
effort during this learning process. This is by no means assured because effort is 
costly and experimentation can result in job losses or task redefinition at all levels of 
the organization. Investors are therefore likely to be subject to significant moral 
hazard problems given asymmetric information problems and limited contract 
enforcement capabilities in developing countries. Not surprisingly, building 
organizational capabilities through private investment and contracting is subject to 
contracting failures that can be described as market failures. Investors in 
organizational development would have to be sure that all stakeholders have 
incentives and compulsions to put in high levels of effort, that investors could extract 
some value from the investments to limit their loss in case of failure, and get their 
agreed share of profits in case of success. All of these requirements are subject to 
significant contracting problems, particularly in developing countries where the 
underlying structure of property rights and the formal contract enforcement 
capabilities of the state are weak. At the same time, if the problems facing the 
construction of competitive organizations are not addressed, an exposure to the 
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market can lead to divergence rather than convergence, as happened in many 
developing countries under colonial rule. This is not surprising because exposure to 
the market without solving the capability development problems can destroy weak 
organizations that do not have the capability to survive international competition.  
 
For instance, between 1873 to 1947 when India was forced to adopt free trade policies 
under British colonial rule, its per capita income declined from around 25% of US per 
capita income to under 10% (Clark and Wolcott 2002). This was a period of close to 
zero tariffs, strong protection of the rights of British investors and virtually no 
restrictions on the repatriation of capital and profit. The reason was simply that it was 
not profitable for anyone to invest in modern manufacturing or agricultural production 
in India while Indian handicraft manufacturing based on more primitive 
organizational principles was destroyed by exposure to international competition. The 
competition was not entirely fair because the British further tilted the playing field 
against Indian handicraft production by imposing domestic taxes that accelerated the 
decline that would almost certainly have happened anyway (Khan 2009a). The 
sobering fact is that the productivity of Indian workers was so low that even very low 
wages compared to Britain did not give India a competitive advantage in basic 
manufacturing. Potential Indian productive organizations may eventually have 
become competitive if sufficient investment and effort was put into building 
organizational capabilities and the relevant tacit knowledge of the workforce and 
management. But who would take this risk given the contracting problems? The 
problem of organizing capability development remains one of the most significant 
problems facing development in contemporary developing countries.  
 
Organizational capability refers to the organizational routines and the knowledge to 
operate these routines that is essential for sustaining competitive production 
outcomes. Without this ‘know-how’, investments in the best available machines and 
in workers with apparently the right formal education can fail. Owners, managers and 
workers somehow have to acquire the know-how to operate new types technologies 
and this typically requires organizing large numbers of people in very specific ways. 
The relevant capabilities are embedded in a combination of new routines, new tacit 
knowledge embodied in key personnel and new hierarchies and incentives within the 
organization. There are many ways of organizing management, factory layouts, 
supervisory structures, quality control structures, incentives and hierarchies even for 
producing a single product. This is demonstrated by the many different ways in which 
firms are organized for different technologies, and differently organized for the same 
technology in different countries (Williamson 1985; Whitley 1992). The 
organizational structure that will work best for a particular technology in a particular 
country depends not only on the technology but also on the initial conditions in the 
country describing hierarchical relationships in society which can sustain or rule out 
particular types of internal firm hierarchies and operating procedures. Typically, 
creating effective organizations therefore involves a lot more than copying a 
blueprint, because not only is the optimal blueprint likely to vary across countries, but 
the functions and tasks of different individuals within the blueprint is not codified 
knowledge that can be learnt in books, but is rather tacit knowledge that has to be 
learnt through a process of experimentation and learning-by-doing.  
 
Poor countries remain poor because they fail to construct organizations with these 
organizational capabilities. Indeed without such organizations, poor countries can 
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paradoxically suffer from capital flight and the outmigration of skilled workers. The 
know-how involved in setting up factories, organizing production lines, managing 
quality control and order flows, maintaining work flows and so on is mostly ‘tacit 
knowledge’ that cannot be learnt in books and manuals. It can only be acquired 
through learning-by-doing with high levels of effort. What is learnt is essentially a 
combination of routines that are embedded in the ways in which organizations are set 
up and associated tacit knowledge embodied in the personnel that operate within these 
organizations (Nelson and Winter 1982; Stiglitz 1987; Lall 1992; Lall and Teubal 
1998; Lall 2000a, 2000b). Without these capabilities, a firm that appears to have all 
the requisite machines and a workforce with the required formal skills will still be 
unable to produce goods or services at a competitive price-quality combination. Any 
production under these circumstances requires implicit or explicit subsidies, either 
from the public purse or from investors taking a bet on the organization achieving 
competitiveness in the future. Since the learning-by-doing required for organizational 
capability development requires a period of doing, a period of loss-making and 
implicit subsidization is necessary. But protection, temporary subsidies or other ways 
of financing the learning will only succeed in developing competitive organizations if 
the organizations have strong incentives and compulsions to rapidly acquire the 
capabilities necessary for achieving competitiveness. 
 
Development therefore involves a lot of effort in building organizations that can 
engage in competitive production. Investment in physical capacity and formal 
education are necessary but not sufficient. At least as important are the investments in 
building organizations. This amounts to financing periods of loss-making when 
learning is taking place and the organization is by definition unable to be profitable. 
But financiers (including society if the financing is a public subsidy) should only be 
doing this if they can be sure they will not lose out because of poor levels of effort by 
those benefiting from the financing. Private financiers may not be able to contract for 
or enforce these conditions, particularly in developing countries, and as a result they 
typically avoid investments in organizations where substantial capability has yet to be 
acquired. Policy can address these market failures by reducing the cost or risk of 
financing loss-making learning periods, provided the governance capabilities are in 
place to ensure that the opportunities created are not wasted in their turn (Khan 2000a, 
2009b). In the literature on technology acquisition, it is recognized that responding to 
these market failures involves the creation of opportunities for new organizations in 
new sectors. Whenever this happens, the firms benefiting from these opportunities are 
effectively getting direct or implicit rents that have variously been referred to as 
learning rents (Khan 2000a), contingent rents (Aoki, et al. 1997: 14-18) or 
performance-indexed rewards (World Bank 1993). But to achieve the learning 
objective, rents have to come with complex formal or informal conditions that create 
incentives and compulsions for the receiving organizations to put in high levels of 
effort into the learning process.  
 
One way of examining the conditions that explain the success or failure of learning 
rents is to analyse the rent seeking processes associated with the creation of these 
rents. If policy results in the emergence of any policy-induced rents, this inevitably 
induces rent seeking. Rent seeking is the expenditure of resources by organizations 
that seek to get the rents that are available or to change the allocation or conditions 
associated with the rents. Not only does rent seeking imply a resource cost since 
resources are used up in these activities, rent seeking can also subvert policies in ways 
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that prevent the resolution of the market failure (Khan 2000a, 2007b). Rent seeking 
can be damaging either because it distorts policy ex ante so that in the name of 
correcting market failures rents are created for unproductive rent seekers. In this 
context, an ex ante policy failure would be the creation of rents for organizations that 
already have competitive capabilities or that have no possibility or intention of 
achieving these capabilities. Or rent seeking can subvert policy ex post if rents can be 
retained by recipients who have no ability or intention to solve the market failure. In 
this context, an ex post failure would involve firms retaining their subsidies even if 
they failed to achieve competitiveness. The important point is that in a world 
requiring solutions to market failures, rents will emerge and rent seeking cannot be 
reduced to zero. The aim should rather be to ensure that the resource cost of rent 
seeking and any distortion in policy is not so great that the net effect of policy is 
negative. The lower the rent seeking cost and the lower the policy distortion, the 
better, but aiming for zero rent seeking is equivalent to aiming for zero carbon 
emissions to save the environment (Khan 2000b). The social objective in both cases is 
to maximize the net benefit.  
 
5. Political organizations and clientelism  
Political organizations also operate differently in developing countries, both internally 
and in their external operations. Their organizational capabilities are by no means low 
but these capabilities are focused on doing different things. Political organizations in 
all countries aim to create or protect rents of different types for their members and 
supporters. But in advanced countries political organizations have to operate in rule-
following ways both internally and in their external activities. The rule-following 
characteristics of politics in advanced countries is often described in terms of states 
being Weberian, in the sense that states follow rules themselves and enforce rules on 
those accessing the state. Since the function of political organizations is to influence 
or operate state institutions, in advanced countries political organizations are also 
generally rule-following themselves. In contrast in developing countries political 
organizations are characterized by a significant degree of informality both in their 
internal organization and in their public activities. The informality refers to the fact 
that their operations are not constrained by formal rules. For instance, leaders often 
appear to be exercising significant discretion in what they do and how they do it. 
Political organizations in developing countries are therefore often described as 
engaged in personalized or patron-client politics. Their behaviour is not necessarily 
entirely unconstrained but the relevant constraints are largely informal, and depend on 
the implicit limits on their activity set by the activities and responses of other 
organizations. The observation of informality in the operation of political 
organizations is systematic across all developing countries irrespective of their 
cultures, economic policies or political institutions.  
 
The formality or informality in the operation of political organizations is important 
because they describe differences in the rent seeking process that are in turn related to 
the types of rents being created. The rent seeking process is only likely to be formal 
and legal if the rents themselves are legally created and regulated, for instance legal 
rents created through fiscal redistributions. If a society can legally create sufficient 
rents to satisfy most political organizations, and it can enforce rules that say that only 
legal rent seeking will be allowed, rent seeking could be restricted to formal rule-
following processes. The ability of economic organizations to deliver sufficient 
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surpluses for the enforcement of formal rules while also providing enough legal 
redistribution through the tax system is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for 
ensuring that most rent seeking remains legal. An example of legal rent seeking would 
be legally regulated spending by competing political organizations to win elections to 
decide how to raise and allocate fiscal resources. Some political organizations may 
wish to break the rules but in principle if most political organizations find it in their 
interest to follow rules, and there is effective enforcement of the rules, a minority can 
be deterred by policing. But in a society where the lion’s share of rents is created 
outside the framework of law, it is implausible that the rent seeking process for 
gaining access to these rents can be mainly legal. Many of the most important rents in 
developing countries cannot be legally endorsed because their creation violates 
principles of universality or equity. Examples include preferential access to jobs, 
granting contracts to preferred firms, creating business opportunities for preferred 
entrepreneurs, prioritizing the allocation of public goods and using political power to 
facilitate asset accumulation. For these types of rents, the rent seeking expenditures of 
political organizations who want these rents for their members cannot follow mainly 
formal or legal procedures. The rent seeking expenditures in this case are likely to 
include expenditures in informal politics, like building informal networks within and 
across political organizations to bargain and protect these rents.  
 
The internal organization of political organizations in advanced and developing 
countries will also broadly reflect the fundamental differences in their dominant rents 
and rent seeking strategies. If political organizations are mainly involved in 
competing for legal rents, it is likely that rule-following behaviour can also be 
enforced in their internal organization. Indeed there are likely to be strong pressures in 
that direction. Members of these political organizations who are providing or raising 
finance have little to gain by not having clear and transparent procedures for selecting 
office-holders and holding them to account. Office-holders who want to engage in 
secret deals are in general unlikely to be able to offer much more to their members 
compared to those who promise transparency. But if the political organization is 
engaged in building informal networks to compete for informal rents, internal 
organizers with much to hide are most likely to succeed in generating rents for the 
organization. It is difficult for transparency and accountability to be enforced within 
such political organizations and there is likely to be limited support for this within the 
organization if success required their leaders to follow informal and personalized 
strategies. In other words, characteristics of informality such as personalized politics, 
involvement in political corruption, patron-client relationships and clientelism that 
characterize developing country political organizations are not just accidental features 
of these organizations. 
 
Clearly the differences described here vary along a scale and we are only describing 
overall characteristics that may differ in detail across countries. Individual political 
organizations in an advanced country may have some of the informal characteristics 
described for developing countries, and many developing countries can have 
significant elements of formality in some of their political organizations. Moreover, as 
developing countries become more prosperous and create more rents through legal 
and fiscal processes, their political organizations are also likely to evolve. As a result, 
developing countries at different levels of development always have mixed 
characteristics, with greater elements of formality as they become more developed. 
But it is still a useful generalization to describe the differences between political 
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organizations in advanced and developing countries in terms of the overall level of 
formalization of their rent-seeking activities. The analytical framework of political 
settlements provides a general framework identifying the implications of these 
differences and shows why they are relevant for understanding the policy approach to 
institutional and governance reform in developing countries.   
 
Underlying these differences in political organizations across countries is economic 
development itself. The prosperity of advanced countries is based on economic 
organizations with high levels of organizational capability. By definition, these 
organizations dominate production, which is why average social productivity is high. 
This in turn implies that the most important property right transformations have 
already taken place and the existing structure of property rights effectively underpins 
a large number of significantly productive organizations. Collectively these economic 
organizations can also pay for the protection of these rights. As a result, advanced 
countries tend to have well-defined and protected structures of rights, and these rights 
underpin the activities of its productive organizations. The dominant economic 
organizations also have the ability to pay taxes that promise significant rents to 
political organizations that play by rules of not fundamentally threatening the rights of 
the productive organizations that generate the social surplus. Their interdependent 
interests ensure powerful feedbacks so that political organizations do not generally 
transgress the collective interests of productive organizations (Khan 2005a). Any 
significant infringement of the rights underpinning productive activity threatens to 
reduce the rents available to political organizations. The resources available to 
productive organizations also allow them to directly support their own political 
organizations.  
 
Economic organizations can therefore engage in their own rent seeking through 
political organizations. This rent seeking can be socially beneficial if the rents allow 
an increase in net social benefits. Subsidies negotiated by productive organizations 
may enhance net social benefits if they enable market failures to be overcome, for 
instance by allowing investments in training or research that may otherwise not have 
taken place. But rent seeking by economic organizations may also create rents that 
reduce net social benefits, for instance if the rents are based on setting up monopolies. 
In a society with many diverse productive organizations, there are likely to be 
feedback mechanisms to limit negative outcomes. If rent seeking by a coalition of 
economic organizations threatens the interests of too many organizations outside the 
coalition, the latter are likely to respond with political activity to counter this rent 
seeking. Thus, outcomes of rent seeking in advanced countries are often damaging, 
but feedback mechanisms are likely to ensure (at least most of the time) that the 
evolution of rent seeking does not spiral out of control in the direction of economic 
non-viability.  
 
The relationship between economic and political organizations is very different in 
developing countries. High capability economic organizations that can generate 
significant surpluses are by definition scarce. They are not likely to collectively 
generate enough of a surplus to pay for the protection of generalized property rights as 
a public good, nor enough of a surplus to make legally generated rents sufficient to 
satisfy political organizations. Moreover, the property rights required for modern 
productive activities will not yet have emerged, and historically inherited property 
rights structures are likely to be inappropriate for modern productive organizations 
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(Khan 2009a). From the perspective of political organizations, these features 
significantly affect their dominant strategies. The absence of many legal rents means 
that rent seeking goals can only be pursued by targeting the creation of informal and 
often illegal rents. The fact that governance agencies cannot enforce formal rights in 
these contexts also means that rent-creation based on violating these rights is viable.  
 
 
Figure 1 Relationships between economic and political organizations 
 
 
These interdependent relationships between economic and political organizations and 
the enforcement of rules by formal and informal enforcement organizations are 
summarized in Figure 1. The two parts of the figure identify in simplified form some 
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of the differences between advanced and developing countries. In reality, most 
countries are somewhere in between these ideal types, and economic development 
gradually allows poor countries to acquire increasing characteristics of advanced one. 
However, the simplified picture can help to identify some of the differences in the 
relationships between different types of organizations in richer and poorer countries. 
In advanced countries, most economic organizations have high productive capabilities 
and most of them generate surpluses. As a result, economic organizations can pay 
significant taxes that allow the enforcement of formal rules by the formal bureaucratic 
agencies of the state, and also provide enough resources in the budget to enable 
formal legal rent seeking to be attractive for political organizations. Economic 
organizations also contribute to the financing of political organizations so that many 
political organizations are directly aligned with the interests of economic 
organizations.  
 
These factors can help to explain not only why formal rights are adequately protected 
in advanced countries, but also why much of the rent seeking by political 
organizations is constrained within legal rules. The formal bureaucratic organizations 
referred to in the figure are state agencies involved in the enforcement and transfers of 
rights. These include agencies of the bureaucracy, the police and the legal 
enforcement framework as well as fiscal agencies that are involved in formal 
redistribution. Typically advanced countries enjoy ‘good governance’ because these 
bureaucratic organizations are effective in the enforcement of formal institutional 
rules and in transferring incomes in accordance with formally agreed rules. Political 
organizations can seek to create changes in incomes by changing formal rules, 
including rules for redistributing resources through the budget. In any case they are 
not likely to seek rents that significantly harm the economic viability of the 
productive sector as the latter after all is the source of the formal rents available for 
redistribution through the tax system and also contributes significantly towards the 
running costs of political organizations through its political contributions and other 
‘rent-seeking expenditures’.  
 
The second part of Figure 1 shows a very different set of relationships between 
organizations in developing countries. A critical difference in initial conditions is that 
economic organizations do not have the capabilities to generate significant surpluses. 
This means that the resources available for formal bureaucratic state organizations are 
limited, and both formal enforcement and formal redistribution are likely to be less 
effective than in advanced countries. In addition, the limited resources of economic 
organizations mean that they are unlikely to make significant contributions to formal 
political organizations that are sufficient to constrain their activities in ways that are 
aligned with the interests of the former. Consequently, formal political organizations 
do not dominate the political sphere, and a variety of informal political organizations 
play a significant role. The informality of these political organizations refers to the 
fact that the resources that fund them and the rents that they generate for their 
members and supporters are not themselves ‘formal’. Their funding may come from a 
variety of grey sources or by sharing rents generated for economic organizations that 
could not be generated or defended if they were transparent. As a result, formal 
political organizations in developing countries may operate with a large element of 
informality and they may also be closely aligned with entirely informal political 
organizations. The latter can range from mafia-like enforcement organizations to 
informally constituted networks of patrons and clients. Examples of the activities of 
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informal political organizations include the informal protection of the rights of 
economic organizations (for a share of the profit), the informal allocation of public 
resources that can amount to informal redistribution, but ultimately also predatory 
expropriation from economic organizations that amounts to a destruction of their 
formal rights.  
 
Thus, in some cases, informal enforcement may simply enforce formal rights for an 
additional price but often formal rights may also be altered as a result of informal 
enforcement. For instance, a firm may have a formal right to acquire land but property 
rights may be so weakly enforced that the market transaction costs of acquiring land 
may be too high. A relationship with an informal political organization with 
enforcement capabilities may enable a firm to acquire land using informal 
negotiations, informal enforcement of the agreed contracts and so on. The price at 
which it acquires the land may be similar to a notional market price and the informal 
activity may then be simply described as a mechanism for reducing transaction costs. 
On the other hand, the political organization could also use its informal power to 
reduce the price to much below the market price and claim a share of the informal 
rents that are thereby generated. In the latter case, informal enforcement could 
effectively attenuate the rights of landholders or even destroy their rights if their land 
is expropriated. Indeed, in the typical developing country context it is difficult to 
assess what a notional market price would be because many significant land and asset 
transactions can simply not happen without a substantial involvement of informal 
political enforcers.  
 
Apart from the fact that economic organizations in developing countries do not have 
the capability to finance the enforcement of formal rights, there is a further problem 
that is more subtle. The formal institutional structure in developing countries is often 
modelled on advanced countries and reflects the requirements of modern economic 
organizations. This is not surprising because apart from the natural emulation of more 
advanced countries, it is reasonable to expect that as economic organizations in poorer 
countries become more productive, they will actually need formal institutions that are 
similar to ones in more advanced countries. But initially, formal economic and 
political organizations are weak and politically marginal. Formal institutions like 
corporate laws or rules for organizing elections, if they could be properly enforced, 
would generate distributions of benefits for organizations that would be significantly 
out of line with the actual relative power of these organizations. Modern economic 
organizations are still weak and lack competitive capabilities. The organizers of 
formal politics are also relatively weak relative to the informal networks within 
political organizations. The powerful organizations in such a society are those that 
base themselves on informal organizations based on patron-client networks. An 
adherence to formal institutional rules that implicitly favour formal economic and 
political organizations would clearly generate results that would be out of line with 
the real distribution of power. This is another way of explaining why significant 
informal adjustments in the operation of formal institutions are necessary and 
inevitable for generating rents for powerful organizations in such a society. These 
informal rents and rent allocation decisions bring about a distribution of incomes that 
is more closely aligned with the actual distribution of organizational power and 




The gap between the theory and reality of formal institutions in developing countries 
is therefore not just the effect of weak enforcement but is more usually the result of 
systematic modifications in the operation of formal institutions brought about by the 
activities of informal enforcement organizations. Economic organizations in 
developing countries readily adapt to these opportunities, and many of them do very 
well by collaborating actively with political organizations to create new rents. Some 
of these rents may be damaging for the overall economy and others may not be, but 
the feedback mechanisms constraining the rent seeking by political organizations are 
weaker in this context.  These structural features imply that the formal agencies of the 
state cannot be reformed or strengthened to become more like state agencies in 
advanced countries without corresponding changes in the capabilities and therefore 
the relative power of other types of organizations. This has important implications for 
our understanding of governance reforms in developing countries that typically focus 
on strengthening the formal bureaucratic enforcement and service delivery agencies of 
the state. To some extent the formal governance capabilities of these organizations are 
of course amenable to policy, but significant changes in the direction of creating a 
rule-following ‘Weberian’ state require many interdependent changes in the systemic 
interaction between organizations as shown in Figure 1. 
6. Political Settlements and Institutions 
For a society to reproduce itself, its institutions and organizations must interact in a 
way that allows at least a minimum level of economic activity and political stability. 
The institutional rules (both formal and informal) and the organizations responding to 
these institutional rules must be interacting in a way that allows minimum economic 
and political conditions to be achieved. Given the features of different types of 
organizations in a society, the formal and informal institutional structure influences 
their activity and therefore the economic and political viability of social reproduction. 
If economic organizations get sufficient formal and informal protection and support to 
pursue their productive activities, the minimum level of economic viability can be met 
or surpassed. At the same time, all organizations and in particular political 
organizations must be sufficiently satisfied with the distribution of incomes and 
benefits coming to them to keep their attempts at changing institutional rules within 
bounds that maintain the minimum level of political stability for social reproduction 
to continue. Organizations are always mobilizing to change or modify institutions in 
their interests and no society is static in this sense. But if existing institutions or 
proposed changes threaten the interests of powerful organizations the result can be an 
increase in social conflict and mobilization that has significant effects on political 
stability. Beyond a point, the social order can begin to unravel, but normally long 
before that, institutions are likely to change incrementally in response to 
organizational pressures provided that economic viability can also be sustained. 
Sometimes, however, societies pass the point of no return and discontinuous changes 
in institutional arrangements follow.  
 
As long as a society is not in a crisis, the interaction between its organizations and its 
institutional structure sustains, by definition, a reproducible macro-political order 
which satisfies the minimum requirements of economic and political viability. We 
describe a reproducible macro-political order as a political settlement. The critical 
feature of a political settlement is that at the social level it is an operational 
equilibrium in the sense that organizations collectively operate in a stable manner 
with operational features that can be identified over time and the institutions that 
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support these operational features are themselves stable and reproducible over time. 
An operational equilibrium is based on organizations achieving a mix of formal and 
informal institutions, and in the case of developing countries, possibly significant 
informal adjustments in the operation of formal institutions in ways that allow the 
minimum economic and political viability conditions to be met. The operational 
equilibrium is never absolute because institutions and the balance of power between 
different types of organizations are always changing. Nevertheless, if significant 
features of an operational equilibrium are identifiable over time, it is useful to identify 
and analyse the system as a political settlement. 
 
The stability of an operational equilibrium can itself vary along a range and as a 
simplification we will find it useful to distinguish between strong, moderate and weak 
levels of operational equilibrium. A strong equilibrium describes the most stable 
political settlement, where institutions closely support the interests of dominant 
organizations and overall levels of social conflict are therefore very low. In this case, 
the broad features of the institutional order does not face concerted challenges from 
organizations and the structure of both are likely to be reproducible over many years. 
Political settlements in many advanced countries are a strong operational equilibrium 
in this sense even though they are always evolving at the margins. A moderate 
operational equilibrium is one where conflicts or inconsistencies in the balance 
between organizations and institutions result in persistent moderate levels of social 
conflict. The persistence of conflict increases the probability that the overall features 
of the political settlement could change relatively soon. Nevertheless, the broad 
features of a moderate operational equilibrium can last for many years, though with 
moderate levels of ongoing conflict. A weak operational equilibrium is the most 
vulnerable variety and while this society is still not in a full crisis, there are 
irreconcilable differences between organizational interests and institutions in some 
parts of the system resulting in persistent high levels of conflict. The conflict is not 
high enough for the social arrangements to begin to collapse, which is why the 
institutional and organizational structure can still be counted as a political settlement, 
but there is a higher probability here of a crisis very soon. The weakness of the 
operational equilibrium is measured by levels of conflict: its features can nevertheless 
be reproduced over many years. Clearly there is a range of variation in the stability of 
the equilibrium described by a political settlement, and these can be broadly identified 
by the equilibrium level of social conflict, repression or violence that is a feature of 
the social equilibrium each case.  
 
The relevance of identifying features of political settlements is twofold. First, at the 
micro-level, the effects of introducing new institutions will depend on the political 
settlement that is operating at the societal level as the latter will affect the ways in 
which a particular institution is likely to be enforced or modified. Secondly, the 
political settlement defines the feasibility of different directions of institutional reform 
in terms of the consequences for conflict and stability. For both these reasons, the 
political settlement is critical for analysing the statics and dynamics of institutional 
performance. The interdependence between institutions and organizations defining the 
political settlement at the social level is summarized in Figure 2. Institutions include 
both formal and informal institutions and informal modifications of formal 
institutions. Organizations include economic, political, state organizations and 
informal enforcement organizations. One direction of causality runs from institutions 
to the distribution of power across organizations. Institutions define or describe the 
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opportunities, rights and obligations of organizations of different types and therefore 
determine the distribution of incomes across organizations. The distribution of 
incomes in turn contributes to the relative power of different organizations to engage 
in activities to protect their interests. However, this is not a determinate relationship 
because relative incomes are not the only source of the relative power of 
organizations. The ability to organize and engage in influencing activities also 
depends on the relative organizational abilities and legitimacy of organizations. The 
reverse direction of causality is from the distribution of power across organizations to 
their activity that determines the evolution of institutions. If the distribution of 
incomes that an institutional structure supports is out of line with the actual power of 
organizations, attempts to enforce these institutional rules is likely to result in activity 
to change these institutions. The iteration is likely to continue till the system achieves 
some degree of equilibrium between the interests supported by institutions and the 
relative power of organizations. Implicit in this equilibrium is the achievement of 
levels of economic activity and political conflict that are sustainable.  
 
Sustainability implies that economic outcomes at least allow economic reproduction 
and that both economic and political outcomes are acceptable given the expectations 
of powerful organizations in that society. As the structure and interests of 
organizations can vary, all societies are not tending towards a unique political 
settlement. Differences in the initial conditions describing the organizational power of 
different types of organizations and historically prior institutional trajectories can 
result in very different political settlements in countries that have similar resource 
endowments or similar levels of economic development. At the same time, the degree 
of variation that is possible in political settlements is also not indefinitely high. By 
looking for the interdependent features that limit variations in how political 
settlements are put together, we can get an analytical handle on how institutions 
operate in different contexts. When an institutional and organizational structure 
becomes reproducible the institutional structure sustains the distribution of power 
across organizations and the operation of organizations in generating economic and 
political outcomes in turn allows existing institutions to be protected and reproduced. 
 
 
Figure 2 Political Settlements as Macro-Political Systems 
 
Organizations can be expected to use a variety of mechanisms to ensure that the 
institutional structure will protect their interests. These mechanisms range from 
spending money in political activities that seek to change the legal framework to 
activity that include engaging in conflict or violence to persuade governments to 
change institutional structures. All of these activities can be broadly described as ‘rent 
23 
 
seeking’. In advanced countries, the rent-seeking process is likely to be largely legal 
and formal (following legal rules), and the changes brought about are likely to be 
changes in formal institutions. In developing countries, both the process of 
influencing and the eventual institutional outcome are likely to have large elements of 
informality.  
 
The relative power of organizations in Figure 2 can be measured by their holding 
power; the ability of a particular organization to hold out in actual or potential 
conflicts against other organizations, including the enforcement organizations of the 
state. The organization that can survive longest in a conflict with organizations with 
contrary interests is likely to be able to achieve a change in formal or informal 
institutions in line with its interests. If competing organizations agree in their 
assessments of their respective relative power, conflicts are unlikely because 
institutions will adapt to reflect the interests of more powerful organizations. Conflicts 
happen when competing organizations do not accept a distribution of benefits as 
reflecting their true relative power. Conflicts are essentially a mechanism for 
establishing both a shared understanding of relative power and a distribution of 
benefits that is in line with this distribution of holding power. Holding power is in 
turn a function of a number of economic, political and other characteristics of 
organizations. Holding power is partly based on economic power, because the ability 
to hold out in a conflict can be aided by the ability of an organization to spend money 
to protect its interests. But holding power is also based on the political ability of an 
organization to organize collective action: to mobilize its supporters to absorb and 
inflict costs during conflicts, to mobilize ideologies to consolidate and keep members 
committed and to create links with other organizations that enhance its holding power. 
 
Holding power is thus correlated to some extent with economic power, but is also 
based on other organizational capabilities. Organizations that have access to greater 
economic resources enjoy an advantage in terms of holding power but this may be 
outweighed by the holding power that other organizations can muster based on their 
greater ability to absorb pain during conflicts, or to inflict pain by mobilizing 
supporters using non-economic resources like ideology or social relationships. This is 
why holding power cannot be reduced to a narrow reading of economic power: richer 
organizations do not always win in conflicts. However, if an organization is powerful 
even when it does not generate significant incomes, it can only sustain its relative 
power over time if it is successful in using its power to modify formal institutions or 
engage in informal enforcement activities to generate additional incomes for itself. If 
it does this, its non-economic sources of power can be reinforced and reproduced over 
time, but not otherwise.  
 
This is another way of understanding why informality in the enforcement of 
institutions and the informal modification of many formal institutions are so deeply 
embedded and difficult to change in developing countries. The informality is part of 
the operational equilibrium that ensures that the overall institutional structure is 
acceptable to and compatible with the interests of the organizational structure. In 
contrast, in advanced countries, the formal institutional structure supports formal 
economic organizations that happen to have high capabilities and therefore dominate 
society in economic and political terms. Their dominant holding power in turn means 
that they can directly and indirectly pay to enforce the formal institutions that support 
their existence. The operational equilibrium between institutions and the distribution 
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of power across organizations in advanced countries is achieved through the 
enforcement of formal institutions that support the dominance of powerful 
competitive economic organizations. These organizations pay for the enforcement of 
formal institutions because the latter protect their interests and this ensures the 
operational equilibrium. 
 
Reproducibility in a political settlement requires both political and economic viability. 
In any political settlement there is always ongoing political activity to change 
institutions and this contestation results in a level of political conflict that is the 
‘normal’ or equilibrium level of conflict for that political settlement. A stable political 
settlement has a strong operational equilibrium, which means that institutions enjoy a 
high level of support from organizations while enabling economic viability. The 
equilibrium level of political conflict is therefore likely to be low. At the other end, in 
a weak operational equilibrium, the political settlement is vulnerable and involves a 
significant level of contestation. Here, there is a significant mismatch between the 
distribution of benefits supported by the institutional structure and the distribution of 
power between organizations. The persistent level of political instability is likely to be 
high as powerful organizations continue to contest the institutional structure. The 
evolutionary path out of vulnerability is not necessarily simple. It may not be 
achieved simply through institutional changes that bring institutions into line with the 
political power of organizations. Such an adjustment may not necessarily be 
sustainable unless these changes also achieve economic viability. If the political 
organizations contesting institutions are political organizations or informal 
enforcement organizations, too great a degree of adjustment in their interest may 
result in a precipitate decline in economic viability and be resisted by economic 
organizations and some state organizations that fear a social collapse. Vulnerable 
political settlements based on a weak operational equilibrium can therefore persist 
with high levels of conflict if there are structural trade-offs between economic and 
political viability.  
 
As long as the minimum economic and political viability conditions are met, the 
broad features of the institutional-organizational structure may be reproducible and 
changes are likely to be incremental and path-dependent. Indeed, most of the time the 
evolution of institutions and organizations with any type of political settlement 
(strong, moderate or weak) is incremental and path dependent. Individual institutions 
and organizations evolve within the limits set by this macro-level political settlement, 
though the political settlement will itself be changing in an evolutionary way as the 
distribution of power between organizations gradually changes. A social crisis only 
emerges if economic or political viability conditions cannot be met. The crisis can 
lead to a significant and non-incremental restructuring of institutions and 
organizations. These discontinuous changes in the path of social evolution can be 
described as discontinuous changes in the political settlement.  
 
The minimum level of economic activity and political stability that avoids a crisis 
depends on the expectations of critical organization and can vary across societies. 
Some poor societies can have reproducible political settlements despite low growth, 
substantial poverty and considerable political instability and even violence. The 
turbulence may be sustainable for some time if no coalition of organizations has the 
holding power to drive a change in the institutional structure towards a new and more 
sustainable equilibrium. Thus, a weak operational equilibrium can reproduce itself 
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with high levels of conflict or low growth or both, the result being a vulnerable 
political settlement. The existence of a political settlement therefore does not imply 
that the economic or political outcomes are desirable or that there is an absence of 
conflict. Nor does vulnerability necessarily mean that the political settlement will 
collapse into crisis. A political settlement only implies that a combination of 
institutions and organizations have achieved reproducibility by achieving minimum 
levels of economic and political conditions. The distinctions between political 
settlements in terms of the strength of the operational equilibrium refer only to the 
levels of political instability and contestation, and therefore the likelihood of change.  
 
7. Political Settlements in Developing Countries and the Implications for Policy 
The differences in the distribution of power across organizations that describe the 
differences between advanced and developing countries can be presented at a high 
level of generalization and abstraction. There are clearly some very broad differences 
in the relative power of different types of organizations between advanced and 
developing countries that can help to identify some critical differences in their 
political settlements. In particular, the better enforcement of formal institutions in 
advanced countries has a structural explanation because the enforcement of formal 
institutions is aligned with the interests of powerful organizations that benefit from 
the enforcement of these institutions. In contrast, in developing countries the weaker 
enforcement of formal institutions is only proximately due to weak technical and 
bureaucratic capabilities of formal enforcement organizations. The latter do indeed 
have limited capabilities, but there are deeper reasons why these capabilities cannot 
be readily improved. The productive organizations that stand most to gain from the 
enforcement of these institutions are too weak in terms of their own capabilities to pay 
for the enforcement of formal institutions and many powerful organizations are able 
to claim income streams precisely because they are able to modify the definition and 
enforcement of formal institutions.  
 
 
Figure 3 A Typology of Political Settlements  
 
Figure 3 summarizes the differences between four broadly defined political 
settlements that are useful for understanding the differences between countries. 
‘Capitalism’ is used as a term to describe an economic system where high-capability 
economic organizations account for the bulk of social production. Economic 
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organizations in advanced economies have been based on private ownership and 
control of capital, though in theory other forms of ownership are possible. But so far, 
the organization of production in advanced economies has been largely capitalist and 
we will restrict our attention to this reality. The capitalist political settlement 
describes an advanced economy where high-capability capitalist economic 
organizations dominate the productive sector. There are obviously significant 
differences within the group of capitalist settlements, with the details of formal 
institutional arrangements differing widely. These differences can explain substantial 
differences in the growth and distributive outcomes across advanced capitalist 
countries. However, all advanced capitalist countries share some common features: in 
all cases modern capitalist economic organizations dominate the economic sector, 
their formal institutions support these organizations, the formal institutions are 
effectively enforced, and their states are generally rule-following.  
 
An economic system based on a large number of high-capability organizations 
requires formal institutional structures to protect their interests and regulate their 
interactions simply because this is the most efficient way to protect the interests of a 
large number of organizations with similar interests. The economic dominance of 
high-capability economic organizations allows them to generate sufficient surpluses 
to dominate the political process based on redistribution, and their surplus is also 
sufficient to enforce the rules that protect the interests of these organizations. The 
mutually supportive relationship between formal economic and political organizations 
described for advanced countries in Figure 1 therefore applies in this case. The 
political settlements here allow the enforcement of formal institutions that support the 
operation of these economic organizations because they are powerful and can ensure 
the enforcement of these formal institutions.  
 
Developing countries are collectively quite different in terms of these characteristics. 
Most developing countries have formal institutional structures that could potentially 
support high-capability economic organizations, and often these institutional 
structures are modelled on more advanced countries. Nevertheless, their economic 
organizations are currently underdeveloped and this is at the root of the weak 
enforcement of formal institutions. Most economic organizations do not have the 
capabilities to engage in competitive economic activities. As a result, the attempt to 
enforce an institutional structure that is appropriate for a capitalist economy inevitably 
results in conflicts of enforcement with organizations that are currently powerful but 
whose activities are not and cannot rapidly become high-capability organizations. 
Many powerful organizations in developing countries (including ostensibly economic 
organizations) have little to gain and possibly much to lose from the enforcement of 
institutional arrangements that assume that they can generate their incomes in 
competitive markets by engaging in productive activities. To protect their incomes 
and ultimately their relative power they understandably seek to modify through 
informal processes the implementation and enforcement of the formal structure of 
rights borrowed from advanced capitalist countries. In other words, the lack of 
‘alignment’ between the current distribution of power across organizations and the 
notional distribution of power that would support the enforcement of formal 
institutions lies at the heart of the social order problem in developing countries.  
 
Thus, it is not surprising that formal institutions are insufficiently enforced in 
developing countries, and informal institutions and informal modifications of formal 
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institutions play an important role. The characteristic feature of developing countries 
is therefore a significant level of informality in the organization of politics and the 
enforcement and modification of formal institutions through informal methods. The 
informality in their economies and in their politics is significant and we describe these 
political settlements as ‘clientelist’, reflecting the personalized and informal nature of 
political organization in these countries. As with the capitalist political settlement, 
there are significant differences within the broad group of clientelist political 
settlements. Countries with these characteristics range from East Asian developmental 
states of the 1960s to states close to economic and social crisis. Nevertheless, all these 
states share some common features: informality in the organization of politics and the 
enforcement or modification of rights using informal methods that go beyond rule-
following enforcement by state organizations. The analysis of growth and 
development and of policy and reform priorities in these contexts has to recognize the 
characteristic features of these political settlements. 
 
The specific informal modifications that formal institutions are subjected to depend 
on the historically inherited distribution of dominant organizations and the particular 
paths of incremental institutional change that are being pursued in particular 
countries. Only when the vast majority of economic organizations have become high-
capability and competitive is the distribution of organizational power likely to support 
a substantial enforcement of formal rules. Before that, informal institutions and 
arrangements, in particular operating through clientelism, play an important role in 
adjusting the distribution of benefits to protect the interests of powerful economic and 
political organizations that are either outside the formal sector or are ostensibly formal 
organizations with significant informal characteristics.  
 
The two other types of political settlement are not directly relevant for developing 
countries but help to understand historical evolution and the extreme cases of crisis. 
The pre-capitalist political settlement describes the organization of developing 
societies before the impact with colonial powers revealed the economic inefficiency 
and backwardness of their economic arrangements. Formal institutions in these pre-
capitalist societies defined the rights of powerful military and bureaucratic 
organizations. These formal rights could be formally enforced because the distribution 
of social benefits supported by formal institutions was aligned with the relative power 
of organizations. Landlords, for instance, possessed formal rights over land and other 
resources and typically had the formal military-organizational power to enforce these 
rights. As a result, pre-capitalist political settlements in Asia and elsewhere did not 
have anything like the modern clientelist political arrangements and informality in 
enforcement that we observe in contemporary developing countries. However, the 
pre-capitalist political settlements did not even potentially support the organization of 
productive enterprises that is the hallmark of modern production that we loosely 
describe as ‘capitalist’. Pre-capitalist systems of social organization were stable in 
their own terms but could not survive exposure to the competition coming from 
countries that were further advanced in terms of the capitalist organization of their 
societies. 
 
The fourth and last type is that of a political settlement in crisis. This is not really a 
normal political settlement but describes a situation where formal institutions have 
effectively collapsed because of the absence of support from powerful organizations. 
This outcome is most likely to describe situations where high levels of political 
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conflict between organizations with incompatible goals prevent the organization of 
activity in formal productive organizations and formal institutions atrophy as a result. 
In these crisis situations the economic activity of society is likely to be carried out by 
informal organizations that use entirely informal methods to protect their activities. In 
extreme cases these societies can become war economies with the result that levels of 
political conflict and violence can reach very high levels. To the extent that a path out 
of the crisis is difficult to find, high levels of conflict and violence can continue for 
long periods. However, unlike a more normal political settlement, reproduction here is 
not based on an operational equilibrium between an institutional and organizational 
structure that reproduces the social structure. Rather, society here is likely to be 
fragmented into a number of non-interactive parts engaged in conflict with other parts 
as in a civil war or in a warlord-run economy. Such a ‘society’ can evolve in sudden 
non-incremental ways through the imposition of a social order by a coalition of 
organizations on others. If this results in a viable political settlement the conflict can 
come down to socially tolerable levels. The outcome then is likely to be some variant 
of a clientelist political settlement.  
 
The developmental transformation is essentially a transition of societies whose 
productive activities are largely organized in low-productivity organizations to ones 
where ‘modern’ productive organizations with high productivity dominate the 
production of goods and services. We are therefore looking at the transition of 
societies with essentially clientelist political settlements towards societies with 
‘capitalist’ political settlements. All developing countries are not making this 
transition at the same pace and along the same trajectory, and some may even be 
retrogressing towards crisis towards the lower-right hand corner of Figure 3. Indeed, 
the next section summarizes the very wide differences that are possible across 
developing countries in the details of their political settlements. These imply very 
different challenges of transformation, and suggest that quite different institutional 
solutions and trajectories may be best in different circumstances.  
 
Certainly, the reform agenda which assumes that developing countries have capitalist 
political settlements are the least likely to be helpful in these contexts. And yet, the 
agenda of reform that assumes that institutional and policy priorities for developing 
countries are to make markets more competitive and efficient and to make 
democracies more competitive and accountable assumes that the monumental 
transformations that led to the emergence of capitalist political settlements in a few 
countries has already happened everywhere. If it has, then a focus on formal 
institutions that sustain the competitiveness of productive organizations that already 
have high capabilities would suffice. These formal institutions could be adequately 
enforced without significant informal adjustments. In theory, such an economy could 
be largely regulated through these formal institutions of low transaction cost markets, 
together with an effective regulatory structure to maintain competition and with a 
state that can effectively deal with important contracting failures, business cycles and 
distributive demands within limits acceptable to the productive sector. But these 
conditions are far away from those that characterize the typical developing country. 
 
The relevance and likely effects of different types of institutional changes depends on 
the characteristics of the overall political settlement. As the share of modern 
economic organizations in the overall economy increases and as these become the 
dominant organizations setting the limits of the polity, a transition to the dominance 
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of formal institutions that support the organization of the economy becomes possible. 
This transition is not instantaneous but can stretch over years or decades. But we 
would expect to see the growth of formalization and of institutions supporting the 
existence of independent organizations contracting with each other under a rule of 
law. We would also expect to see political institutions that engage in formal rent 
seeking within a rule-based system with the limits of distribution set by the political 
and economic acceptability of the dominant economic organizations. These transitions 
are likely to be contested and gradual. For most developing countries the end-state 
does not give useful guidance about what the immediate priorities need to be in terms 
of institutional reform or policy to support the transition along different dimensions, 
and particularly to support economic development. Thus, while we can agree about 
the general features of the capitalist political settlement as the destination for 
developing countries (remembering also the significant institutional and political 
differences between advanced capitalist countries), we need to understand much 
better how developing countries with clientelist political settlements are actually 
organized now. This is important for assessing the likely economic and political 
effects of particular trajectories of institutional change. 
 
The first problem is that when modern productive organizations account for a small 
part of the economy, it is very likely that even the formal property rights over critical 
assets are not appropriately defined. Property rights are complex rules that define 
many dimensions of use-rights and decision-making rights over an asset. They can be 
defined in different ways, but unless the rights defined over the asset are appropriate 
for the requirements of economic development, the rights may actually hamper rather 
than facilitate development. In theory, as long as every dimension of use, allocation 
and decision-making is clearly defined and allocated, the allocation of rights across 
individuals or organizations does not matter. But this is in theory. Every dimension of 
use and decision-making cannot be defined at low cost and the mechanisms of formal 
enforcement of rules are in any case weak in developing countries. Under realistic 
conditions, where transaction costs are not low, the initial definition and allocation of 
rights does matter. If the initial definition of formal rights is inappropriate, value-
enhancing re-allocations of the asset through private contracting in a ‘market’ may be 
effectively precluded. Thus, the problem in developing countries is not just that 
formal institutions are not being adequately enforced, but that the structure of formal 
institutions may also need substantial restructuring over time (Box 1). 
 
Box 1 Land Rights: Missing or Inappropriate? 
The case of land rights provides a good example of how rights can be inappropriately defined. 
Very rarely are rights over land entirely missing in developing countries. The problem is more 
complex: rights do exist, but they are “inappropriate” for enabling the re-allocations of land 
required for economic development. Most developing countries have complex structures of 
land rights that can also vary significantly from region to region within the same country. 
Before the emergence of modern economies, what mattered were the occupancy rights of 
tenants and the right of the state and of landlords to collect taxes and claim a share of the 
surplus produced on the land. Property rights emerged to solve these problems. In the 
zamindari parts of the Indian subcontinent, for example, multiple layers of sub-tenants were 
entitled to a share of the revenue. These right holders could buy and sell their revenue rights 
but the actual peasant who was the occupier of the land suffered no change in land use as a 
result. As land revenue declined in importance, one of the many lower-level ‘sub-tenants’ 
often became the legal owner of the land but the history of multiple revenue rights often left 
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conflicts between land records and tax records and often recorded multiple owners of the 
same land. In Tanzania, collectively owned village land was leased to peasants with a lack of 
clarity about who had priority in deciding changes in land use. In these types of cases, 
different stakeholders possess slightly different rights over the same piece of land and no 
stakeholder may have a clear priority in determining changes in land use through sale. In 
addition, occupants with partial ownership rights may not have bothered to sort out land 
records by contesting conflicting records of other owners because the sale of land had never 
been an issue. Many variants of inappropriate land rights exist in different contexts.  
 
In these contexts, defining and enforcing existing property rights somewhat better will not 
necessarily resolve developmental problems. In the examples above, to enable the market to 
address land use and land allocation problems rights have to be transformed in particular 
ways. What is missing is often a clearly defined right that gives a particular stakeholder the 
right to transfer land to different uses. These changes are likely to be intensely contested and 
take a long time to achieve. In the meantime attempts to transact land can face very high 
transaction costs even if existing rights were somewhat better enforced.  
 
Ironically, informal modifications of formal land rights often happen to enable transactions 
with inappropriate formal rights. For instance, in India with its British colonial past, the 
state’s formal right of eminent domain was often used beyond its formal remit to enable the 
state to acquire land for private investors. But this generated intense social protests and 
opposition in the 2000s. The criticism of this use of informal state power was often entirely 
justified. Genuine investors did need informal assistance but once this was available 
politically-connected investors also acquired land for private real estate development or other 
purposes where the forced acquisition of land from poor peasants at a relatively low price was 
much less easy to justify. 
 
In other countries (including some parts of India, Bangladesh and Pakistan), high transaction 
costs in land markets have led investors to use the informal power of local mafias to negotiate 
land transfers and enforce contracts. These informal power networks often work closely with 
formal state administrative structures and political parties and the dividing line between 
informal and formal arrangements and indeed between crime and politics can be blurred. 
Once again, sometimes the outcomes are beneficial for all sides if there are no alternative 
mechanisms for transferring land to higher-valued uses, but equally, in many cases power and 
politics have been used to expropriate assets of the poor and the less powerful. Underlying the 
problem is a real issue of high transaction cost markets and confused and contradictory rights 
which will take years if not decades to sort out.  
 
(Source: Khan 2004b, 2004a, 2009a) 
 
Apart from many rights being inappropriately defined, state capabilities for enforcing 
rights are also weak for reasons discussed earlier. These capabilities are partly weak 
because of the limited resources available for enforcement activities. But enforcement 
is also weak because powerful organizations do not want strict enforcement. If 
powerful individuals and organisations operating under particular rules support their 
enforcement, not only is it easier to raise the resources to strengthen enforcement, the 
task of enforcement becomes much easier. In advanced countries, most organisations 
have an interest in supporting the enforcement of the formal institutional structure, 
because even if an individual organisation could benefit by free riding, breaking rules 
is not in general essential for the survival of these organisations. The formal 
institutional structure, if properly enforced for everyone, would allow an individual 
organisation to engage in business and survive. Most organisations therefore support 




This is not the case in many developing countries. The formal institutional structure 
(including for instance the structure of property rights over land) often needs to 
change substantially before it can support the activity of many, if not most, 
organisations. This means that most economic organisations in developing countries 
engage in “informal” practices even if the organizations are formally constituted as 
legal entities.  Many of the most powerful economic organisations, including those in 
the formal sector rely on informal modifications of formal rights or they need to 
engage in transactions and contracts that are not supported by formal rules. Both 
require informal access to political power and informal enforcement. As a result most 
organisations whether with apparently formal rights or without are unlikely to support 
every incremental improvement in the enforcement of formal institutions, as 
improvements in some directions may adversely affect the informal activities on 
which their immediate survival depends.  
 
Improvements in the enforcement of some formal institutions can thus face 
widespread resistance in developing countries even from organisations that would 
theoretically benefit in the long run from their proper enforcement. Their resistance 
may not be public because no-one wants to openly support informal arrangements, but 
the resistance may nevertheless be intense. Understanding this paradox is very 
important for designing reforms that can make a difference in developing countries. 
Many firms are involved in activities that violate formal rules simply because the 
formal institutional framework is inappropriately defined and poorly enforced. They 
do this not just to work around red tape and other obstacles, as is commonly 
supposed, but more fundamentally to enforce contracts and to get access to assets for 
which appropriate property rights and markets are not available. A more stringent 
enforcement of the existing formal rules is likely to have a negative impact on many 
firms until a full transition to an appropriate and adequately enforced formal structure 
can take place. But that transition could take decades, and in the meantime a slightly 
better enforcement of some existing rules may worsen the survival chances of 
particular enterprises and organizations. This transitional problem in the enforcement 
of institutions is quite different from the situation in advanced countries and has 
significant implications for planning and implementing reforms.  
 
These observations also apply to institutions and policies addressing market failures 
understood as contracting failures. Weak enforcement capabilities have meant that 
developing countries suffer from significant state failures as well as market failures. 
Taxes, subsidies or regulations can address market failures if they effectively target 
particular problems. This requires that the conditions for a successful outcome are 
monitored effectively and that the incidence of the tax or subsidy or the penalties for 
failing regulatory conditions match the achievement of targets. State failures in this 
context are generally associated with a failure to monitor conditions effectively and 
enforce the allocation of rewards or penalties appropriately. This was frequently the 
case, for example, with efforts by states in developing countries to accelerate 
technology acquisition by infant industries (Box 2). Technology acquisition and 
learning is subject to serious contracting failures in developing countries but success 
requires effective monitoring and disciplining of firms receiving support. Formal rules 
that define the conditions of support and the conditions that need to be fulfilled would 
not work on their own given the general limitations of formal enforcement in all 
developing countries. Successful industrial policy countries typically combined 
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elements of informal pressure, threats and sanctions with formal enforcement 
capabilities to achieve results. In contrast, less successful countries suffered informal 
modifications to their formal policies as powerful organizations were able to pursue 
an easier life by protecting themselves from disciplining.  
 
Box 2 State Failures in Accelerating Technology Acquisition 
The low productive capabilities of economic organizations are amongst the most serious 
constraints on development in developing countries. Most of the potential workforce has not 
previously worked in a modern factory and have limited experience of quality control, 
timekeeping, and the challenges of meeting international competitiveness. This applies not 
just to production line workers but often to managers and entrepreneurs too. Buying the 
machines is the easy part of investment. The difficult part is to set up the factory in such a 
way that internal bottlenecks are minimized, high levels of quality can be maintained, wastage 
of inputs minimized and targets met on time. This requires learning-by-doing within the 
factory as the different stakeholders work out the most appropriate way to set up and manage 
a competitive factory, and the specific arrangements that work in a particular country have to 
be worked out by trial and error. During that process the stakeholders have to put in a lot of 
effort and therefore have to have incentives and compulsions to do so. 
 
The contracting problem emerges because during the experimentation and learning-by-doing 
the enterprise is by definition not fully profitable and may even be making losses. Someone 
has to finance the low or negative profits with the expectation of higher profits in the future. 
This is a serious contractual problem in developing countries. Private financiers are not likely 
to invest in an enterprise which is not already competitive because they are unable to enforce 
contracts that ensure high levels of effort and allow them to withdraw their investment in case 
effort by stakeholders within the enterprise turns out to be poor. 
   
This market failure has elicited a range of state responses that have sometimes been referred 
to as “industrial policy” and sometimes as “investment and technology policy”. At its heart 
has been an attempt to solve the contractual problem of financing learning-by-doing by 
providing finance to “infant industries”. The instruments have ranged from import controls 
and tariffs that raised domestic prices and provided “rents” to finance the learning period, to 
low interest loans, equity support, and other forms of subsidies. But these strategies only 
worked in a few countries (mainly in East Asia) where the state had the capability to monitor 
outcomes and the enforcement capacity to withdraw support if the pace of progress was slow. 
In the absence of these capabilities infant industries “refused to grow up” or achieved limited 
competitiveness, and the policies eventually had to be abandoned. Given the limitations of 
formal enforcement in all developing countries, the success of some countries was based on 
their ability to deploy a combination of formal and informal mechanisms to enforce the 
conditions required for ensuring high levels of effort in a context of learning. 
 
(Source: Khan 2009b; Khan and Blankenburg 2009)  
 
Policies that seek to improve the productive capabilities of particular enterprises face 
another problem. Formal rules have an implicit political requirement which is that the 
policy should be neutral across regions, classes and sectors. Neutrality means that 
individuals or organizations with similar rights should be treated equally, not that all 
individuals or organizations should possess similar rights. For instance, neutrality 
means that all owners of similar assets should be taxed at the same rate; it does not 
mean that all individuals should own the same value of assets. But even this 
understanding of neutrality cannot be sustained in a developing country. The creation 
of new institutions and property rights or the upgrading of technological capabilities 
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of some organizations cannot be neutral. The developing country state cannot treat all 
individuals with the same rights equally because it is changing the structure of rights. 
Some individuals are inevitably privileged and others find their previous rights are 
now worth a lot less or have disappeared. In addition, given the low level of initial 
capabilities, everyone who may have been similarly entitled to gain new rights or 
claim similar support for capability development is likely to fail to obtain similar 
rights in practice.  
 
Hence, the role of the state is fundamentally different in developing countries, a 
difference we mark by describing the role of the state as transformational (Khan 
2004a). A transformational state is not, and cannot be, neutral and its functions are not 
limited to the usual textbook ones of service delivery. This raises further problems for 
specifying the formal rules of engagement for a state in a developing country as 
formal rules need to be neutral at least in the limited sense of treating all individuals 
and organizations with similar initial rights equally. Of course, this does not mean that 
all developing country states perform their transformational tasks well: many if not 
most may be performing rather poorly. There is no guarantee that powerful 
organizations and the state will interact to change institutions and rights in productive 
directions. The state may even be retrogressive if its interaction with society results in 
institutions and rights being altered in adverse ways. The response to this must be to 
identify the organization of the society and the incremental transformational strategies 
that are most likely to be implementable and have a significant impact. The 
expectation that a better enforcement of existing rights and a reliance on enforcing 
institutions that enable market contracting will do the trick is in general likely to be 
very wrong for the typical developing country.  
 
These “technical” requirements of an appropriate reform agenda constitute one side of 
the reform challenge. The other part of the challenge is to understand the organisation 
of the political forces in that society and why they may support or resist policies that 
can be identified in abstract as feasible in terms of addressing important market 
failures. A feasible reform strategy has to be both economically beneficial and 
consistent with the broad configuration of political forces in that society, so that its 
implementation will not result in a political breakdown. Politics in all countries 
involves redistributing incomes through the political process, in other words, politics 
always involves creating and allocating redistributive rents. If powerful groups in 
society demand income redistribution, political stability requires organising this 
redistribution. Redistribution can have negative effects on incentives and induce rent-
seeking costs, but the benefit is the political stability that may otherwise not have 
been achieved. Redistribution is necessary but not sufficient for stability, and some 
redistribution can undermine stability if losers strongly resist the redistribution.  
 
In advanced countries, the political redistribution that keeps societies together is 
organised through a formal process of taxing and re-allocating resources through the 
budget. In contrast, in developing countries a significant part of the redistributive 
rents that keeps society together have to be organised and allocated outside the budget 
because the formal sector is not big enough for formal taxation to provide all the 
resources required for political stability. Instead, the ruling coalition has to generate or 
allow enough informal rent creation for its most powerful supporters to hold together. 
These rents often appear as informally allocated privileges or as political corruption. 
The difficulty is that sometimes political corruption is indeed very damaging as 
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political power can be used to expropriate from productive sectors. But equally some 
political corruption is unavoidable as it describes the informal rent generation and 
allocation that achieves political stability in these contexts (Khan 2002, 2005b, 2005a, 
2006). But whether or not corruption achieves political stability, informal rent 
generation can pose problems for strengthening the transformational capabilities of 
the state. For instance, the political imperatives facing the ruling coalition may induce 
it to concede rents to powerful constituencies in ways that undermine developmental 
rent management. If the owners of enterprises receiving financing for learning happen 
to be politically powerful, the state cannot credibly impose conditions on them for 
performance. The result of this rent capture means that potentially developmental 
rents become redistributive rents with adverse consequences for development. A 
reform strategy that aimed to enhance the enforcement capabilities of particular state 
agencies would not make much headway if it did not recognise that the problem was 
essentially political and not bureaucratic or technocratic. 
 
Understanding these political constraints properly is the first step in designing 
effective institutional capacity-building strategies. Many reform strategies fail simply 
because from the perspective of the ruling coalition they were never meant to work. 
An analysis of the political settlement can help to identify the types of reforms that 
are likely to be implementable. This analysis can not only help to identify the reforms 
that are likely to be implementable in that context but also to examine whether the 
configuration of power in that society has to change if development is to be 
sustainable. In some contexts, the political configuration may be so adverse that it 
may be difficult to envisage any incremental strategy that would make a significant 
impact. The distribution of power across organisations in a society is not an 
exogenous variable for the reform process in the medium term. The configuration of 
power can be changed through political mobilisation and the establishment of new 
political organizations. These political strategies can allow the construction of a new 
ruling coalition that may face different constraints in managing particular rents. 
Indeed, a very constrained economic future may persuade some elites to take the 
initiative to reconfigure the political settlement of the country.  
 
8. Differences between Developing Countries 
The distinction between capitalist and clientelist political settlements identifies broad 
differences in the ways in which formal institutions operate in advanced and 
developing countries. There are in addition many important differences between 
developing countries associated with differences in the relative power of 
organizations. Since organizational power is only partly based on economic power 
(particularly in developing countries), the history of organizational development 
across countries is important for understanding these differences. Some differences 
can be traced to differences in the organization of pre-capitalist societies that 
determines ‘initial conditions’ in terms of the organization and legitimacy of different 
groups during the transition to capitalism. In addition, in many countries new classes 
and groups were organized as a result of the social engineering carried out by colonial 
powers. Colonial strategies of creating social balances for supporting colonial rule 
often left significant legacies in terms of the relative power and legitimacy of different 
social groups and their organizations. In many cases these social balances were 
simply reproduced after the departure of the colonial power and continued to evolve 




The relative power of organizations can be compared along different dimensions and 
at different levels of detail depending on the question being addressed. To keep the 
comparisons simple, it is obviously necessary to select a few important dimensions. 
The complex institutional-organizational structure of any society can be broken down 
into a number of subsystems: political, economic or even more narrowly defined ones, 
depending on the problem being analysed. The operational equilibrium of institutions 
and organizations can then be examined for each subsystem. Clearly, the 
characteristics of any subsystem will depend on other subsystems and subsystems are 
also likely to overlap to some extent. As a result, when analysing features of the 
operational equilibrium in any subsystem we have to take into account the 
characteristics of other subsystems in that society. Subsystems within a society can 
have different levels of stability and they can have a direct or indirect effect on 
economic outcomes by affecting the institutions relevant for economic activity. The 
features of the overall political settlement can then be identified by analysing the 
interaction of its critical subsystems.  
 
Three critical subsystems describe important characteristics of the overall political 
settlement. These correspond to the domains of the three important types of 
organizations identified in Figure 1: political organizations (including informal 
enforcement organizations) that are primarily engaged in broadly defined rent-seeking 
activities; economic organizations that are primarily engaged in productive activities 
(but are also likely to engage in parallel rent-seeking activities) and formal 
bureaucratic organizations of the state charged with the implementation of formal 
redistributive and enforcement strategies (even though they may also be involved in 
substantial informal activities). The activities of these organizations are focused in 
one of three parallel subsystems though clearly their activities cut across all 
subsystems. First, there is the subsystem of institutions and organizations that define 
the organization of the polity. Here, the main players are political organizations, 
which interact with formal and informal institutional rules guiding their activity. The 
relative power of political organizations that make up the ‘ruling coalition’ is 
important in determining how institutions and policies are formulated and the 
effectiveness of their implementation. A second subsystem defines the organization of 
governance in a society. Here the main players are bureaucratic organizations 
involved in implementing the formal institutional rules that define the formal structure 
of governance. The relative power and capabilities of different agencies is an 
important determinant of the types of institutions that can be enforced. Finally, the 
organization of the productive sector describes the organizations involved in the 
production of goods and services and the institutional structure guiding their 
activities. Here, the distribution of power between productive organizations and vis-à-
vis other types of organizations determines the likely effects of different types of 
formal rules guiding economic activity. The three subsystems overlap and influence 
each other but their characteristics can be separately examined as a starting point. 
Together, the broad features of these subsystems define important differences within 
the broadly defined clientelist political settlement. These differences in turn help to 
explain differences in the operation and effectiveness of institutions across countries.  
 
The analysis of the operational equilibrium within a subsystem can be simplified by 
focusing on the distribution of power across the most important organizations relevant 
for that subsystem. This is one side of the two-sided balance between institutions and 
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organizations that an operational equilibrium represents. However, it is more difficult 
to identify the features of an institutional structure precisely because organizations 
can modify the operation of formal institutions in informal ways that may not be 
immediately obvious. It is usually easier to reduce variations in the relative power of 
organizations to a few critical dimensions that are relatively easier to observe. 
Moreover, the distribution of power between organizations is usually more persistent 
compared to changes in formal institutional rules. A change in formal institutional 
rules without an accommodating change in the distribution of power across affected 
organizations is likely to only result in subtle modifications in the enforcement and 
implementation of these institutions so that the outcomes are acceptable to powerful 
organizations. These outcomes could be very different from the outcomes associated 
with the same formal institutional rules in other countries where the distribution of 
power between organizations was different. Indeed, one of the main puzzles that we 
want to address is that apparently similar formal institutional structures appear to 
perform very differently across countries.   
 
A description of the relative holding power of organizations is therefore a useful 
starting point for a classification and analysis of variations within subsystems defining 
political settlements. The holding power of organizations relevant for the subsystem 
will determine the informal adjustments in formal institutions that are required for an 
operational equilibrium to be sustained. If the required informal adjustments have not 
yet happened, or are heavily contested, or if they result in unviable economic 
outcomes, the subsystem will be subject to instability and contestation and the 
operational equilibrium (at least in that subsystem) is likely to be weak. Even if there 
is an operational equilibrium of some variety, differences in the relative power of 
organizations can explain significant differences in informal adjustments of formal 
institutions that result in different development outcomes across countries. An 
examination of organizational power and its evolution therefore provides a lens for 
examining the parallel evolution of formal and informal institutions in these 
subsystems and ultimately in the political settlement as a whole.  
 
In the case of political organizations, we focus on two dimensions of variation in the 
relative power of organizations. The first is the power of political organizations within 
the ruling coalition compared to organizations that are currently outside. The intensity 
of the contestation between them helps to determine the time horizon of the ruling 
coalition and the types of institutions and policies they are likely to support. The 
second dimension looks at the relative power of higher-level political organizations 
within the ruling coalition compared to lower-level ones. This affects the capacity of 
the ruling coalition to enforce the institutions it has decided are important. In the case 
of bureaucratic organizations we focus on two similar dimensions: the relative power 
of lead bureaucratic agencies compared to other horizontally located agencies and the 
relative power of higher-level agencies relative to lower-level ones. Finally, in the 
case of productive organizations where relative power is more closely connected to 
economic capabilities, we focus on the productive capabilities of organizations 
relative to their competitors in other sectors and countries, and also their holding 
power relative to other types of organizations in that society. These help to explain 
both the types of formal institutional rules that can be enforced in each subsystem and 
the degree to which they can be enforced. In some cases the operational equilibrium 
could be quite close to the formal institutional structure, in other cases quite far 
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removed. The stability of the operational equilibrium can also vary widely, as can the 
implications of the subsystem for the pace and direction of economic development.  
 
The three subsystems are closely related. Indeed, the interdependence shown in 
Figure 1 suggests that strong bureaucratic enforcement capabilities or political 
organizations concentrating on formal rent seeking are unlikely when economic 
organizations are weak and have low capabilities. However, this does not mean that 
the relative power and capabilities of different types of organizations are perfectly 
correlated such that the features any subsystem are determined by the features of 
others. Indeed, there is a substantial openness in the variants of organizational 
strategies within a subsystem that may prove to be viable given the characteristics of 
other subsystems, as well as considerable resistance to change (and therefore path 
dependence) once the relative power of different organizations has been established. 
This implies that subsystems with significant differences in their features can be 
reproducible across countries that otherwise appear to be similar and are at similar 
levels of development. Clearly, by describing the relevant differences in 
organizational power across countries that are sustainable we are not explaining the 
origin of these differences. That cannot be done without reference to the historical 
evolution of different countries. However, an analysis of currently existing variations 
in the relative power of organizations along a number of dimensions can explain 
significant differences in the institutional performance of countries and the trajectories 
of their development.  
 
The Organization of the Polity  
Political organizations and their interplay with the institutions defining the rules of 
political engagement define the organization of a polity. The institutional rules in this 
subsystem primarily describe the rights and responsibilities of political organizations 
and the methods they may use to gain power. Institutional rules in different countries 
can be differentiated at various levels of detail. A broad distinction is often made 
between democratic and authoritarian institutional rules. Under democratic 
institutional rules, organizations are relatively free to organize and compete for votes 
in order to form a ruling coalition. The ruling coalition has the right to change lower-
level rules through legislation within limits set by the constitution. Under 
authoritarian arrangements, organizational freedoms are curtailed in different ways, 
affecting the formation of the ruling coalition. Both ‘democratic’ and ‘authoritarian’ 
institutional rules show considerable variation within many further distinctions in the 
rights and constraints that organizations face under each system. In addition, there is a 
significant grey area between democracy and authoritarianism because restrictions on 
organizational freedoms can increase along different dimensions till democracies 
become less free and may ultimately be judged to be authoritarian regimes. On the 
other hand, in every democracy there are restrictions on what organizations can 
legitimately do and restrictions on how they can be set up. The most important point 
from our perspective is that regardless of the institutional rules, the operational 
equilibrium of the political subsystem depends on the relative power of the political 
organizations operating within it and their ability to reproduce this distribution of 
power within the (formal and informal) institutional rules. This is why similar formal 
rules describing the polity can be associated with very different levels of conflict and 




In developing countries, rent-seeking by political organizations very often involves 
informal enforcement and redistributive activities. These are the core activities of 
patron-client networks organized by political entrepreneurs. At the most basic or 
primary level, an effective political organizer will organize supporters-clients who 
will offer their organizational support to the organizer in exchange for a share of the 
rents the network collects. Lower-level organizers can in turn have their own clients 
who are the basis of their own organizational power. The primary political 
organization is therefore pyramidal network of patrons and clients under an 
organizing patron. The viability of the organization depends on its success in 
mobilizing organizational power to carry out enforcement activities for a price and 
mobilize and capture other types of rents. The benefits that are captured are 
distributed down the pyramid to sustain the organization. Larger political 
organizations, including political parties, are simply coalitions of these networks, each 
primary pyramid slotting into an appropriate position in a bigger pyramid depending 
on the organizational power the particular organizer can deploy and the payoffs they 
are able to negotiate from higher-level organizers. Bigger organizations are engaged 
in more significant enforcement and rent capture activities. The constituent primary 
networks participate and benefit depending on the activity in question and the 
informal rules of internal participation and rent sharing. Clearly such structures are 
fluid and cannot be entirely regulated by formal rules. Even when there is an apparent 
formal structure of rules defining say the organization of a political party, the relevant 
internal organization may be based on an informal organization of primary pyramids 
with many of the exchanges within the coalition based on informal negotiations and 
relationships. The pyramid that constitutes the ruling coalition can be characterized 
both by the number and strength of the coalitions it includes and excludes, and the 
power of higher-level organizations vis-à-vis lower-level ones within the ruling 
pyramid. These organizational differences in the construction of the ruling coalition 
have significant implications for the enforcement and operation of the formal 
institutions defining the political structure, and for institutions more generally. 
 
 
Figure 4 The Configuration of Political Organizations and the Ruling Coalition  
 
Figure 4 shows two dimensions of variation in the distribution of power between 
political organizations that are of interest from our perspective. The bi-directional 
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arrows remind us that the range of variation along these dimensions is continuous but 
for ease of exposition the figure divides each range in two. In reality, societies are 
located at varying intermediate positions. The ‘horizontal distribution of power’ 
describes the power of excluded political organizations relative to those within the 
ruling coalition. If excluded coalitions are weak, the ruling coalition is likely to feel 
more secure and adopt a longer time horizon. As excluded organizations become 
more powerful, the ruling coalition is likely to feel more vulnerable even if it resorts 
to the use of repression to ensure its hold on power. At the limit, if excluded coalitions 
become more powerful than the ruling coalition, the latter is unlikely to survive 
irrespective of the institutional methods used for sustaining the ruling coalition.  
 
The relative strength of excluded organizations can be assessed by looking at their 
strategies. The strength of excluded organizations can be measured either by the 
benefits they are able to capture despite their formal exclusion from the ruling 
coalition or by the resistance they put up to their exclusion. But care has to be 
exercised in assessing this resistance. Organizations can appear to be quiescent for 
different reasons. The benign possibility is that excluded organizations are actually 
weak, either because powerful organizations already belong to the ruling coalition or 
because the excluded are currently too disorganized to have significant holding 
power. The less benign possibility is that excluded organizations are quiescent 
because of administrative, legal or military restrictions on their activities. In this case 
their temporary quiescence does not necessarily signal weakness but it may be quite 
difficult to assess how strong they actually are before a conflict breaks out. The more 
intense the capacity of repression, the more likely that excluded organizations are 
actually strong and their exclusion is likely to be unsustainable. Other features of 
political activity may provide an indication of the strength of excluded political 
organizations. In particular, a growth in the bargaining power of lower-level 
organizations within the ruling coalition can indicate that excluded organizations are 
growing in strength. This makes the threat of defection to the opposition a credible 
threat for lower-level organizations within the ruling coalition and can allow them to 
demand more resources. The relative power of excluded organizations is therefore 
closely related to the relative power of lower-level organizations within the ruling 
coalition. We now turn to this second dimension of variation. 
 
This describes the ‘vertical distribution of power’ within the ruling coalition. By 
definition, lower levels in a patron-client hierarchy are weaker and to some extent 
dependent on higher levels. But their relative weakness can vary significantly from a 
situation where they have almost no bargaining power to one where they have the 
ability to dictate the terms on which rents are allocated within the ruling coalition. 
When lower level organizations have little holding power, higher levels can select the 
rent-allocation strategy and select the lower-level organizations required to implement 
these policies and institutions. Under these conditions, higher-level organizations are 
likely to enforce institutions and strategies that maximize the return to the ruling 
coalition and the rents claimed by lower-level organizations are likely to be relatively 
low. In contrast, when lower level organizations have significant holding power, they 
may block policies or institutions that deprive any powerful lower-level organizations. 
Under these conditions, the policy freedom of the coalition leadership is likely to be 
very limited with adverse implications for the total return the ruling coalition can 
generate and the share that lower-level organizations can claim is likely to be higher. 
In this scenario the ruling coalition may be unable to enforce many rules or policies 
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that could otherwise have enhanced the overall net return to society. The constraint on 
enforcement is likely to be the most significant adverse implication of strong lower-
level organizations rather than the distribution of rents in favour of lower-level 
organizations. Moreover, organizations outside the ruling coalition may now find it 
easier to block the enforcement of rules that are against their interests. They will find 
it easy to find one or more lower level organizations within the ruling coalition who 
can (for a share of the rents) block the implementation of particular rules that hurt the 
rents of particular organizations. So for instance, we should expect the disciplining of 
industrial policy conditions to be very weak under these circumstances. The variations 
along these dimensions define a two-dimensional space but Figure 4 simplifies the 
exposition by defining four ‘limiting-case’ variants of the ruling coalition.  
 
Strong Patrimonialism (usually in equilibrium with Developmental States) 
At the top left-hand corner is a ruling coalition whose characteristics of exclusion and 
enforcement we describe as strong patrimonialism. The term patrimonialism here 
refers only to the more or less effective claim of a ruling coalition to rule exclusively 
as of right (its patrimony) and should not be confused with other uses of the term in 
the sociological literature. Clearly, neither the ability to override excluded groups nor 
lower-level organizations within the ruling coalition can be absolute, but one of the 
features of strong patrimonialism is its ability to identify growth strategies from above 
and implement them to a large extent. This can (under certain conditions) result in a 
virtuous cycle of growth where the legitimacy of the ruling coalition is enhanced by 
growth and allows the coalition to continue to enjoy its status of strong 
patrimonialism for some time. In the long run strong patrimonialism cannot be a 
lasting feature of any society as growth is likely to create new and powerful 
organizations outside the ruling coalition. However, if the ruling coalition does not 
accelerate growth fearing such an outcome, its strong patrimonialism status may 
paradoxically come to an end even faster as a result of declining legitimacy and the 
coordination of collective action by excluded groups to challenge the ruling coalition. 
While it lasts, such a ruling coalition has interesting characteristics that can explain 
the success of institutional rules supporting developmental states in some developing 
countries.  
 
An important implication of the limited contestation from horizontally excluded 
groups is that the ruling coalition is likely to have the confidence to adopt a long time 
horizon in its rent seeking. This can help to align its interests with the enforcement of 
institutions required for long-term development as the latter are most likely to 
maximize the net benefit a ruling coalition with a long time horizon. In addition, the 
effective power of higher-level organizations over lower-level ones means that the 
ruling coalition has strong implementation capabilities for enforcing a broad range of 
policies and institutions. Its growth-supporting strategies are therefore less likely to be 
blocked because they threaten the rents of particular organizations. These features 
imply that this is potentially the most developmental coalition, provided the 
institutional rules required for a developmental state emerge, and bureaucratic 
organizations have the technical and bureaucratic capabilities for enforcing and 
managing these institutions. It is also necessary that the economic organizations that 
are assisted with these strategies have the technological capabilities to benefit from 
growth-supporting policies. If these conditions are fulfilled, the emergence of 
institutional rules and governance capabilities appropriate for a developmental state 
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are likely to emerge because the ruling coalition will have strong incentives to move 
in that direction.  
 
Errors of judgement on the part of the leadership or the absence of compelling internal 
or external pressures on the leadership to deliver growth could mean that the 
institutions of a developmental state do not emerge even though they could potentially 
have been enforced. But it is likely that they will emerge because most state 
leaderships are likely to recognize that their leadership positions and legitimacy will 
be much stronger if they can capitalize on their enforcement capabilities to support 
developmental strategies. The same realization is likely to result in efforts to improve 
the capabilities of bureaucratic organizations and their governance capabilities if these 
were weak to begin with. In theory, authoritarian institutional rules in the political 
sphere are not necessary to sustain the hold on power of a ruling coalition with strong 
patrimonial characteristics because opposition from excluded organizations is weak to 
begin with. However, institutional rules that impose discipline on economic and 
political organizations in society as part of a developmental strategy can have aspects 
of ‘developmental authoritarianism’. They formally describe the enforcement 
capabilities of a strong patrimonial coalition. Historically, therefore, developmental 
states have been associated with some authoritarian institutional characteristics that 
limited the ability of organizations to block policies or resist the enforcement of 
institutional rules that were judged to be important by the leadership. But these 
restrictions on organizational activity are likely to be associated with strategies of 
imposing economic discipline rather than repressing excluded political organizations 
by force because the latter is unnecessary in this scenario. Clearly, as the relative 
power of excluded political organizations increases, the characteristics of restrictions 
in these authoritarian states can also change significantly.  
 
It is important not to confuse these institutionally authoritarian characteristics of a 
developmental state with the harsh repression of excluded organizations in weaker 
authoritarian states where excluded organizations are stronger and the legitimacy of 
the ruling coalition is much more limited. The distribution of power across political 
organizations in the case of strong patrimonialism implies that ‘developmental’ 
authoritarian institutional rules supporting a developmental state are likely to be in a 
strong operational equilibrium with organizations given their weak ability to resist 
these institutions. This means that informal adjustments of the formal and informal 
rules of a developmental state are likely to be relatively limited. Off-budget payments 
to political organizations (both within and outside the ruling coalition) are likely to 
remain because of the common features of all developing countries discussed earlier 
that limit the scope of budgetary transfers and an entirely formal organization of 
society. But the terms of both formal and informal resource allocations, the sums 
allocated to different organizations and in particular the conditions under which both 
formal and informal support can be withdrawn are likely to be defined and enforced 
by the leadership of the ruling coalition.  
 
These characteristics of developmental states can give the misleading impression that 
these states are ‘Weberian’ or rule-following. In fact, they are unlikely to be strictly 
rule-following for the reasons that affect all developing and transition economies. 
Developmental states in developing countries are likely to have substantial aspects of 
informality in the definition and enforcement of rules and in the allocation of 
resources. In particular, the ruling coalition may exercise informal power and 
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networks in enforcing rules, whether formal or informal. But nevertheless, a ruling 
coalition with strong patrimonial characteristics will be able to define and enforce 
both formal and informal rules supporting its economic strategies more effectively 
and the informal adjustments to formal rules brought about by powerful organizations 
to protect their interests are likely to be less significant compared to other 
configurations in Figure 4. Political stability is also likely to be relatively high once 
an operational equilibrium emerges. Moreover, the fact that developmental state 
institutions are likely to be effectively enforced means that growth is likely to be high 
in this operational equilibrium. This in turn supports the legitimacy of the ruling 
coalition and is likely to set off a virtuous cycle that enables strong patrimonialism to 
be sustained for a substantial length of time. Indeed once established, a strong 
patrimonial developmental state could successfully oversee a significant social 
transformation of a society.  
 
Examples of coalitions with strong patrimonial characteristics include the coalitions 
ruling in South Korea and Taiwan from the 1960s to the 1980s. The distribution of 
power between political organizations in these configurations helps to explain why 
effective institutional solutions emerged that could accelerate economic development. 
These institutional solutions involved the creation and disciplining of significant 
developmental rents and the characteristics of the ruling coalition helped to ensure 
that the organizations receiving these rents could be effectively disciplined. 
Developmental results were generally positive. The support that economic 
organizations received in these examples was often formal, including credit from 
publicly owned banks and other forms of subsidies. However, the manner in which 
organizations were disciplined often employed informal threats and sanctions that 
were not always enshrined in law. Sometimes, these informal methods could also 
result in extortion from organizations that were not aligned with the interests of the 
ruling coalition. Nevertheless, if the ruling coalition has a long time horizon, it is in its 
interest to ensure that growth-enhancing strategies are effectively enforced as this 
gives it the highest returns over time. Countries with these characteristics can 
therefore sustain high levels of growth over several decades.  
 
Compared to most other developing countries, the East Asian developmental states 
achieved high levels of political stability as well as high rates of economic growth. 
These outcomes are consistent with the existence of a strong operational equilibrium 
in the political subsystem between what we describe as ‘developmental’ authoritarian 
institutional rules and strong patrimonialism describing the distribution of power 
between political organizations. Other features of the polity in these countries were of 
course also important, including internal and external pressures to adopt growth 
strategies. But without the strong patrimonialism in the distribution of power between 
political organizations the ruling coalition would not have had the long time horizons 
and high implementation capabilities that characterize a ‘developmental state’. 
Unfortunately, this distribution of power between political organizations is not 
common. Its emergence in East Asia in the 1950s and 1960s was very untypical and 
this is why the results of the East Asian developmental state have not been easy to 
replicate in other countries even though the formal institutional instruments of a 
developmental state were adopted by a number of developing countries (including 
Pakistan in the 1960s). The differences in results were largely due to differences in 
their enforcement capabilities. The disciplining of economic organizations was 
typically much poorer in countries which lacked strong patrimonialism. In particular, 
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economic organizations supported as part of a formal development strategy found it 
easier to protect their rents without having to deliver results.  
 
Vulnerable Patrimonialism (usually in equilibrium with Authoritarian Regimes) 
Two other variants of patrimonialism can be identified with different implications for 
the operational equilibrium in the political subsystem. Both are weaker variants of 
patrimonialism, and neither can fully support the institutions of a developmental state 
as an operational equilibrium. While they have differences, they are similarly 
disadvantaged compared to strong patrimonialism in that they are less likely to enjoy 
virtuous cycles of growth and legitimacy. Both are likely to gradually move towards a 
crisis in sustaining the operational equilibrium and the distribution of power between 
organizations is also likely to evolve in the direction of variants of competitive 
clientelism before a significant social transformation can be achieved.  
 
The first of these two variants we call vulnerable patrimonialism. Here excluded 
political organizations are relatively much stronger than in the case of strong 
patrimonialism, and the ruling coalition is therefore vulnerable. This configuration 
can still result in a patrimonial ruling coalition if the ruling coalition believes in and 
wants to establish an exclusive right to rule. It could still attempt this even though it is 
qualitatively more vulnerable than in the strong patrimonialism case but here it would 
have to use authoritarianism more directly as an institutional instrument of ensuring 
its rule. One effect of vulnerability is that its time horizon is likely to be shorter than 
in the case of strong patrimonialism. Nevertheless, the claim of the ruling coalition 
that ruling is its ‘patrimony’ may still be partially implementable if the ruling 
coalition has a leadership that is able to get the coalition to act in a coordinated way to 
enforce the institutions of exclusion. This implies that higher-level organizations 
within the ruling coalition can impose discipline on lower-level ones. If this condition 
is met, the implementation capabilities of the ruling coalition may be high enough 
both to ensure exclusion through the enforcement of rules of exclusion (and therefore 
a stable operational equilibrium with authoritarian institutions) and for reasonable 
economic and political outcomes sufficient to sustain its legitimacy for a time. 
 
Given this distribution of power, democratic institutional rules defined as the 
relatively free competition for power between political organizations are unlikely to 
result in a stable operational equilibrium. The dominant political coalition is likely to 
win in an open electoral competition. However, competition between organizations 
for political power is likely to increase the bargaining power of lower-level 
organizations within the ruling coalition for reasons discussed later. A stable 
operational equilibrium is therefore unlikely as the distribution of power described as 
vulnerable patrimonialism is likely to rapidly evolve with democratic institutional 
rules. Some variants of authoritarianism can provide a moderate operational 
equilibrium for vulnerable patrimonialism, at least for a time. Institutional rules 
restricting the organizational capabilities of excluded organizations can be described 
as ‘authoritarianism’ and range from relatively minor restrictions to quite severe 
levels of repression. Provided that the strength of excluded organizations is not too 
great and implementation capabilities of the ruling coalition are sufficient to enforce 
the level of repression required, there may be a moderately stable operational 
equilibrium with authoritarianism. A well-organized and disciplined ruling coalition 
may persuade excluded organizations to accept their exclusion at least for a time. In 
many cases of vulnerable authoritarianism, the real extent of exclusion may be far less 
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than the formal exclusions suggest. In many cases exclusion may only be achieved 
through a combination of institutional exclusion with substantial payoffs to excluded 
organizations. In the latter cases, the operational equilibrium is weak and excluded 
organizations are likely to get stronger over time relatively rapidly. Vulnerable 
authoritarianism is therefore usually associated with authoritarian regimes with 
different combinations of political stability and economic performance.  
 
The operational equilibrium in this case is likely to have a number of characteristics 
different from that associated with strong patrimonialism. First, the strength of 
excluded organizations is by definition higher and these organizations are likely to 
periodically test the ruling coalition’s institutional restrictions on their organizational 
freedoms. As a consequence, we can expect the ruling coalition will be called upon to 
demonstrate its repressive capabilities more frequently than in the case of strong 
patrimonialism. Secondly, the vulnerability of the ruling coalition means that while it 
has reasonable implementation capabilities, it is unlikely to embark on institutional 
and developmental strategies that have long gestation periods. Generally, this is likely 
to result in less developmental strategies because rents that can be quickly generated 
are less likely to be associated with value-enhancing strategies. This prevents a strong 
virtuous cycle developing because economic outcomes are poorer and political 
stability is periodically tested. The legitimacy of the ruling coalition is therefore 
weaker. Thirdly, ruling on the basis of repressive capabilities is unsustainable for very 
long. As a result, formal rules of organizational exclusion are likely to be significantly 
adjusted by informal payoffs to powerful excluded organizations. These strategies are 
likely to further strengthen excluded organizations but can for a while prolong the life 
of the ruling coalition.  
 
Informal adjustments to authoritarian rules of exclusion are common in weak 
authoritarian regimes. Informal payoffs and opportunities are regularly created for 
oppositional groups as a way of reducing their opposition by ‘buying them off’. This 
can enhance political stability but complex informal rent distribution driven by 
political concerns is very likely to have negative implications for growth. In a context 
where the ruling coalition did not have a long time horizon to start with, the gradual 
accretion of informally negotiated redistributive rents to many different organizations 
is likely to further reduce growth prospects. On the other hand, attempts to include 
currently excluded organizations within the ruling coalition are likely to be resisted by 
organizations already within the ruling coalition as this dilutes their own access to 
rents. If carried through to a significant extent, this strategy transforms the distribution 
of power into the ‘ineffective patrimonialism’ variant that is discussed later.  
 
Furthermore, the weak bargaining power of lower-level organizations in this 
configuration is not sustainable. Their holding power can be expected to increase 
more or less rapidly. Excluded organizations (which are powerful by definition) have 
strong incentives to induce lower-level organizations within the ruling coalition to 
defect by offering them higher rents if a new ruling coalition can be formed with their 
assistance. These attempts inevitably increase the bargaining power of lower-level 
organizations within the ruling coalition because they can demand higher rents and 
can dictate the distribution of rents to a greater extent, or they can actually start 
defecting. In either case, there is likely to be a relatively brief window of opportunity 
during which a ‘vulnerable patrimonial’ ruling coalition with authoritarian rules has 
an operational equilibrium that can deliver high growth with reasonable political 
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stability. This operational equilibrium is likely to be upset by the very strategies of 
sustaining this institutional structure, which result in a change in the relative power of 
its lower-level organizations. As this happens, the implementation capabilities of the 
ruling coalition can be expected to decline, with a corresponding decline in the ability 
of the leadership to discipline the allocation of rents and the enforcement of 
institutional rules that are vital for its economic objectives. This in turn feeds the 
perception of excluded organizations that the ruling coalition has a finite life, leading 
to redoubled efforts to organize resistance and to detach lower-level organizations 
from the ruling coalition.  This is why vulnerable patrimonialism is vulnerable and 
unlike strong patrimonialism is unlikely to sustain high levels of growth over long 
periods. A sudden collapse of the operational equilibrium is also likely.   
 
The cumulative relationship between defections, the power of lower-level 
organizations and the power of excluded organizations explains why an authoritarian 
coalition based on vulnerable patrimonialism can suddenly face a crisis, as happened 
in several North African and Middle Eastern countries in 2011. Of course, 
authoritarian regimes can vary across a range. Authoritarian coalitions facing weaker 
excluded coalitions (those towards the centre of the horizontal range of variation in 
Figure 4) are less likely to have to use violence or to make informal adjustments to the 
same extent. This makes them less vulnerable and more likely to sustain themselves 
over time. For instance, after the blood-letting of 1973 that brought Chile’s Pinochet 
to power, the regime faced relatively little opposition till the transition to democracy. 
It did not have the implementation capabilities of a developmental state (or indeed a 
developmental ideology) but was able to push through market-based structural 
reforms relatively rapidly. In contrast, the military-controlled ruling coalition in 
Pakistan/Bangladesh in the 1960s faced initially weak excluded coalitions, but had to 
resort to violence as excluded coalitions became stronger strengthened lower-level 
organizations within the ruling coalition became correspondingly stronger. The latter 
began to obstruct the effective implementation of developmental strategies and also 
began to defect to join excluded organizations. Pakistan’s developmental state 
institutions and policies delivered high growth in the first half of the 1960s but 
implementation worsened thereafter. The ruling authoritarian coalition was eventually 
overthrown by a mass uprising in 1969.  
 
In general, authoritarianism in the context of vulnerable patrimonialism is difficult to 
sustain for long unless there are special factors like natural resource rents or external 
military support that bolsters the exclusion capabilities of the ruling coalition. Even 
with these special factors, this configuration is unlikely to be stable for very long or to 
sustain an operational equilibrium with developmental institutional rules. External 
rents can increase the exclusion and repression capabilities of the ruling coalition but 
they also increase the incentives of excluded political organizations to try and 
overthrow the ruling coalition. Intense contestation by excluded organizations can in 
turn increase the power of lower-level organizations. Resource-rich authoritarian 
regimes end up making significant unproductive payoffs to their supporters with very 
negative effects on developmental transformations. As with developmental coalitions, 
the enforcement capabilities of authoritarian coalitions are initially relatively good, 
but time horizons are likely to be poorer given the vulnerability of the leadership. 
Moreover, given the tendencies for lower level factions to get stronger over time, the 
implementation capabilities of an authoritarian coalition are likely to get progressively 
weaker. Looking at these features of the operational equilibrium with vulnerable 
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patrimonialism, we can begin to explain why authoritarianism is often not 
developmental and also suffers from progressively weaker implementation 
capabilities (Khan 2010). 
 
Constrained Patrimonialism (usually in equilibrium with Dominant Parties)   
In the third variant of patrimonialism the ruling coalition is not vulnerable to external 
attack and therefore believes it can rule indefinitely. Its characteristic feature is that 
there are few powerful organizations outside the ruling coalition. Almost all powerful 
organizations and factions have been included within the ruling coalition, which 
typically takes the form of a dominant party. Its negative feature is that as there are a 
large number of relatively powerful organizations within the ruling coalition, the 
leadership has to deal with a greater number of lower-level organizations that are 
relatively powerful. This distinguishes it from strong patrimonialism, compared to 
which it has weaker implementation capabilities: hence the term ‘constrained’ 
patrimonialism. In contrast to vulnerable patrimonialism, the dominant party does not 
have to use administrative or military power to exclude others to the same extent and 
in many cases such a party can rule by winning elections. In principle, constrained 
patrimonialism can be in an operational equilibrium with democratic political 
institutions. However, in some cases, the dominant party can be additionally protected 
by institutional restrictions on the activities of other organizations. If these restrictions 
are relatively minor, the distribution of power can still be described as a variant of 
constrained patrimonialism. On the other hand, if the restrictions are necessary for 
ensuring the continued rule of the dominant party, then the distribution of power is 
closer to either vulnerable patrimonialism or the fourth variant of competitive 
clientelism that we discuss later. Constrained patrimonialism can therefore be in an 
operational equilibrium with either authoritarian or democratic political institutions 
though the two equilibria operate slightly differently.  
 
The dominant party in ‘constrained patrimonialism’ enjoys a longer time horizon 
compared to authoritarian regimes in ‘vulnerable patrimonialism’ because it faces a 
lower risk of being removed from office by powerful excluded organizations. This 
potentially gives this ruling coalition a greater interest in adopting a longer-term 
developmental strategy. In principle, the creation of rents associated with the 
promotion of new productive capabilities requires a long time horizon for the political 
coalition to reap the benefits from these rents. As against this, the dominant party 
requires a large flow of internal rents to its supporters from the outset, unless it is a 
well-disciplined party that can make credible promises to its members about payoffs 
in the future. An example of a disciplined dominant party would be the Chinese 
Communist Party in the 1980s and beyond. However, in the typical dominant party, 
supporters are unlikely to find promises of future benefits credible enough to forego 
demands for immediate benefits. In these cases, the dominant party may have to 
generate significant rents from the outset, and it is unlikely to be able to do this by 
focusing on developmental strategies. Thus, despite their longer time horizon, many 
dominant parties are likely to pursue damaging rent creation strategies to satisfy large 
numbers of restive supporters. 
 
In addition, whether or not the dominant party is able to focus on developmental 
strategies, all dominant parties find that their implementation capabilities are 
constrained, and this is the characteristic feature of constrained patrimonialism. The 
source of the constraint is that the ruling coalition includes many political 
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organizations that have been absorbed within it. As a result, there are many potential 
points at which implementation can be vetoed simply because any group that is 
dissatisfied can exercise a blocking action on implementation. Again, a disciplined 
dominant part with strong internal discipline and credible rewards for those who 
follow party directives may not suffer from this problem to a very great extent. The 
implementation capabilities of this coalition are normally weaker not only compared 
to strong patrimonialism but also compared to early stage authoritarian regimes 
underpinned by a vulnerable patrimonialism. In the latter, lower-level organizations 
are less able to block policies or block the enforcement of institutions that are contrary 
to their particular interests. The precise characteristics of stability, the time horizon 
and economic strategies of the ruling coalition will depend on the strength of 
excluded organizations, the strength of lower-level organizations, the degree of 
internal discipline and institutional structure within the dominant party and 
characteristics of other subsystems in the political settlement.  
 
Like vulnerable patrimonialism, constrained patrimonialism has internal stresses that 
potentially limit its life span. The operational equilibrium in this context is unlikely to 
be very strong or stable. If the ruling coalition attempts to enhance its stability by 
including all powerful organizations within it, it can remove threats from outside, but 
at a price. Rents are spread more thinly within the coalition and attempts at 
institutional enforcement that threaten to change the distribution of rents are likely to 
be blocked by powerful internal organizations. Alternatively, the ruling coalition 
could try to generate a large quantity of rents over a short time horizon to satisfy its 
internal demands but economic development is likely to be very adversely affected in 
this case because hastily generated rents are likely to involve growth-reducing 
policies. The unwinding of a dominant party can happen in various ways. If 
opposition parties are allowed, and there is some degree of electoral competition, the 
dominant party can face a sudden defeat at the polls if economic development and the 
enforcement of institutions become very poor. This can be precipitated if dissatisfied 
groups and factions within the ruling party start joining excluded groups or leave the 
ruling coalition to set up new political organizations. Defections are particularly likely 
if it is difficult to change the leadership of the dominant party. Political organizations 
outside the dominant party can also start to offer promises of more rents to lower-
level organizations within the ruling coalition to induce them to leave. Regardless of 
the sequence of events in particular cases, once a cumulative decline of a ruling 
coalition starts, it may be difficult the stop.  
 
Constrained patrimonialism can also be in an operational equilibrium with 
authoritarian political institutions that limit the degree of freedom with which new 
political organizations can be set up outside the ruling coalition. In these variants the 
cumulative decline can be slowed down for a time. The dissatisfaction of lower-level 
members of the party is likely to grow over time as losers from successive policy 
changes increase in number. At some point some powerful lower-level organizations 
are likely to break free of the ruling coalition and become powerful excluded 
organizations. Their presence and the likely offer of better benefits to lower-level 
organizations can further strengthen lower-level organizations within the ruling 
coalition, setting off a process of cumulative decline. While the sequence of triggering 
factors may vary across cases, the internal stresses within the ruling coalition mean 
that a cumulative decline is likely to be set off at some point. As with vulnerable 
patrimonialism, the presence of natural resource rents and external rents in the form of 
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military and other forms of aid can slow down the process of challenges to the 
leadership but does not necessarily change the features of this subsystem to a 
significant extent. Examples of dominant parties under constrained patrimonialism 
include the Congress Party in India in the 1950s and 1960s, the CCM in Tanzania, the 
CPM in West Bengal from 1977 to 2011 and the Thai Rak Thai in Thailand from 
2001-2006. Each was a variant of a dominant party with somewhat different internal 
characteristics. They also operated in different institutional contexts, with the 
resulting operational equilibrium characterized by different levels of stability and 
developmental outcomes.  
 
Competitive Clientelism (usually associated with Developing Country Democracies) 
This brings us to the fourth and final variant of the distribution of power across 
political organizations where there is a substantial level of fragmentation in the 
distribution of power across political organizations and within the ruling coalition 
such that higher levels have more limited powers over lower levels. This is 
competitive clientelism, where the number and strength of clientelist political 
organizations is such that the inclusion of all of them in a ruling coalition would not 
work and neither would a strategy of keeping excluded groups out by legal or military 
mechanisms. As we have seen, there are dynamic factors supporting a temporal 
growth in the relative power of both excluded political organizations and lower-level 
organizations within the ruling coalition. As a result, competitive clientelism is likely 
to be the default structure of clientelist political settlements. However, if this 
configuration of political power emerges at very early stages of development when 
economic organizations are also underdeveloped there are likely to be problems with 
achieving political and economic viability. Competitive clientelist political 
organizations can sometimes be in unstable operational equilibrium with authoritarian 
institutions but they are typically associated with developing country democracies.  
 
The only sustainable (if vulnerable) arrangement with this configuration of power is 
an operational equilibrium with political institutions (formal and informal) that can 
ensure that excluded coalitions can cycle in and out of power in an orderly way. When 
the ruling coalition is replaced by a new coalition the political settlement technically 
changes, but is replaced by a new political settlement that retains the competitive 
clientelist characterization of its political organizations. The new political settlement 
is therefore substantially quite similar except in the identity of the organizations 
constituting the ruling coalition. In practice there may be further differences in the 
identity of the dominant economic and bureaucratic organizations as these are likely 
to have close links with political organizations in developing countries. Nevertheless, 
the stability of the political settlement in this case refers to the potential of smooth 
changes in the identity of the ruling coalition without either excessive political 
violence or the transition to a different configuration of political organizations such as 
a vulnerable patrimonialism that supports authoritarian institutions.  
 
In developing countries the weakness of formal institutions implies that the smooth 
cycling of political organizations into and out of power requires informal institutional 
arrangements between competing organizations. Informal arrangements are essential 
for ensuring that competing coalitions believe that their chances of becoming the 
ruling coalition are proportional to some agreed measure of their relative power. 
Democracy in developing countries is therefore typically based on an operational 
equilibrium between variants of competitive clientelism and formal and informal 
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institutions that credibly ensure access to power for the coalition that can mobilize the 
greatest organizational power. This, rather than a rule-following competition for 
power between parties with different manifestos for taxing and spending, describes 
how democracies work in developing countries. The ruling coalition in developing 
countries is formed by political entrepreneurs who seek to bring together a large 
enough number of political organizations within their coalition to be able to rule but 
not so many that rents are spread too thinly. The excluded are technically free to 
organize, organize new groups and entice factions currently included in the ruling 
coalition to leave and join them in an attempt to form a new coalition.  
 
Given the relative power of the excluded, a stable operational equilibrium requires the 
recognition on the part of the ruling coalition that excluded coalitions will cycle into 
power sooner or later so that attempts to exclude them do not extend to outright 
repression. Elections provide a mechanism for testing the organizational power of 
competing coalitions, and elections are successful if they reflect the balance of 
organizational power on the ground. But given the difficulties of enforcing formal 
institutional rules in developing countries, the sustainability of electoral competition 
cannot simply be based on formal electoral rules. A stable democratic system with 
competitive clientelism is only likely to be sustainable if there is an ‘implicit rule of 
law’ amongst competing coalitions that ensures that all competing factions follow the 
same formal and informal rules in organizing themselves and losers accept the 
outcomes of these contests without descending into open warfare. Competitive 
clientelism can only sustain political stability when institutions and particularly 
informal institutions emerge to provide credible assurances to excluded organizations 
that they can eventually gain power by building their coalition within these rules and 
they do not need to engage in excessive levels of violence to oust the ruling coalition.  
 
If the underlying distribution of power between political organizations is as in the 
lower right hand corner in Figure 4, an attempt to institutionalize authoritarian rules or 
even a dominant party can produce worse outcomes than if an attempt was made to 
institutionalize a competitive democracy. For instance, attempts to sustain 
authoritarianism as an institutional arrangement when the underlying distribution of 
power approximates competitive clientelism can result in an unstable operational 
equilibrium with high levels of violence and very poor economic outcomes. The 
activity of powerful political organizations to change institutional arrangements that 
seek to exclude them can result in very significant costs for society associated with 
the ensuing contestation. The activity to change significant institutional arrangements 
like authoritarianism or a one-party system can be seen as a large-scale rent seeking 
process where the costs of violence and disruption are significant ‘rent-seeking costs’ 
inflicted by excluded political organizations. Occasionally, the violence unleashed by 
a ruling coalition can destroy the organizational power of excluded organizations so 
that the underlying distribution of power is eventually no longer competitive 
clientelist. If this happens, an authoritarian type of regime can be established as a 
stable operational equilibrium. But in the typical case where violence breaks out 
against an authoritarian regime operating in a configuration of competitive 
clientelism, the likely route to a more stable equilibrium is through an abandonment 
of authoritarianism. A transition to the institutional arrangements of ‘democracy’ can 
(after a sustainable equilibrium has been achieved), provide relatively better results 
compared to the attempt to preserve an authoritarian institutional system in a 




Thus, the institutional arrangements associated with developmental states, 
authoritarian regimes or dominant party coalitions can be associated with 
developmental outcomes in some contexts, but only if the underlying distribution of 
power between political organizations support these institutional arrangements. In the 
presence of competitive clientelism, authoritarian institutional arrangements are likely 
to be associated with poorer development outcomes compared to societies where the 
underlying political distribution of power is corresponds to some variant of 
patrimonialism. Indeed, with competitive clientelism, variants of democratic 
institutional arrangements may offer the best developmental prospects for that society 
to the extent that the distribution of power cannot itself be altered through political 
reorganization.  
 
Understanding the institutional requirements for achieving a stable operational 
equilibrium with competitive clientelism is important because it is the likely political 
settlement underpinning developing country democracies. The collapse of 
authoritarian arrangements in developing countries is most likely to happen in the 
context of a change in the underlying distribution of power in the direction of 
competitive clientelism. The likely outcome is the eventual emergence of democracies 
in the context of an evolution towards competitive clientelism rather democracies that 
approximate to Weberian social democracies. The achievement of an operational 
equilibrium in this political configuration faces challenges from a number of 
directions. First, political stability power in the context of significant informality in 
institutional rules requires that the ruling coalition understands that excluded political 
organizations are powerful and cannot be excluded by formal or informal repression. 
Stability will only be achieved if the ruling coalition internalizes the futility of using 
administrative power as a long-run strategy of exclusion. Secondly, the design of 
governance institutions in this context has to take into account the specific problems 
of short-termism and generally weak implementation capacities. The imperative of 
focusing on developing targeted governance capabilities is most important in this 
context precisely because of the general characteristics of competitive clientelism.  
 
The different variants of the clientelist political settlement display important 
differences but in every case, attempts to develop broad-based ‘good governance’ 
capabilities for the state organizations enforcing formal institutional rules are likely to 
fail. The futility of a primary focus on good governance reforms is particularly serious 
in contexts of competitive clientelism with its short time horizons and weak political 
implementation capabilities. This may appear paradoxical because moderately stable 
democracies in competitive clientelist contexts appear to have features of political 
accountability that authoritarian or dominant party systems appear to lack. But 
developing country democracies have features that are significantly different from 
advanced country social democracies and in particular, the institutional and political 
balances on which the social equilibrium is based are typically very fragile. Equally, 
attempts at introducing developmental state institutions in competitive clientelist 
contexts are also likely to fail.  Developmental strategies used by developmental 
states require long-term rent management and implementation capabilities that are 
likely to be missing in competitive clientelism. The most appropriate developmental 
strategy in contexts of competitive clientelism is likely to be targeted strategies of rent 
management in sectors and over time horizons that are credible given the 




The more fundamental problem for competitive clientelism is that the institutional 
conditions for a stable operational equilibrium are frequently violated because the 
ruling coalition has a temptation to believe that it can use its administrative powers to 
keep the opposition excluded. In other words, the ruling coalition can suffer from the 
misapprehension that it can enforce authoritarian institutional rules. But the real 
distribution of power between political organizations in this context precludes 
authoritarian solutions and attempts in that direction only result in repeated crises of 
violence. This can paradoxically create strong pressures for organizations like the 
military to attempt to re-create an authoritarian coalition based on its stronger 
exclusion capabilities or for the ruling coalition to attempt to construct a dominant 
party, often by co-opting military and security forces within the ruling party. Military-
authoritarian institutional arrangements are sometimes possible for short periods as an 
operational equilibrium with competitive clientelism but only with significant rent 
distribution by the ‘authoritarian’ leadership to political organizations or with 
significant amounts of repression that is unlikely to be sustainable for long. Given the 
underlying distribution of power, operational equilibria with authoritarian institutional 
arrangements are likely to be short-lived unless there is a successful political project 
of social engineering to reconstruct political organizations to change the underlying 
distribution of power.  
 
A sustainable competitive clientelism requires credible institutional arrangements that 
allow the ruling coalition to be replaced in periodic elections by an alternative 
coalition if the latter demonstrates greater holding power. This cannot be ensured 
simply through formal electoral rules in societies where much happens informally. 
Informal institutions have to be in place reflecting the recognition by the ruling 
coalition that the use of administrative power to exclude powerful coalitions cannot 
transgress acceptable limits. This is difficult to achieve. As a result, democracy is not 
always stable in developing countries nor does it necessarily generate developmental 
outcomes. All of South Asia is today governed by variants of democratic institutional 
arrangements in the context of competitive clientelism as is much of Africa. Thailand 
in the 1980s and 1990s was characterized by an institutional equilibrium of 
competitive clientelism with quasi-democratic institutional arrangements. But only 
India has achieved an operational equilibrium that makes its competitive clientelism 
operate relatively smoothly. One reason for India’s exception is paradoxically its size 
and diversity. This actually helps to inoculate its ruling coalition from imagining that 
it can get away with significant administrative interventions to exclude currently 
excluded organizations. Intervention to benefit a complex ruling coalition of diverse 
factions is itself complex and the complexity helps to ensure an informal rule of law 
emerging for conducting electoral contests in a way that outcomes reflect the relative 
power of political organizations.  
 
A further factor that helps the credibility of elections in India is that it is a large 
federal country with elections organized at the state level. If excessive violations 
happen in a particular state, the federal government has strong incentives to intervene 
to prevent that state descending into a local crisis. The federal government can impose 
president’s rule and re-run the election. Therefore, while irregularities, violence and in 
particular, the use of ‘black’ money from the informal economy does happen in India, 
competing parties know that an outcome that is significantly out of line with their 
organizational strength on the ground cannot be sustained. Smaller countries do not 
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have this credible third-party ‘institutional’ oversight of electoral outcomes and their 
ruling coalition can believe (wrongly) that they can hold on to power using 
administrative exclusion as a strategy for excluding the opposition. As a result, 
electoral crises are frequent in the typical developing country democracy and often the 
only exit route from the ensuing crisis is a military takeover that results in another 
transition problem. An understanding of this aspect of the political settlement suggests 
that the problem is unlikely to be solved simply by attempting a stronger enforcement 
of formal electoral laws. Considerable attention has to be given to strategies that can 
assist the evolution of an informal rule of law for political coalitions, and a shared 
understanding amongst elites about how this political settlement actually works.  
 
The Organization of the Bureaucracy  
Bureaucratic organizations are the agencies that enforce formal rules and implement 
formal policies. In developing countries, these organizations also operate in informal 
ways and may be engaged in informal enforcement activities (as when the police or 
courts enforce the law but only when informal arrangements and connections are 
invoked). The agenda of governance reforms has sought to enhance enforcement 
capabilities in developing countries by targeting the technocratic and technological 
capabilities of bureaucratic agencies involved in the enforcement of formal 
institutions and the implementation of formal policies.  
 
 
Figure 5 The Configuration of Bureaucratic Organizations 
 
Apart from these technological and technocratic capabilities, the effectiveness of 
bureaucratic organizations also depends on the configuration of power across these 
organizations and their relationship with organizations in other subsystems. The 
configuration of power across political organizations is likely to have an important 
effect on the organization of bureaucratic agencies and the distribution of power 
across bureaucratic organizations. Figure 5 classifies bureaucratic subsystems in terms 
of the relative power of lead agencies vis-à-vis others (the horizontal distribution of 
power across bureaucratic organizations) and the enforcement capabilities of higher 
level agencies over lower level agencies (the vertical distribution of power across 
bureaucratic organizations). As with the classification of political organizations, we 
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simplify the range of variations across developing countries by looking at the four 
corners of the configuration. 
 
Concerted Bureaucratic Authority  
Theoretically the most effective bureaucracies in developing countries are concerted 
bureaucracies located at the top left-hand corner of Figure 5. Here the lead agency has 
the effective power to coordinate across other agencies allowing coordination across 
agencies. The lead agency refers to the agency through which the political leadership 
can attempt to coordinate policy implementation and the enforcement of rules. The 
lead agency is not necessarily the same across countries, and could for instance be the 
presidential office, the planning commission or the finance ministry. In addition, in 
this configuration, higher bureaucratic levels have the capability of enforcing 
decisions so that lower-level bureaucratic organizations implement the strategies of 
enforcement. The capability of higher levels of the bureaucracy to enforce and 
implement decisions requires the existence of bureaucratic capabilities and systems 
but also the existence of a hierarchy of enforcement that enables obstruction or 
contrary interests at lower levels to be disciplined and thereby limited. For obvious 
reasons, this distribution of power can be in a stable operational equilibrium with the 
formal institutional structure of a developmental state bureaucracy.  
 
There are obvious parallels between this bureaucratic structure and a political system 
characterized by strong patrimonialism. There is also likely to be a causal link 
between the configuration of political organizations in strong patrimonialism and the 
development of bureaucratic capabilities in the direction of concertation. A strong 
patrimonial ruling coalition will have the incentive to reorganize the bureaucracy in 
the direction of concerted bureaucratic authority if it was not already organized in this 
way. Not only is a strong patrimonial leadership likely to have the capacity to set such 
a bureaucratic reorganization as a priority, it can also ensure that lower levels of the 
bureaucracy or parallel agencies of the bureaucracy are not able to block 
implementation or follow contrary strategies. The latter typically implies that 
obstructive bureaucratic agencies are acting with the political support of some 
political organizations, and this is unlikely when the distribution of power between 
political organizations is of the strong patrimonial type. The emergence of concerted 
bureaucratic authority enables a patrimonial ruling coalition to implement its 
strategies and maximize its returns over time. Thus, it would be plausible to expect 
strong patrimonialism to be associated with the emergence and development of 
concerted bureaucratic authority in the bureaucratic subsystem.  
 
Divided Bureaucratic Authority  
In this configuration the lead agency is unable to enforce coordination across all 
agencies even though higher levels are able to enforce implementation by lower 
levels. For instance, different branches of government or different sections and 
ministries may be able to protect their jurisdictions from the intervention or 
coordination of other jurisdictions. In advanced countries the separation of powers 
between different branches of government can be an intended feature of the 
constitution. In the constitutional model of the United States checks and balances are 
built into the administrative structure to ensure that political intervention can be 
limited and checked by adversely affected interests operating through alternative 
branches of government such as the judiciary (Okuno-Fujiwara 1997). With a well-
established market economy and as long as significant economic restructuring is not 
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required, this configuration of the bureaucracy can be reasonably effective, 
particularly in providing established capitalist interests with a degree of confidence 
that policies will not be easy to change in arbitrary ways. But even in advanced 
countries, this type of bureaucratic organization can become a liability at times of 
crisis or economic restructuring when coordinated decisions have to be made and 
implemented. The ability of adversely affected interests to resist changes by 
mobilizing different branches of the government and bureaucracy can have high 
social costs in such contexts. 
 
In developing countries, divided bureaucratic authority is not likely to be solely the 
outcome of a design feature of a constitution based on checks and balances between 
different branches of government. The formal constitution is in any case not likely to 
be fully implementable given the general characteristics of informality and weak 
enforcement of formal institutions in developing countries. Divided bureaucratic 
authority is more likely to represent a transition phase when a concerted bureaucracy 
is becoming more fragmented as a result of different branches of government being 
able to act more autonomously. This is most likely to happen if the political 
configuration of power is itself changing in the direction of greater fragmentation, 
with different agencies being responsive to and protecting the interests of different 
sets of political organizations. As long as implementation capabilities are high and 
higher levels can impose discipline on lower levels, the main problem that the 
bureaucracy is likely to face is that policy coordination and coherence is likely to be 
compromised. This bureaucratic configuration can be in a moderate to weak 
operational equilibrium with developmental policies and institutions. If formal 
policies and institutions adversely affect powerful organizations, these can be blocked 
using both rule-following as well as informal mechanisms that exploit the divided 
authority of different agencies.  
 
Constrained Bureaucratic Authority 
A third configuration can emerge if higher bureaucratic levels have a limited ability to 
impose discipline and implementation on lower levels but effective coordination 
across agencies can be achieved. The weaker capabilities of enforcing discipline on 
lower levels in this case can be due either to poor technocratic and bureaucratic 
capabilities of the bureaucratic subsystem or because lower levels can be mobilized 
and supported by powerful political organizations to protect their interests if these are 
threatened by policies or institutions that the ruling coalition is trying to enforce. This 
bureaucratic configuration is most likely to be associated with dominant party systems 
where there may be a coherent and coordinated economic programme that the top 
bureaucrats in each agency accept but its implementation may be blocked because 
powerful organizations that are adversely affected can block its implementation by 
operating through lower-level bureaucratic organizations.  
 
A very specific variant of this bureaucratic structure operated in post-War Japan 
during its rapid industrialization (Okuno-Fujiwara 1997). Coordination across 
agencies was possible but lower levels of the bureaucracy were relatively powerful 
and concertation from above was more difficult as a result. Nevertheless, coordination 
operated at the local level as a result of coordination across agencies and economic 
interests. This resulted in a uniquely Japanese style of implementation through 
consensus-building at different levels of the bureaucratic and economic system that 
had higher implementation costs than a concerted bureaucratic system, but benefited 
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from better information flows as a result of the process of building consensus. 
However, consensus-based implementation can face problems at times of crisis when 
significant restructuring is required that generates winners and losers. Losers can have 
strong relationships with some parts of the bureaucratic structure and the necessity of 
all bureaucratic agencies to achieve consensus in this system can slow down or block 
implementation at times of crisis. In developing countries this bureaucratic 
configuration can be in a moderate to weak operational equilibrium with 
developmental institutions and policies. It is likely that formal developmental policies 
that hurt powerful interests will result in informal arrangements with lower levels of 
the bureaucracy to soften their implementation and impact.  
 
Fragmented Bureaucratic Authority 
The fourth configuration is much the most problematic one because here both 
coordination across agencies and the imposition of discipline on lower levels of the 
bureaucracy are both weak. This could have a number of contributory reasons. The 
formal structure of checks and balances in the constitution and rules of business of the 
bureaucracy could prevent close coordination across agencies based on formal 
procedures. There may be weaknesses in the technocratic and bureaucratic 
capabilities of agencies that prevent higher levels from adequately monitoring and 
imposing discipline on lower levels. Most importantly, a fragmented (competitive 
clientelist) political structure could result in different levels and agencies of the 
bureaucracy operating in alliance with competing political organizations and interests.  
 
The policy implementation and rule-enforcing capabilities of the bureaucracy are 
weakest in this case. The operational equilibrium with developmental institutions and 
policies is likely to be weak. We can expect significant levels of informal adjustments 
that dilute the implementation and enforcement of formal developmental policies. 
This configuration of bureaucratic authority is likely to be associated with competitive 
clientelism, though it may also emerge in either of the weaker patrimonial systems 
too. A competitive clientelist political subsystem is likely to have a ruling coalition 
that is too weak to lead a restructuring of the bureaucratic system towards greater 
professionalism and concertation. Indeed, the presence of competitive clientelism can 
lead to progressively more fragmented bureaucratic structures as competing political 
organizations will tend to politicize and work through their own bureaucratic 
agencies, resulting in progressive internal fragmentation across agencies and levels of 
the bureaucracy.  
 
The Organization of the Economy  
The final subsystem that constitutes an important part of the overall political 
settlement of a country is the subsystem of economic organizations producing goods 
and services. The types of economic organizations and their political linkages are 
likely to differ significantly not only across countries but across sectors and regions 
within a country. Two dimensions of variation describing the economic organizations 
in a developing country are relevant for us. The first is the average technological and 
entrepreneurial ‘capabilities’ of the organizations in question and second, the holding 
power they can deploy to protect their interests. As we are referring to developing 
countries, we assume that the modern economic organizations that we are describing 
here are a small part of the economic structure. The economic organizations that need 
to be described depend on the question we are asking. We could be interested in a 
particular sector or region, the characteristics of a subset of firms, or the average 
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characteristics of the whole economy. The relevant level of abstraction depends on the 
question being addressed. The important point is that when we describe economic 
organizations as having high, moderate or low productive capabilities, we are 
referring to the modern sector, or some part of the modern sector, and not the 
economy as a whole. For some types of analysis, a description of the average 
economic organization of the modern sector is required, for other questions a 
differentiated analysis of the power and capabilities of economic organizations across 
modern sectors and regions may be required.  The two dimensions of variation are 
shown in Figure 6 and once again we will focus on the four ‘corner’ variants while 
remembering that most countries and most sectors will have organizations that are 
likely to be intermediate cases.  
 
 
Figure 6 The Configuration of Economic Organizations 
 
The first dimension of variation describes the distribution of technological and 
entrepreneurial capabilities across economic organizations within the modern sector. 
The technological and entrepreneurial capabilities describe the productive capabilities 
of the individuals and teams within the organization. An economic organization with 
a high productive capability is more likely to find technology adoption and learning 
strategies beneficial as it is likely to achieve competitiveness rapidly in the 
technologies it is using or in technologies further up the technology ladder. 
Conversely, organizations that have no reasonable possibility of achieving 
competitiveness are likely to focus on unproductive rent capture. Developing 
countries typically operate well within the technology frontier for most products and 
services, and as a result, even potentially productive economic organizations are 
unlikely to be immediately competitive in most activities. The achievement of 
competitiveness requires a considerable investment of time, effort and resources in 
technology adoption and learning. This, rather than the innovation of new products or 
services is the challenge for most economic organizations. The learning-by-doing is 
more likely to be successful if the organizations have adequate levels of technological 
and entrepreneurial capabilities. This in turn depends on their prior experience in 
producing similar products even if they have not yet fully achieved competitiveness in 
the technologies that are currently being acquired. As economic organizations 
approach the technological frontier they have to move from learning to innovation, 
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and new problems emerge. However, most developing countries are far away from the 
frontier for most of their sectors of economic activity. Indeed, this is what defines 
them as developing countries. 
 
The second dimension of variation describes the relative political power of economic 
organizations. Political power is a measure of the ability of the organization to engage 
in ‘rent seeking’ activities to protect its interests through a political process. Clearly, 
economic power is one source of power because this provides the resources to buy 
access to the political decision-making process or to engage in conflicts of different 
types. But wealthier organizations are not always more powerful because power is 
also based on the capacity to organize collective action and to access and make links 
with other organizations, in particular political organizations. The relative power of 
economic organizations can therefore depend not only on their economic power but 
also on the configuration of political power that defines the cost and ease with which 
political power can be purchased. Economic organizations can be expected to be more 
powerful if it is easy and cheap to make political alliances with political organizations 
or to buy access to the political decision-making process. In contrast, even wealthy 
economic organizations may be relatively powerless if their access to political power 
is limited as a result of the configuration of political organizations. Emerging 
economic organizations in developing countries, even if they are high-capability 
organizations, are unlikely to exercise political power entirely through formal 
processes. Economic survival and growth in developing countries often requires 
access to informal power structures through which formal and informal rights can be 
negotiated and protected. Indeed many entrepreneurs who lead economic 
organizations often accumulated their initial wealth by means of close links with 
political organizations and still retain strong links with these organizations.  
 
At the same time, political organizations also depend on the resources entrepreneurs 
can provide either from their productive enterprises or through grey networks based 
on informal trading and financing activities. Entrepreneurs and their economic 
organizations linked to political organizations in this way are likely to have 
considerable holding power because they are effectively protected by and can 
mobilize the political organizations that are dependent or linked to them. But even if 
economic organizations are providing resources to political organizations, they can 
still be politically weak if the political organizations within the ruling coalition can 
operate without the support of particular entrepreneurs. If the ruling coalition is 
cohesive enough and can collectively negotiate resources from economic 
organizations, particular economic organizations may still find it difficult to protect 
themselves from disciplining or even predation. The political power of economic 
organizations thus depends not only on their capacity to provide resources to the 
political system but also on the organization of the political system. The political 
power of economic organizations also depends on whether political organizations 
have other sources of funding. Natural resources, aid or other resources accessible to 
political organizations can reduce their dependence on economic organizations. 
Finally, the ability of economic organizations to mobilize their own collective action 
or to finance their own political organizations can obviously enhance their holding 
power.  
 
The top left-hand corner in Figure 6 describes an economic subsystem where 
organizations have relatively high capability and political power, usually because they 
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are networked with political organizations in ways that allow them to deploy 
significant holding power. Paradoxically, this configuration is not necessarily the 
most conducive for driving growth in developing countries. This is perhaps true in 
general because powerful entrepreneurs and their organizations can be expected to use 
political power to create rents for themselves, and some of these rents could be 
damaging for the overall performance of the productive sector. For instance, powerful 
entrepreneurs can be expected to try and prevent institutional changes that ensure high 
levels of competitiveness that can expose their organizations to higher levels of 
competitive risk or force them to engage in higher levels of investment and effort. As 
a result, economic organizations are likely to resist institutions that aim to increase 
either market discipline through competition or state discipline enforcing conditions 
for policy support. The resistance to the latter is particularly likely when policy 
support for learning moves beyond the initial ‘easy’ protection phase when plants are 
first set up to the more difficult stage when competitiveness has to be enhanced. The 
latter requires credible compulsions on economic organizations receiving support to 
ensure high levels of effort during the learning process. This includes, for instance, 
the withdrawal of support from poorly-performing enterprises to establish that support 
is not unconditional. In many circumstances therefore, politically connected economic 
organizations can present obstacles to the introduction and implementation of 
institutional rules that impose market or state discipline on their activities.  
 
However, powerful economic organizations are not necessarily always obstructive for 
economic development. If high capability economic organizations are close to the 
competitiveness frontier, they may have strong internal incentives to reach the frontier 
and access potentially significant market-based profits. Under these circumstances, 
economic organizations can use their political power to create temporary rents that 
allow them to engage in learning-by-doing to reach the frontier. Given their internal 
compulsions to put in high levels of effort, there is also a high likelihood of success 
under these conditions. But these strategies are only likely to emerge if powerful high-
capability organizations are ‘close’ to the competitiveness frontier. The closeness 
depends not just on the level of technological and entrepreneurial capabilities but also 
on the location of the competitiveness frontier. If the organization is far away from 
competitiveness given the technologies and products in which it has invested, it is 
likely to use its political power to create and protect permanent unproductive rents as 
it has little hope of becoming competitive. However, if the organization is close to the 
competitiveness frontier, political power may sometimes be useful for assisting it to 
negotiate temporary support that allows it to reach the frontier. Pockets of well-
connected high-capability capitalists have driven growth in this way in developing 
countries like India after the 1980s (Khan 2008b, 2009b). They were also instrumental 
in driving growth in Thailand in the 1980s and 1990s (Doner and Ramsay 2000; Khan 
2000b; Rock 2000). But these configurations are vulnerable and require attractive 
returns if competitiveness can be achieved. If powerful economic organizations are 
far from the competitiveness frontier it may not be rational for them to try and use 
their political links to get support in an attempt to reach the frontier. In these cases, 
the likely strategy is to use political power to create rents for the economic 
organizations that are likely to be damaging because they benefit the organization 
without raising productivity or otherwise benefiting the broader society. The growth 
of damaging business-government relationships in India in the 2000s demonstrates 
what is likely to happen when strong business-government relationships continue and 
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the majority of economic organizations that have not already become globally 
competitive are too far away to pursue productive rent-creation strategies.  
 
The bottom left-hand corner describes high-capability organizations that are 
politically weak in the sense of not being able to deploy significant holding power to 
protect their particular interests. Paradoxically, the political weakness of economic 
organizations in this configuration can allow the implementation of effective 
industrial policy if the ruling coalition is a strong patrimonial one and adopts 
developmental strategies. The political settlement in South Korea during the critical 
decades of the 1960s, 1970s and much of the 1980s was characterized not only by a 
ruling coalition with strong patrimonial characteristics but also a productive sector 
characterized by high-capability economic organizations with limited independent 
holding power. These characteristics of the South Korean political settlement allowed 
the implementation of an industrial policy that not only directed significant resources 
to the productive sector, but also effectively enforced discipline and compulsion to 
ensure that economic organizations put in high levels of effort in learning. The 
political weakness of South Korean capitalists was related to the weak development of 
factional politics in Korea during Japanese rule, such that there were no significant 
independent political factions within the ruling coalition that individual Korean 
capitalists could have linked up with. Moreover, the close association of Korean 
entrepreneurs with Japanese industrial interests during the colonial period meant the 
former had very limited legitimacy after the Japanese defeat and could not 
immediately attempt to organize to protect their political interests (Amsden 1989; 
Kohli 1994; Khan 2000b). 
 
However, this configuration of economic organizations also does not necessarily 
ensure growth and development. Politically weak but high capability economic 
organizations can be vulnerable to predation by political organizations (in the sense of 
revenue extraction) if the ruling coalition is unable to take a long view and is more 
interested in immediate resource capture to satisfy its political requirements. Thailand 
in the 2000s under Thaksin is an example of constrained patrimonialism operating 
through a dominant party system that sustained its power through populist strategies 
of redistribution rather than the development of productive sectors. The populist 
strategies led to significant problems for the Thai industrial capitalist class who faced 
growing implicit taxes while Thaksin’s own commercial interests were protected. 
Eventually these tensions induced a constitutional crisis in Thailand in the late 2000s 
(Khan 2008b; Phongpaichit and Baker 2009). A somewhat different constrained 
patrimonialism in the state of West Bengal in India under the dominant CPM party 
from 1977 to 2011 also led to the gradual sidelining of an industrial sector that once 
had some high capability sectors. The CPM’s agrarian base and its responsiveness to 
the interests of agrarian factions led to a gradual withdrawal of effective support for 
industrial upgrading and led to a gradual industrial decline of the state as industrial 
capital relocated to other parts of India (Khan 2008b).  
 
The top right-hand corner in Figure 6 describes politically powerful economic 
organizations with low to moderate productive capabilities. In this case, given the low 
economic capabilities of the organizations, their high holding power is likely to be 
based on their connections with powerful political factions. The holding power of 
economic organizations is likely to be high if the ruling coalition is fragmented and 
characterized by weak patrimonialism or competitive clientelism. This allows 
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individual economic organizations to line up with particular political organizations 
either within or outside the ruling coalition that in turn have the holding power to 
resist the decisions of the leadership of the ruling coalition. This can clearly provide 
particular economic organizations with significant holding power that can be used in 
different ways. In particular, economic organizations can block growth-enhancing 
institutional changes that threaten their interests. Given the lower levels of productive 
capabilities in this configuration, there are obviously serious consequences of 
blocking the imposition of market or non-market discipline on economic 
organizations. However, as before, all rent-seeking activities of powerful capitalists 
are not necessarily damaging from the perspective of development. Powerful 
capitalists can induce the ruling coalition to promote productive sectors even if they 
are not likely to immediately become very productive.  
 
The industrial growth in South Asia in the 1950s and 1960s was driven by emerging 
capitalist interests with close links to political organizations within the ruling 
coalition. These interests defined early industrial policy supporting economic 
organizations investing in new technologies by providing them with protection and 
subsidized credit and other inputs. Extensive growth was rapid, even if learning and 
movements towards the technology frontier were slow. The problems with industrial 
policy emerged later when it became clear that the political power of these 
organizations reduced their incentives to put in high levels of effort in enhancing 
productivity. This was not surprising given that their rents were assured even if they 
did not or could not achieve competitiveness. In many developing countries growth 
was therefore initially rapid as protection allowed new firms to be established but 
growth could not be sustained as high levels of effort to raise productivity could not 
be assured. India, Pakistan and Bangladesh enjoyed dramatic growth accelerations 
with their industrial policies in the 1950s and early 1960s. Although output and 
productivity growth slowed down eventually, almost all the technological capabilities 
that subsequently drove growth in different sectors after the 1980s were developed 
during this early period (Khan 2008b, 2009b).  
 
As in the case of powerful high-capability economic organizations, the critical 
variable here is once again the distance of the economic organization from the 
competitiveness frontier. A moderate-to-low capability economic organization may be 
reasonably close to the competitiveness frontier for some basic technologies and 
products. These firms will then have strong internal incentives to achieve global 
competitiveness if there are significant market-based rewards for firms achieving 
competitiveness. Under these conditions, politically connected firms may use their 
political access to create temporary rents for themselves to help finance learning-by-
doing and to persuade the government to solve other problems that may otherwise 
have constrained them from reaching the competitiveness frontier. But as before, if 
the distance from the competitiveness frontier is significant or if the profits from 
achieving competitiveness are not very high, powerful economic organizations can be 
expected to use their power to create unproductive rents for themselves. It is more 
likely that economic organizations with moderate to low productive capabilities are 
far from the competitiveness frontier in most sectors. In these cases political power 
weighted towards the economic organization is likely to be deleterious to the 
imposition of discipline that may have accelerated learning and the achievement of 
competitiveness. At best, low capability economic organizations with political power 
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may engage in primitive accumulation to create wealthy organizations that may invest 
in their own capability development to become more competitive in the future.  
 
Economic organizations with low productive capabilities and considerable access to 
political power characterized many parts of South Asia in the immediate post-colonial 
period, in the 1950s and 1960s. The failure to achieve significant learning and 
productivity growth in South Asia during the 1950s and 1960s was at least partly due 
to the political ability of the entrepreneurs receiving industrial policy support to block 
attempts to discipline them (Khan 1999, 2000b; Chibber 2003; Khan 2009b). On the 
other hand, moderate capability but powerful economic organizations close to the 
competitiveness frontier in sectors like garments drove rent strategies in Bangladesh 
in the 1980s that took them to the competitiveness frontier. The sources of power that 
enabled economic organizations to resist disciplining are important because they 
imply specific policy responses. What gave a small group of economic organizations 
in post-independence India (or Pakistan) the ability to resist disciplining when the 
ruling coalition was based almost entirely on political organizations dominated by 
other interests? Indeed, as in South Korea, capitalists in the Indian subcontinent did 
not enjoy high levels of legitimacy in the post-independence period and indeed the 
official ideology of the dominant Congress Party in India was socialism.  
 
According to Chibber, individual capitalists had the power to block disciplining 
during this period because import substitution policies in India created the wrong 
incentives for capitalists. Chibber argues that capitalists were politically powerful but 
collectively had no interest in supporting disciplining because an individual capitalist 
who was inefficient had no effect on the profits of other capitalists. In contrast, 
Chibber argues, if export promotion had been attempted (as in South Korea), 
capitalists would collectively need high-quality and competitive inputs from other 
capitalists to be able to export their own products and they would therefore have 
collectively supported the disciplining of capitalists who were underperforming 
(Chibber 2003). Chibber’s argument is intriguing but in the end not persuasive in 
identifying the source of capitalist power in India and in the Indian subcontinent in the 
1950s and 1960s. It asserts that capitalists were powerful without explaining what 
gave them this power, and the core of his argument is that import substitution did not 
create incentives for this powerful constituency to support the government in 
enforcing discipline on individual capitalists. His argument suggests that shifting from 
import substitution to export promotion may have broken the power of individual 
capitalists to resist by ensuring that capitalists as a group would collectively support 
disciplining. The implicit claim here is that the establishment of a collective capitalist 
interest would change the balance of power between the state and individual 
capitalists when it came to imposing discipline. 
 
Unfortunately, export promotion can also be done inefficiently, as Pakistan 
discovered in the 1960s. Its subsidies supporting export promotion could not be 
efficiently re-allocated because re-allocation was effectively resisted by individual 
capitalists. As long as subsidies continued, low quality exports were feasible. The 
problem ultimately was not export promotion versus import substitution but rather 
that in both cases industrial policy institutions lacked the power to withdraw subsidies 
from individual capitalists. In theory, import substitution could be combined with a 
gradual opening up and a reduction of protection for selected sectors to create strong 
compulsions for productivity growth. If import-substituting industries believed that a 
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gradual opening up could be enforced, they would also have strong incentives to 
ensure that other capitalists provided them with high-quality inputs required for 
achieving competitiveness. It is not export-promotion that creates incentives for 
productivity growth but the credibility of the state declaring that support would be for 
a limited period. The weakest part of Chibber’s argument is the claim that the Indian 
state could not discipline individual capitalists because capitalists collectively were 
not supporting disciplining. Apart from the fact that capitalists had no collective 
organizations with political clout, the support or otherwise from a class that was tiny 
in numbers and with relatively limited resources is unlikely to have constrained the 
decisions of a dominant party ruling coalition based on other power bases. 
 
However, Chibber is undoubtedly right to point out that disciplining was being 
blocked by capitalists, many of whom had not even achieved significant technological 
capability or economic power. An alternative analysis of the political settlement in 
India can explain the power of individual capitalists to block disciplining using their 
association with powerful political organizations. Rather than the collective position 
capitalists may have taken about the usefulness or otherwise of disciplining, a better 
explanation is that Indian capitalists could buy into significant informal sources of 
holding power provided by political organizations that were not in turn well-
coordinated in a cohesive ruling coalition. The ruling coalition in India was a weak 
variant of constrained patrimonialism, with a dominant party, the Congress Party, 
which was internally divided in many factions and with relatively weak leadership 
control over different factions. Individual capitalists could not be disciplined because 
they could develop associations with particular political factions that were powerful. 
The factions needed the economic resources and rents that the capitalists could 
generate or kick back to the faction. In return, the individual economic organization 
would be protected and be able to resist attempts to discipline the conditions under 
which it received support. The failure of institutions like the licensing system to 
allocate or re-allocate licenses in line with objective criteria that it had set itself had 
little to do with whether capitalists collectively were interested or not interested in 
supporting disciplining. Rather, the failure was a result of individual capitalists being 
linked to powerful politicians and their factional organizations within the Congress 
Party. As a result, these economic organizations could not be disciplined by the lead 
agencies charged with monitoring and enforcing industrial policy institutions.  
 
The fragmentation of political organizations in India meant that even capitalists who 
were unable to mobilize significant resources were able to find some powerful 
political organizations hungry for resources and willing to offer their support to 
particular capitalists and their organizations. Indeed, the historical evidence suggests 
that Indian capitalists were closely associated with particular politicians and factions 
in the Indian subcontinent from the early twentieth century and these links were 
developed further during the early industrial policy period. This more plausible 
explanation of the power of individual capitalists also suggests that broad-based 
industrial policy would not have worked in the Indian subcontinent without 
significant changes in the political settlement. A shift from import substitution to 
export promotion would not have achieved a significant change on its own, and the 
experience of Pakistan in the 1960s supports this hypothesis (Khan 1999). 
Alternatively, given this political settlement, variants of industrial policy that focused 
on narrower sectors and technological goals may have performed better if the 
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appropriate (narrowly defined) governance capabilities to implement these institutions 
could have been developed.   
 
Finally, the lower right hand corner of Figure 6 describes a difficult situation where 
entrepreneurs have low technological and entrepreneurial capabilities and also lack 
any significant political power. Outcomes will once again depend quite significantly 
on the interface with the ruling coalition. In principle, a strong patrimonial 
developmental coalition could be quite successful in accelerating accumulation and 
learning in these contexts (provided some technological and entrepreneurial 
capabilities existed). Ethiopia’s attempt to implement accumulation and learning 
strategies in the late 2000s under its dominant party ruling coalition is an interesting 
experiment of this type. However, with limited political voice and holding power, 
entrepreneurs in this economic configuration may also be expropriated if the ruling 
coalition objectives change to short term extractive goals as a result of its perceived 
vulnerability or other reasons. Particular entrepreneurs and their organizations can 
also face expropriation if they do not fit into the particular regional or sectoral 
interests of the ruling coalition.  
 
If the ruling coalition is not able or interested to push accumulation and technological 
progress, economic organizations that are politically weak are unlikely to be able to 
drive economic policies. For instance, Tanzania’s dominant party ruling coalition in 
the 2000s was based on a relatively weak patrimonialism, and tending to transform in 
the direction of competitive clientelism. The ruling coalition had a limited 
engagement with economic organizations despite official support for the private 
sector during this period. Directed policies of support for economic organizations 
have not been aggressively supported. In this case, one reason was that many 
entrepreneurs were Asian or European in origin and not African and this perhaps 
made it more difficult for a vulnerable dominant party to openly support business 
interests. At the same time, business interests were themselves too politically weak to 
drive policies and institutions from below. The availability of aid and natural resource 
rents further weakened the incentives of the ruling coalition to develop the politically 
weak productive sector with proactive policies when easier opportunities for meeting 
the minimum resources requirements for the viability of the ruling coalition existed.  
 
9. The Political Settlement and the ‘Micro’ Analysis of Institutions  
The political, bureaucratic and economic subsystems together describe the most 
important organizations in a society. The operational equilibria within and across 
these subsystems defines a political settlement if the minimum economic and political 
viability conditions for system reproduction are achieved. At the macro-level, the 
political settlement describes the mutually supportive institutions and organizations 
that constitute this reproducible system. Figure 2 summarized the interdependent 
relationship between institutions and the distribution of power between organizations. 
Institutions affect the distribution of power because institutions sustain a distribution 
of economic benefits across organizations and contribute to their holding power. At 
the same time, the distribution of power across organizations affects institutions 
because powerful organizations are likely to determine the evolution of, and 
modifications in, formal and informal institutions to achieve the distributions of 
benefits most aligned with their relative power. Once a sustainable equilibrium 
between institutions and organizational interests emerges, both the institutions and the 
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distribution of power become mutually supportive in a reproducible economic system. 
An operational equilibrium at the macro-level does not imply that growth is high or 
that social conflict is low but only that the levels of economic activity and political 
stability achieved allow a reproduction of the institutional system. The first level of 
analysis is thus to describe the operational equilibrium of the political settlement at a 
social level, and in particular the economic outcomes and levels of political stability 
or conflict associated with the reproduction of that particular operational equilibrium. 
Once this emerges, the evolution of institutions and organizations takes place in path 
dependent ways within the constraints set by the macro-political settlement.  
 
The analysis of the characteristics of a political settlement at the macro-level is a 
necessary starting point for a second level of analysis of particular institutions at the 
micro-level. The economic effects of any particular institution is likely to depend on 
the characteristics of the political settlement within which it is embedded as the latter 
determines the modifications that are likely to be necessary for the institution to 
achieve an operational equilibrium. At the same time, the political costs of changing 
or introducing particular institutions are also likely to depend on the macro-political 
settlement because the resistance or support that particular institutional changes face 
will depend on the configuration of organizational power in which the institutional 
change in question is to be located. As new institutions or changes in institutions 
affect the incomes of relevant organizations, the resistance or support of particular 
organizations can be predicted. The implications for resistance and therefore for 
political stability will depend on the configuration of power across affected 
organizations. Typically, the analysis of institutions ignores the organizational and 
political structure in which the institution is supposed to operate and this is why 
standard institutional analysis is unable to explain why apparently similar institutions 
have significantly different effects in different contexts. An understanding of 
differences in the construction of the political settlement across contexts can help to 
explain a significant part of these differences in institutional performance.  
 
This analysis is particularly relevant for policy assessments of the feasibility and 
likely outcomes of different directions of incremental institutional change. The 
distribution of organizational power supported by the macro-political settlement can 
help to explain the joint economic and political implications of introducing or 
changing particular institutions. Every incremental institutional change is likely to 
involve a combination of formal and informal modifications to these institutions 
depending on the macro-political settlement (with incremental implications for 
growth and development) as well as resistance or support from competing groups of 
organizations (with incremental consequences for political stability and conflict). The 
outcome of any particular institutional change will therefore be a combination of 
changes in economic outcomes and in overall political contestation and stability that 
cannot be read off just from the characteristics of the institution without looking at the 
political settlement in which it is being located. The micro-analysis therefore 
identifies a specific ‘growth-stability trade-off’ emerging as a consequence of 
particular paths of incremental institutional change in the context of a political 
settlement. The characteristics of this trade-off depend on the specific institutional 
change that is being considered as well as the characteristics of the macro-political 
settlement. Some directions of institutional change are likely to have more adverse 
growth-stability trade-offs in particular political settlements because they involve 




The macro-political settlement can be described by putting together the interactive 
features of the three subsystems that describe the political, bureaucratic and economic 
organizations of a society. In each case, the strength of the operational equilibrium 
with existing institutional structures and the economic consequences of informal 
modifications depend on the interests and relative holding power of the dominant 
organizations in these subsystems. Figure 7 summarizes the characteristics of a 
number of political settlements in developing countries that are all variants of the 
broadly defined clientelist political settlement. The effective interventionist 
institutions of the East Asian developmental state achieved rapid and sustained social 
transformations. But the effectiveness of these institutions is only imperfectly 
understood by looking at the institutional features of industrial and other policies in 
these countries. More fundamental was the effective and strong operational 
equilibrium between these institutions and a configuration of organizational power 
that allowed the enforcement of particular formal and informal institutions. The 
features of the distribution of power between different types of organizations that 
underpinned the developmental state are summarized in the first row of Figure 7. The 
operational equilibrium allowed the enforcement of rapid transfers of assets to 
modern productive sectors and the enforcement of effective learning strategies and 
other policies that accelerated the capability development in economic organizations.  
 
 
Figure 7 Variants of Clientelist Political Settlements 
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In contrast, many authoritarian states in developing countries had superficially similar 
formal institutions, and their leaderships attempted to follow similar strategies of 
support for capability development in export-oriented economic organizations. The 
much poorer performance of these states, including Pakistan in the 1960s has elicited 
a number of explanations focusing on small differences in policy instruments but none 
of them are entirely satisfactory. The major difference between the performance of 
authoritarian and developmental states can be located in the distribution of 
organizational power that resulted in very different types of operational equilibria for 
apparently similar institutions attempting to address similar economic problems. In 
Pakistan’s authoritarian state, institutions that attempted to direct resources to 
productive sectors faced much higher political costs in terms of instability. In 
addition, institutions that attempted to enforce discipline on firms receiving support 
for technology adoption were subverted by coalitions of these firms and powerful 
political organizations. The distribution of power across political organizations meant 
that economic organizations could easily form coalitions with powerful political 
organizations to protect their interests (Khan 1999). 
 
Figure 7 shows a few more examples of the possible variations in the constitution of a 
clientelist political settlement. From the perspective of the political settlements 
framework, the critical differences between clientelist political settlements are located 
in the distribution of power between organizations in one or more areas. In each case, 
the overall configuration achieves reproducibility of the system but with different 
rates of economic growth and overall political stability, and possibly with different 
levels of sustainability of the system over time. In addition, the characteristics of the 
macro-level political settlement are important for our second level of analysis, which 
focuses on the economic and political effects of particular institutions at the micro-
level. This level of analysis is shown in Figure 8. It looks at the implications of 
introducing particular ‘incremental’ institutions within a specific political settlement.  
 
 




Standard institutional analysis typically looks at the economic implications of 
particular institutions in isolation. The conventional theoretical analysis of 
institutional outcomes is shown in the left-hand half of Figure 8. The standard 
analysis does recognize that the norms and values of the population may affect the 
costs of enforcement. For instance, if the respect for private property is internalized in 
norms, this is likely to reduce the costs of enforcing private property rights. But in the 
absence of significant distributive conflicts, the enforcement of socially desirable 
institutions should lead to accommodating changes in cultures and values. The latter 
can only explain significant differences in the performance of similar institutions if 
we believe that values are exogenously given and are not amenable to change in 
response to economic opportunities. Otherwise they can at best explain relatively 
small and transient differences in institutional outcomes before economic 
opportunities result in accommodating changes in values.  
 
However, values and norms may not always evolve to support apparently beneficial 
institutions if there are distributive conflicts between different groups preventing their 
enforcement. An institution may result in an increase in net social benefit but with the 
benefits and costs distributed in ways that are resisted by powerful groups. If 
contestation prevents the enforcement of the potentially beneficial institution, cultures 
and values are unlikely to change in ways that support its enforcement. In this case, 
the norms in question are not independent variables explaining the poor outcomes; 
rather they are dependent variables reflecting the failure of enforcement. The failure 
of enforcement, in turn, can be explained by juxtaposing the change in the distribution 
of benefits associated with the particular institutional change and the relative power of 
the organizations affected. If powerful organizations are adversely affected, they are 
likely to successfully contest the enforcement of the institution. The result is likely to 
be some combination of formal or informal modifications to the institution that in turn 
affect the economic outcome and perhaps also an ongoing resistance to its 
enforcement that affects the overall level of political contestation in society. The 
effect of any particular institution therefore depends not only on the description of the 
institution but also on the macro-political settlement which describes the distribution 
of power between the organizations affected by the particular institutional change.  
 
The extended analysis of institutions in the context of the political settlement is shown 
in the right-hand half of Figure 8. The particular (incremental) formal institution that 
is the subject of policy implies specific distributive outcomes that may or may not be 
consistent with the distribution of organizational power described by the political 
settlement. The contestation over enforcement then explains the varying economic 
and political outcomes that can be associated with the same institution in different 
contexts. This analysis has a number of important implications. First, if the 
enforcement of formal institutions is constrained by the distribution of organizational 
power sustained by the ‘social order’, we can begin to explain why the performance 
of institutions and policies has varied so greatly across countries. A corollary is that 
the institutions and policies that are developmental can vary significantly across 
countries. What may be theoretically a ‘second-best’ institution may actually be ‘first-
best’ once we account for differences in resistance and enforcement costs that may 
result in a worse outcome in some contexts if we attempt to follow the best 




Secondly, an analysis of the political settlement also explains why ambitious 
developmental strategies of the East Asian type have generally failed in most 
developing countries. The East Asian states adopted institutional responses to market 
failures that made obvious sense if they could be adequately enforced. Their good 
fortune was that they also had very specific political settlements that allowed the 
enforcement of these specific institutional strategies. In particular, they had inherited 
weak political organizations as a by-product of Japanese strategies of colonial rule. In 
contrast, in the more typical British and French colonial strategies, indigenous elites 
were used in the colonial administration together with strategies of divide and rule. 
Political organizations therefore evolved to be both much stronger and more 
fragmented as colonial powers encouraged countervailing political organizations to 
balance each other and thereby reduce the cost of suppressing them collectively (Khan 
1999, 2000b).  
 
Thirdly, the characteristics of the political settlement in developing countries can 
explain why in general, good governance strategies that attempt to introduce and 
enforce market-enhancing institutions have also fared poorly. The social order in 
developing countries has to be responsive to powerful organizations outside the 
formal economy. The enforcement of formal institutions is unlikely to protect the 
incomes of these organizations. These incomes are by definition likely to be based on 
informal institutions and informally managed rents. Powerful organizations can 
therefore be expected to resist the enforcement of formal institutions and to 
successfully modify their enforcement in ways that ensure their access to significant 
rents. Finally, in some countries, the political settlement may be so adverse that the 
space for feasible institutional and policy reforms may be very limited. There may be 
no feasible improvements in institutions and in the capabilities of bureaucratic 
organizations that would allow even a few important market failures to be adequately 
addressed. Here an understanding of political settlements and the experiences of other 
countries may suggest strategies of political reorganization to change the political 
settlement itself. But the difficulty and hazards of such strategies need not be stressed.  
 
10. The Growth-Stability Trade-off  
The introduction of institutions that are incompatible with the interests of powerful 
groups can be expected to result in resistance and counter-mobilizations by these 
groups. The transition costs that powerful coalitions can inflict on those who are 
proposing the institutional change as well as on society in general have multiple 
dimensions. We include in these political transition costs all types of costs that a 
society can face as a result of organized political resistance to the implementation and 
operation of particular institutions. The transition costs can be measured by the degree 
to which stability declines. If the institution is a growth-enhancing one, we expect to 
observe a ‘growth-stability trade-off’ whose severity depends on the political 
settlement, the institution in question and the strategies the ruling coalition are 
pursuing in attempting to enforce the institution.  
 
As there is always some margin for tolerating a decline in stability, some growth-
enhancing institutions are always being introduced and partially enforced in most 
political settlements even if they are resisted by powerful groups. The severity of the 
decline in stability when improvements in growth are achieved determines the 
feasible limits to institutional change along the particular path being followed. Thus, 
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the shape of the ‘growth-stability trade-off curve’ and the minimum level of stability 
that the society has to maintain are important determinants of the limits to institutional 
change possible in that society over the period in question. The shape of the trade-off 
and changes in it over time are in turn determined by a number of variables and we 
will consider three important factors that will inform our subsequent analysis.  
 
First, holding everything else constant, the shape and position of the trade-off depends 
on the political settlement, as the distribution of power determines the strength of 
resistance to particular institutional changes. The distribution of power is exogenous 
for the analysis of particular institutional changes but is not exogenous for society. It 
changes through social mobilizations, political activities creating new political 
organizations and coalitions, and the process of institutional change itself. Note that a 
change in the relative power of organizations brought about by organizational activity 
is only sustainable if the new distribution of power is reproducible, in other words, if 
a new political settlement eventually emerges.  
 
Second, the shape of the trade-off depends on the strategies used while introducing 
the institutional changes. If powerful groups are bought off by sharing some of the 
benefits from the outset the trade-off is likely to be less steep compared to a strategy 
of confrontation. In this case, there is an informal modification of the formal 
institution that results in lower contestation and instability but very likely at the price 
of an inferior economic outcome compared to the theoretical outcome associated with 
that institution. However, over time, informal modification strategies may gradually 
change the relative power of organizations to imply further movements in the trade-
off curve. For instance, in some cases early compromises with powerful groups can 
build up more serious problems later by strengthening the relative power of these 
groups and resulting in a further deterioration in the trade-off over time. Conversely, 
in some cases a confrontation strategy that has high initial transition costs in the form 
of political stability can if successful reduce the power of unproductive organizations 
to hold up future changes and result in a more favourable trade-off curve in the future. 
But the sequence may be otherwise in both cases. For instance, confrontation could 
result in the fragmentation of a fragile coalition supporting change and result in a 
more adverse trade-off in the future, and so on.  
 
Thirdly, the position of the trade-off curve over time can also depend on whether 
incremental or discontinuous changes in the institutional structure are being 
attempted. Small incremental institutional changes are obviously likely to face more 
limited resistance while simultaneous changes along a number of fronts that can be 
described as ‘discontinuous’ can unite a number of coalitions of organizations to resist 
the changes. But once again, there may be paradoxical effects over time. Incremental 
changes may result in sequential modifications of the formal institutions that are being 
introduced in such a way that the motivation for further institutional changes is 
dampened. Discontinuous changes may by-pass this problem. Nevertheless, in general 
it is much more likely that incremental changes will face a more favourable trade-off 
in the immediate future as well as over time.  
 
The observations above are relevant for the analysis of institutional change within a 
particular country. The trade-off analysis can also be used to compare institutional 
performance across countries in a more realistic way as long as we remember that the 
effects of different political settlements on levels of political stability are not directly 
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comparable across countries. Nevertheless, a better qualitative analysis of institutions 
and institutional change is possible if we begin with a comparison of the differences 
in the relative power of organizations affected by similar institutional changes and the 
likely effects of their support and resistance for particular trajectories of institutional 
change.  
 
Political Settlements and the Trade-off Curve 
The growth-stability trade-off shown in Figure 9 can only be defined with clearly 
specified initial conditions. The initial conditions are specified not only in terms of 
resource endowments, rights and technological capabilities but also in terms of the 
formal and informal institutions and organizations that describe the distribution of 
power in that society. It follows that growth-stability trade-offs are specified for 
periods when these initial conditions and in particular the macro-political settlement is 
relatively stable. A change in the distribution of power or any of the other initial 
conditions can be expected to shift the trade-off curve. The institutional changes along 
a particular path also have to be well defined together with the strategies of 
management and modification through which incremental institutional changes are 
introduced. The resistance to particular institutional changes can be very different 
even in the same country depending on the sectors and the interests affected and the 
organization and relative power of these interests. In our trade-off curves we will not 
be looking at the general problem of institutional change, or even the best path, but at 
specific paths defined by the actual trajectories of institutional change in the context 
of a particular political settlement.  
 
 
Figure 9 The Growth-Stability Trade-off 
 
The vertical axis indirectly measures the political transition costs of institutional 
changes by showing the ordinal rank of institutional situations in terms of their 
implications for ‘stability’ as perceived by the ruling coalition responsible for the 
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enforcement of institutions and therefore directly subject to transition costs. The 
horizontal axis measures economic performance, in this case economic growth. 
Keeping all other variables fixed, incremental changes in institutions or incremental 
changes in the enforcement of existing institutions can improve growth. Both count as 
institutional change. If the resultant distribution of income is contested by powerful 
groups, higher growth could be associated with higher transition costs with obvious 
implications for stability as perceived by the ruling coalition. Our first proposition is 
that the greater the holding power of the groups whose distributions of benefit are 
threatened by the institutional changes, the steeper the trade-off curve will be. 
Moreover, any exogenous strengthening (weakening) of these groups will result in the 
trade-off curve as whole moving towards (away from) the origin.  
 
Transition costs are imposed primarily on the ruling coalition proposing the 
institutional change, but there are significant externalities affecting the broader 
society, particularly in the case of violence. Transition costs in general are likely to 
affect much broader groups in society, and indeed this may also be part of a strategy 
of putting pressure on the ruling coalition. An inclusive measure of all the dimensions 
of costs unleashed by political conflict does not exist as transition costs can be 
inflicted through different mechanisms ranging from legal protests and mobilizations 
to violent conflict. Each of these mechanisms may inflict measurable transition costs, 
either directly on the ruling coalition or indirectly through effects on society, in the 
form of days lost in strikes, the costs of different forms of violence and so on. But the 
different dimensions of transition costs are not necessarily commensurable and some 
dimensions may be more important than others in particular contexts. To enable 
comparisons across situations where the dominant transition costs are different, we 
use a general category of ‘stability’ to rank situations in terms of the most relevant 
transition costs appropriate to a particular institutional path.  
 
We need to assume that the most significant transition costs along a particular path of 
institutional change can be identified (electoral risk for the ruling coalition, economic 
costs of strikes, human costs of violence, and so on). We also assume that we can at 
least rank situations in terms of the most relevant transition costs along a specific path 
of institutional change. This means that we know whether one situation ranks higher 
or lower in terms of transition costs compared to another situation even if we cannot 
measure these transition costs directly. This is a plausible assumption in most cases, 
as opposed to the requirement of a cardinal measure of transition costs. The stability 
axis locates situations distinguished by different institutional characteristics in terms 
of their rank. Institutional characteristics refer to the extent to which a particular 
institutional change has been implemented or enforced. Locations higher up the figure 
(higher stability) rank lower in terms of transition costs and vice versa. It is worth 
pointing out that the decline in political stability shown along any particular trade-off 
curve is not necessarily permanent and refers only to the period of resistance to a 
specific institution or institutional change. However, the period of resistance can be 
long or short and is itself the subject of analysis. If the institutional change is rapidly 
accepted then the power of previously powerful organizations must have changed as a 
result and the macro-political settlement has itself evolved in a particular direction. 
Thus, political stability can improve either because the institutional change is 
reversed, or if the groups engaging in resistance give up. The latter implies the 




The horizontal axis measures the actually achieved growth rate (or other measure of 
economic performance) associated with each of the institutional situations that were 
ranked along the y-axis. Each point on the trade-off curve (shown as a continuous 
curve for convenience) therefore represents a specific institutional situation (defined 
by the degree to which an incremental institutional change is implemented and 
enforced) described in the diagram in terms of its associated growth rate and its rank 
in terms of stability. The pace at which stability declines will clearly depend on the 
strength of the groups opposing the institutional change and the other characteristics 
of the institutional change discussed earlier such as the strategy of modification, the 
scale of the change and so on. If the resisting coalitions are weak, the trade-off curve 
is more favourable (higher up and/or flatter), if they are strong, the trade-off may be 
very adverse (lower down and/or steeper). Changes in the strength of supporting and 
opposing coalitions can also result in shifts of the trade-off curve, as the same 
institutional changes will then be associated with greater or lesser effective resistance. 
Changes in the political settlement are therefore an important endogenous cause of 
shifts in the position of the trade-off curve for a particular society. 
 
The ‘minimum sustainable level of stability’ in Figure 9 plays an important role in our 
analysis. This is the level of stability that is tolerable for the ruling coalition given the 
reproduction conditions of the macro-political settlement. The minimum level of 
political stability required for a particular path of institutional change depends on the 
political settlement but also on the identity of the groups affected by the reform. For 
instance, if the resistance is being organized by coalitions on which the ruling 
coalition depends, the minimum level of stability may be quite high. The minimum 
level defines the point beyond which institutional change cannot be pushed without 
unravelling the ruling coalition and therefore changing the political settlement. 
Crossing this point in some situations could simply mean an electoral defeat for the 
ruling coalition. In a competitive clientelist configuration this may result in the 
emergence of a new ruling coalition without changing the overall characteristics of 
the political settlement, but the current ruling coalition will obviously not push 
institutional change to the point where this becomes likely. In other contexts it could 
mean a more fundamental change not only in the identity of the organizations that are 
dominant but in the organization of the political settlement itself. In extreme cases 
violence could escalate out of control and the political settlement could unravel into a 
sustained crisis.  
 
A political settlement also requires a minimum level of economic performance to 
sustain itself. If economic performance falls below this level the distributive 
arrangements that sustain the political settlement are also likely to unravel as powerful 
groups may engage in new mobilizations to ensure that their economic interests are 
protected. In Figure 9, the maximum growth that could be achieved with the initial 
political settlement PS1 is at point A1. This would only be achieved if the ruling 
coalition had incentives and compulsions to push growth to that point. The diagram 
simply tells us that such an outcome would be feasible in terms of the political 
settlement. If a change in the distribution of power weakened the coalitions resisting 
institutional change, and the political settlement moved to a more favourable position 
like PS2, this would allow higher growth to be achieved at A2 along the same path of 
incremental institutional changes. On the other hand, if an autonomous change in the 
political settlement resulted in the trade-off curve to move to PS3 the society would 
find itself in an unsustainable position because it would not be able to satisfy its 
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minimum economic and stability conditions simultaneously. A settlement like this is 
likely to unwind into crisis and conflict till a new distribution of power emerges that 
allows the minimum economic and political viability conditions to be satisfied. 
 
11. The Evolution of the Political Settlement in Bangladesh  
The borders of Bangladesh emerged in 1947 when the British province of Bengal was 
partitioned and parts of Assam were added on to create East Pakistan, which became 
the eastern wing of the uniquely bifurcated new state of Pakistan. East Pakistan 
became Bangladesh in 1971 when the two wings of Pakistan separated. Unlike West 
Bengal which was significantly industrialized, East Bengal in 1947 was almost 
entirely an agrarian economy growing rice and jute. The economic backwardness of 
the new state of Pakistan and the perceived threats to its survival combined with a 
failure to find a constitutional arrangement that could simultaneously reflect the 
relative populations of the two wings (East Pakistan was more populous) and the 
interests of dominant economic, political and military organizations (almost entirely 
located in West Pakistan) resulted in the emergence of an authoritarian governance 
structure in 1958. In the 1960s substantial progress towards industrialization was 
achieved from a very low base. However, both economic growth and political 
evolution changed the balance of power between organizations in ways that made the 
industrial policy institutions and the authoritarian political structure unsustainable. 
The result was another set of violent confrontations between incumbent and emergent 
elites in Pakistan culminated in 1971 in the separation of East Pakistan as Bangladesh. 
 
Table 1 East Pakistan/Bangladesh Growth Trends 1950-2005 
 Manufacturing  Industry  Agriculture  
1950-1955  9.5 11.5 2.4 
1955-1960         8.5  8.6 0.3 
1960-1965  10.6 17.4 3.2 
1965-1970  5.3 7.7 2.8 
1970-1975  -9.8 not available  not available  
1975-1980  5.1 5.9 3.3 
1980-1985 4.5 5.5 2.8 
1985-1990 4.6 5.4 1.6 
1990-1995 7.9 7.2 1.7 
1995-2000 5.5 6.3 4.7 
2000-2005 6.5 7.1 2.4 
Sources: Lewis (1969: Table 1), World Bank (2008) 
 
The birth of Bangladesh in 1971 was followed by more violence that grew in intensity 
in the early years of the state. The conflicts over resources between competing groups 
of ‘primitive accumulators’ became more intense as the previously excluded Bengali 
elites now had access to state power to accelerate their own accumulation strategies. 
Initially, of course, these processes were very wasteful because the accumulators were 
not productive and their accumulation strategies seriously damaged an already 
vulnerable economy. And yet, this accumulation was creating a future class of 
capitalists who would play a role in driving growth in the next decade. Nevertheless, 
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this was a period of substantial instability, with an attempt to create a one-party state 
in 1975, the assassinations of two heads of state in 1975 and in 1981, periods of 
military rule and finally the emergence of a competitive clientelism with an emergent 
multi-party democracy in 1991. The latter faced periodic crises of electoral transition 
when parties refused to accept (often with good reason) the organization of elections 
or their results. Nevertheless, despite its apparently dysfunctional governance, by the 
turn of the century Bangladesh emerged as a relatively high-growth developing 
country with a growing base in manufacturing based on the garments and textile 
industries and gradually branching into other sectors. The trends in growth rates from 
1950 to 2005 are summarized in Table 1. The political settlement in Bangladesh has 
clearly changed over time and these changes are relevant for understanding the nature 
of the institutional and policy challenges the country faced over time.  
 
The evolution of the political settlement can be divided into four main phases, each 
with implications for institutional performance relevant for growth and stability. 
These are summarized in Figure 10. The first phase, from 1958 to 1971, during the 
Pakistan period, was characterized by a vulnerable patrimonialism as a description of 
the relative power of political organizations and authoritarian political institutions. 
This was an outcome of the coup of 1958 that brought in a military-led government 
and a new constitution that created political institutions with authoritarian 
characteristics. Bureaucratic organizations in the new state had limited capabilities for 
concerted action. Economic organizations had low capabilities and in addition, the 
dominant economic organizations were politically well-connected making it difficult 
to discipline these organizations when that was necessary. Nevertheless, it was during 
this phase that Pakistan’s industrial policy was most effective in generating growth, 
with significant progress in industrialization, mostly in the West, but with substantial 
progress in the East as well, as can be seen in Table 1.  
 
The growth-stability trade-off was relatively favourable for the implementation of a 
strategy supporting extensive growth. A pro-industry industrial policy supported a 
high rate of accumulation in industry assisted by exchange rate, interest rate and 
subsidy policies. Rapid industrial investments took place in new sectors in which the 
country had little or no prior experience. As in India, the new capitalists were well 
connected to political factions, in the case of Pakistan with politicians and bureaucrats 
within the authoritarian state. This meant that despite the state being formally 
authoritarian, it lacked the political capacity to discipline apparently weak economic 
organizations and this limited the prospects of industrial policy when it had to move 
beyond its extensive phase (when new economic activities were initiated) to the 
intensive phase (when the new organizations had to graduate to global 
competitiveness so that subsidies could be removed and made available for 
developing further sectors). The low productivity growth within the new firms being 
set up in industry would eventually have made the strategy unsustainable. In Pakistan, 
the challenge to the policy came first from a different source: the distributive conflict 
between West and East Pakistan that changed the distribution of power and 





Figure 10 Stages in the Evolution of the Political Settlement in Bangladesh 
 
The industrial policy that was applied in Pakistan created a distribution of benefits 
between East and West Pakistan that was politically unsustainable. It favoured the 
development of economic organizations that already had moderate productive 
capabilities and these were almost entirely based or at least owned by entrepreneurs 
from the Western wing. The strategy of developing an East Pakistani capitalist class 
was half-hearted and insufficient. The fact that the East’s population was bigger than 
that of the West meant that the distributive conflict rapidly took the form of a mass 
movement for democracy. As new political organizations emerged and began to 
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coalesce into a grand coalition, particularly in East Pakistan, the distribution of power 
between the ruling coalition and excluded organizations began to change. The 
effective distribution of power was no longer a vulnerable patrimonialism by the late 
1960s but had shifted effectively towards competitive clientelism. The operational 
equilibrium of authoritarian political institutions was no longer sustainable without 
the use of excessive amounts of violence. Not surprisingly, the embattled military 
government eventually allowed elections in 1970, and the East Pakistan based Awami 
League won a majority of seats in the Pakistan parliament on a programme of radical 
federalization. But a transition to democratic political institutions could not be 
achieved because the powerful economic, political and military organizations of the 
West refused to accept the outcome of the elections. The result was another partition, 
with much violence.  
 
A second phase in the evolution of the political settlement covers the period from 
1971 to 1975. A diverse coalition of organizations had come together to fight the 
authoritarian state and these coalitions now came to power at the head of a new state. 
The inclusion of almost all politically relevant organizations within the ruling 
coalition meant that the political system had a constrained patrimonial structure. 
Constrained patrimonialism has limited enforcement capabilities in general, but in this 
case the low economic capabilities of the economic organizations aligned with the 
ruling coalition meant that it had very limited capabilities to enforce limits on 
unproductive rent capture by its own constituent organizations. Organizations that 
appeared to be economic organizations were effectively organizations in close 
alliance with political organizations and engaged in unproductive resource capture. 
This obviously had dire consequences for the economy. This was a turbulent and 
violent period as the new elites with political power had few productive economic 
assets or supporters with such assets. It was not surprising that the political 
organizations in the ruling coalition had no interest in enforcing the formal rights of 
the productive sector. Their goal was rather to use formal and even more so informal 
political power to capture assets and resources for themselves. The result was intense 
‘primitive accumulation’: the capture of assets using political power. This was 
necessary to satisfy the aspirations of important organizations within the new ruling 
coalition, but the pace of the primitive accumulation meant that the ruling coalition 
rapidly faced the prospect of political and economic collapse. The growth-stability 
trade-off was adverse for almost any growth-enhancing institutional strategy. 
Moreover the trade-off was rapidly worsening to a position where the achievement of 
the minimum economic and political viability conditions was threatened. Famine 
struck and the attempt of the ruling coalition to keep its hold on power through 
authoritarian responses rapidly began to unravel. 
 
A constrained patrimonialism had produced a dominant party through the electoral 
system but its electoral dominance could no longer be guaranteed given the economic 
and political crisis that was unfolding. Many of its constituent organizations were 
dissatisfied with what they were getting and wanted to leave. Some did begin to leave 
and began to challenge the ruling party from outside. Effectively, the distribution of 
power began to change in the direction of competitive clientelism. The response of the 
ruling coalition was to amend the constitution to create a one-party state, effectively 
attempting to institutionally maintain the dominant party by changing the political 
rules of the game. The use of administrative measures to define insiders and outsiders 
created political institutions with authoritarian characteristics. Keeping the ruling 
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coalition formally inclusive by administrative decree would at best be a weak 
operational equilibrium given that the underlying distribution of power was moving 
away from constrained patrimonialism towards competitive clientelism. In fact the 
one-party state could not even be implemented at all because President Mujib-ur-
Rahman was assassinated in 1975 with the tacit knowledge and support of 
organizations within the ruling coalition.  
 
The third phase from 1975 to 1990 was a transitional phase towards the political 
institutions of multi-party democracy. The underlying distribution of power had 
already shifted substantially in the direction of competitive clientelism. Political 
institutions that were entirely authoritarian could no longer be in operational 
equilibrium with this distribution of power. The coalitions ruling during this period 
were led by military leaders, and formal and informal institutional limits on political 
competition continued over this period. But repressive authoritarianism of the type 
that was instituted in the 1960s could no longer be in operational equilibrium with the 
very different distribution of power across political organizations that had evolved. 
The interim solution devised during this transition period was to have military backed 
political parties engaged in electoral competition with other parties with little or no 
formal restrictions on the latter. In fact, of course, the participants knew that winning 
these elections was impossible for the opposition because of informal administrative 
measures. But the ruling party was constituted out of coalitions absorbed from other 
parties, and the electoral process and open political competition served the purpose of 
helping to identify the most powerful political organizations which needed to be 
accommodated within the ruling coalition. The political competition was therefore 
functional in helping to construct the most effective ruling party in terms of the 
political organizations that were included and the price at which they were included. 
The political calculations for constructing an effective ruling coalition in a context of 
competitive coalition began to emerge during this transition period.  
 
This was also the period when the economy began to slowly recover from years of 
conflict. From 1980 to 2005, the agrarian nature of the economy began to gradually 
change. Table 2 shows that the share of industry in GDP grew from around twenty to 
almost thirty per cent, with agriculture moving in exactly the reverse direction. The 
military rulers and military-backed parties began a slow process of economic reforms 
that moved away from the centralized ‘socialism’ of the immediate post-independence 
period, with (very gradual) moves towards privatization and liberalization. The 
garment sector takeoff began in the late 1970s, helped by lucky international 
accidents like the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) but also because ad hoc 
institutional changes on a small-scale could be effectively implemented and enforced 
under the more stable operational equilibrium in the political sphere under President 
Zia-ur-Rahman. The growth-stability trade-off began to improve but growth was still 
sluggish. Economic organizations were still weak in terms of technological 
capabilities and still had considerable access to political power. In some sectors, 
economic organizations were close to the global competitiveness frontier in 
technologies that were relatively simple, like garments. In these sectors, the political 
connections of economic organizations helped to get policies modified in ways that 
could assist these organizations to achieve international competitiveness. This assisted 
growth through gradual pro-business interventions in these critical sectors with 
relatively simple technologies where the emerging economic organizations with 




Table 2 Sectoral GDP Shares Bangladesh 1980-2005 
1980 1990 2000 2005
Bangladesh Agriculture 31.6 30.3 25.5 20.1
Industry 20.6 21.5 25.3 27.2
Services 47.8 48.3 49.2 52.6
    Source: (World Bank 2008) 
 
However, this was a transitional period because the political institutions of controlled 
democracy were in increasingly unstable equilibrium with intensifying competitive 
clientelism. The latter was evolving as excluded factions were becoming relatively 
stronger and were increasingly unwilling to accept the rules of political competition 
set during this period. After a series of intense confrontations, the second ex-military 
ruler, President Ershad, was forced to step down in 1990 and the period of multi-party 
political competition under competitive clientelism began. 
 
The fourth and final period is one of a moderately stable but vulnerable operational 
equilibrium of democratic institutional rules with competitive clientelism. This period 
also witnessed a steady increase in the economic growth rate. The garment industry 
played an important role in the economic fortunes of the country in this period. After 
steadily acquiring competitive capabilities, its growth took off in the mid to late 1980s 
and it rapidly became the major foreign currency earner of the country. Political 
competition was organized around two major parties distinguished by deeply felt 
differences in the way they defined the ‘nation’. These differences had trivial 
implications for practical policy issues but allowed the definition of two coalitions big 
enough for each to form a ruling coalition. The major political problem was to ensure 
that elections were not manipulated by incumbents to the extent that the excluded 
faction refused to participate in elections. The crucial transitional election of 1991 
was held under an ad hoc caretaker government that was non-partisan. The non-
partisan administration during the election meant that the losing Awami League 
accepted the result and their demand for a permanent constitutional arrangement for a 
caretaker government to organize elections led to the 13th Constitutional Amendment 
of 1996.  
 
The system worked till 2007 when the caretaker system was undermined by the 
incumbent Bangladesh Nationalist Party interfering with the process that determined 
the head of the caretaker system. The resulting crisis resulted in a two-year emergency 
caretaker government backed by the army that attempted to solve the problem of 
political instability by attempting to implement good governance reforms. The 
political settlement could not, of course, be changed to approximate those of advanced 
countries and the system reverted to its equilibrium of multi-party democracy with 
competitive clientelism. However, instability remains high and in 2011 the ruling 
Awami League pushed through the 17th Amendment that did away (amongst other 
things) with the caretaker system. The opposition BNP has stated very clearly that it 
will not participate in elections unless the caretaker system is re-instated. The 
sustainability of democratic institutions therefore remains vulnerable.  
 
A serious problem for the operational equilibrium of democratic institutions with 
competitive clientelism is that formal institutions are insufficient for ensuring 
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acceptable elections. There are general limitations in enforcing formal institutions in 
clientelist political settlements. In a context where all formal institutions are 
informally modified, it is not surprising that formal political institutions have proved 
inadequate for constraining the competing parties during elections. Violations of the 
rules constraining the illegal financing of political parties are widespread. In addition, 
the incumbent can leverage bureaucratic organizations involved in administration and 
policing to tilt the outcome slightly. This is one reason why the bureaucracy has been 
increasingly politicized over time. The electoral result can therefore often be 
justifiably rejected by the loser if the winner is the incumbent. If elections are close in 
terms of the numbers of votes cast for the two major parties (which is often the case in 
Bangladesh), the outcome can depend on administrative obstacles created for the 
losing party in a small number of constituencies. Politically, the outcome of an 
election is acceptable to the loser under these circumstances only if it is very clear that 
the winner can field significantly greater organizational power. The attempt to solve 
this problem through the constitutional mechanism of caretaker governments during 
elections worked for three successive elections but failed in 2007. The sustainability 
of the competitive clientelist political settlement requires a solution that credibly 
ensures the possibility of factions cycling through elections. This credibility is likely 
to depend on informal ‘institutional’ arrangements between the two main parties that 
assures a ‘live-and-let-live’ understanding on areas of major concern and therefore 
ensures that the loser can cycle back to power after a term in opposition. This 
informal understanding has not emerged.  
 
An unfortunate consequence of competitive clientelism has been that bureaucratic 
organizations have become more fragmented and of lower capability over time. This 
is the result of a creeping politicization of the bureaucracy with wholesale transfers 
that amount to the effective demotion of senior bureaucrats after every change of the 
party in power. As a result, the time horizons of bureaucrats undoubtedly shrink and 
incentives are created for bureaucratic investments in developing party loyalties rather 
than in their professional capability development. Economic organizations have on 
the whole gradually enhanced their competitive capabilities though most remain in 
relatively low technology sectors like garments and textiles. The growth-stability 
trade-off in this political settlement depends on the institutions and policies being 
examined. For sectors where entrepreneurs possess sufficient capabilities to become 
internationally competitive rather rapidly, the growth-stability trade-off can be quite 
favourable. Institutions that appear to be dysfunctional can often be made to work in 
the interests of competitive economic organizations through informal means and side-
payments. Thus, the property rights of these enterprises are effectively protected (for a 
price) and they are able to influence policy and its implementation sufficiently to 
remain viable. On the other hand, acquiring technological capabilities in new sectors 
that are far from the competitiveness frontier faces a much less favourable trade-off. 
Responding to these market failures typically involves the creation of relatively long-
lasting policy-induced rents to enable learning-by-doing to be financed. Success 
requires the management of these rents by enforcing conditions for their allocation 
using formal or informal mechanisms. These requirements are difficult to meet when 
political power is fragmented and bureaucratic organizations have weak capabilities 
and are linked to political power. In this context, informal modifications of formal 
institutions have a negative effect because the enforcement of conditions can be easily 
subverted. Thus, in sectors where economic organizations are relatively far from the 




12. Military Authoritarianism: 1958-1971 
The roots of the economic and political crises with which Bangladesh began its life as 
an independent country in 1971 has to be understood by looking at the legacies of the 
Pakistan period. Pakistan itself faced serious political and economic challenges when 
it became independent in 1947 and the patterns of economic and political 
development that were adopted deepened the crisis in its eastern wing. The challenges 
faced by Pakistan were both economic and political. All the territories that constituted 
the new state of Pakistan were relatively some of the least developed parts of the 
Indian subcontinent. The reasons behind the political crisis were even deeper. A 
constitutional crisis in the newly independent Pakistan was almost inevitable given 
that the western wing was relatively more developed and was home to the top 
bureaucratic, military and economic elites while the eastern wing had a bigger 
population and therefore would hold power in a democratic polity. East Pakistan had 
virtually no indigenous capitalists, and virtually no senior bureaucrats or army officers 
in 1947. While West Pakistan was less developed compared to more advanced areas 
of India, many of the Muslim businessmen and senior bureaucrats from other parts of 
India who opted for Pakistan settled in West Pakistan as they were culturally closer to 
that region. The army too was largely drawn from the Punjab region of West Pakistan.  
 
The indigenous elites of the two wings of Pakistan had never been strongly behind the 
idea of Pakistan and had not worked together prior to 1947 with a shared vision of 
Pakistan. This may appear to be surprising but their unpreparedness and lack of 
coordination is in fact easy to understand. The two most important Muslim-majority 
areas of India were Punjab and Bengal. The western part of Punjab became the heart 
of West Pakistan and the eastern part of Bengal became the core of East Pakistan. 
However, the demographic dominance of Muslims in these provinces meant that 
Muslims already enjoyed substantial power under the electoral system introduced by 
the British in 1936. As a result, Muslim chief ministers already ruled in these 
provinces long before 1947 and they had no interest in partitioning the provinces they 
were already ruling. The dominant Muslim parties in these provinces were not the 
Muslim League though they were sometimes in coalitions with the latter. The 
discourse on partition was primarily played out in central India where Muslims were a 
minority and where Jinnah’s Muslim League was trying to negotiate constitutional 
and political protections for Muslims in these provinces in an independent India. The 
Muslim League was not organizationally strong in either Bengal or Punjab and it 
spent much time trying to bring these provinces under its wing to enhance its own 
bargaining power at the centre.  
 
Jinnah’s own commitment to an independent Pakistan was a negotiable one. When the 
British offered a federal plan (known as the Cabinet Mission Plan) in 1946, Jinnah 
gave up his demand for Pakistan and was willing to negotiate with the Indian 
Congress under Nehru on this basis. The Cabinet Mission Plan gave substantial 
powers to federal units and the fact that Muslims would have real powers in some 
parts of India gave Jinnah the confidence that this would be sufficient to protect 
Muslims in the parts of India where they would be a minority (Jalal 1985; Chatterji 
1995). It was only when Nehru ruled this out that the Muslims in Bengal and Punjab 
panicked at the implications of a centralization of power in Delhi which would make 
them powerless in their own provinces. There was an electoral and political swing to 
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the Muslim League at the last minute, as a result of which the Muslim League won 
the 1946 elections in Bengal and was the biggest party in Punjab. The partition of 
India rapidly became inevitable as a result of this last minute failure in negotiations 
between Jinnah and Nehru. Only then did it become clear that the partition of India 
was definitively going to happen and would create a Muslim homeland in the two 
main Muslim provinces. But the local leaderships and populations in these provinces 
were unprepared for either partition or statehood and had not spent a long time 
working out what such a state would look like.  
 
The Muslim League immediately faced serious problems in trying to cobble together 
a Pakistani state. It had won many votes in the 1946 elections but it had a weak party 
organization in the parts of India that would now become Pakistan. Moreover, most of 
its top leadership came from parts of India that would not become Pakistan and lacked 
any political constituency in the new country. However, West Pakistan’s largely 
Punjabi elites soon discovered they stood to become the dominant group in the new 
state in terms of their relative position in the bureaucracy and army and their relative 
economic development. The Punjabis also experienced the most significant savagery 
on both sides during partition and this created a strong demand for a centralized and 
militarily strong Pakistan, a demand that had little resonance in the East where the 
experience of partition was less traumatic and bloody. This combination of factors led 
to the East Pakistani political elites suddenly discovering that they were in a 
subordinate position of political power in the new state. Thus, the new state of 
Pakistan began its life with serious conflicts of interests between the politicians and 
political organizations of the two wings from the outset. A decade of constitutional 
discussions failed to achieve a power-sharing formula between the two wings that 
would satisfy both the dominant elites of the west and the aspiring elites of the east. 
The former were dominant in terms of their links with economic and bureaucratic 
(including military) organizations, but the latter could legitimately claim political 
equality if not superiority on the basis of their population numbers.  
 
The central problem was that the relatively poorer and less developed East Pakistan 
had at that time a bigger population, making the economically dominant West 
Pakistani elites suspect that they had much to lose in a democratic system. Moreover, 
even though East Pakistan was relatively underdeveloped, its political organizers were 
more organized and experienced in mass political mobilization and electoral politics 
as it had a longer history of colonial rule. Finally, West Pakistan was internally split 
into four provinces so that it was very likely that votes in the West would be split 
between several political parties. These asymmetries in the economic, political and 
organizational capabilities of the two wings made a constitutional settlement virtually 
impossible. The military coup of Ayub Khan in 1958 was the result. 
 
The imposition of martial law curtailed the formal rights to set up and operate 
political organizations. The ruling coalition was defined around a core group of 
bureaucratic and military elites but inevitably West Pakistani economic organizations 
were close to these groups. Political parties were excluded and initially had very 
limited organizational capabilities to resist the enforcement capabilities of the 
military-bureaucratic coalition. However, the history of prior political mobilization 
meant that the excluded organizations would not remain permanently quiescent. The 
political subsystem was nevertheless initially a vulnerable patrimonialism and the 
institutional authoritarianism that was introduced was initially in a moderately 
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effective operational equilibrium with this underlying distribution of organizational 
power. For a while, the threat of force did indeed disrupt the ability of excluded 
organizers to pose a significant threat to the ruling coalition. Till the mid-1960s the 
operational equilibrium was fairly stable in the political subsystem. But gradually, 
political organizers in both wings of Pakistan began to organize increasingly effective 
popular resistance to the ruling coalition, taking the form of strikes, demonstrations 
and defiant public meetings. In the second half of the 1960s, Bhutto’s Pakistan 
People’s Party in the West and even more so, the Awami League in the East led by 
Mujibur Rahman began to mount an effective challenge to the ‘patrimonial’ claim of 
the military-authoritarian ruling coalition to rule in perpetuity.  
 
Economic organizations had low competitive capabilities in both wings of Pakistan 
but they were almost non-existent in the East. The West benefited from the fact that a 
number of capable Muslim merchant and industrial capitalists immigrated to Pakistan 
from western India and chose West Pakistan as their natural home. These capitalists 
had strong links with the Muslim League from British times and had financed its 
politics in India (Khan 1999). These political contacts became even stronger now 
because the military-dominated ruling coalition realized that economic growth was 
vital for the survival of the country. As a result they fostered strong ‘political’ links 
with the West Pakistan-based business elites. Policy-induced rents were now 
controlled by a ruling coalition consisting of the military-bureaucratic elite and their 
close business allies. At the same time control over access to foreign exchange, the 
exchange rate, interest rates and tariffs and quotas allowed the state to create rents for 
privileged business elites. The initial effect of the new political settlement was not 
only greater political stability but also a sustained growth spurt that lasted through 
much of the 1960s. But the location of political power and entrepreneurial capabilities 
meant that almost all the manufacturing growth was located in West Pakistan.  
 
The military ruling coalition could not rule without some incorporation of political 
forces. The major institutional mechanism for purchasing and organizing stability was 
the Basic Democracy system that Ayub innovated in 1959, one of the first acts of his 
regime. This attempted to by-pass the established political organizations led by 
organizers based in the towns by creating a new constituency of political leaders in 
the villages who would be cheaper to accommodate within the ruling coalition. A total 
of 80,000 ‘basic democrats’ were elected on a non-party basis. They served as an 
electoral college for electing members of parliament as well as the President. 
Authoritarian regimes have often used this tactic of going over the heads of their 
immediate opponents and appealing to the interests of those below them. The latter 
would initially demand a lower price and from the perspective of the patrimonial 
ruling coalition, the new socially inferior political organizations appear to be easier to 
control. The provision of relatively limited rents to this large army of rural 
representatives through rural infrastructure construction programmes and Food for 
Work programmes for a time created a countervailing source of support for the 
regime that made it difficult for the older political organizations to organize dissent 
(Sobhan 1968). 
 
In the end, Basic Democracy was self-defeating for the regime. As the rural basic 
democrats became more confident and ambitious, they saw obvious opportunities in 
throwing their lot in with the growing dissent that the traditional political 
organizations could mobilize. When this began to happen in the late 1960s, not only 
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did the ‘hot house’ economic development come under threat, the political stability of 
the country was fundamentally challenged as there were no easy ways of 
incorporating excluded elites into the system quickly enough. The PPP in West 
Pakistan and the Awami League in East Pakistan began to significantly increase their 
holding power as their number of direct and indirect supporters increased. In the 
second half of the 1960s the number of strikes, hartals (general strikes shutting down 
cities for a day) and other manifestations of civil protest increased exponentially 
(Alavi 1971; Ziring 1971; Jahan 1972; Gardezi and Rashid 1983; Zaheer 1994). This 
evidence can be interpreted as a dramatic increase in the relative power of excluded 
organizations and an increasingly rapid dissolution of the organizational distribution 
of power in the political subsystem described as vulnerable patrimonialism. 
 
Under pressure in both wings of Pakistan, the military government allowed elections 
in 1970. They did not foresee that the East Pakistan based Awami League would gain 
an absolute majority in parliament. The East did have a majority of seats in the central 
legislature but the military ruling coalition believed that the vote would be split 
between several parties. In the end, the superior political organizational skills of East 
Pakistani politicians led to a resounding victory of a single party, the Awami League. 
This led to an even more serious constitutional crisis as West Pakistan based elites 
were unwilling to let an East Pakistan party form the government. The last desperate 
act of the authoritarian regime was a bloody crackdown on political organizers and 
their intellectual supporters in East Pakistan in March 1971. As the conflict became 
increasingly bloody, the political settlement collapsed into crisis. Civil disobedience 
in the East intensified and transformed into a war for liberation and independence. 
Pakistan’s historic enemy India intervened to assist the Bengali struggle for 
independence and the independent country of Bangladesh was born in 1971. 
 
The relationship between changes in the political settlement and the implementation 
of institutions supporting growth is summarized in Figure 11. The combination of 
changes in the relative power of political organizations and the introduction of 
authoritarian political institutions in 1958 resulted in a movement outwards of the 
growth-stability trade-off curve for institutions and policies supporting of extensive 
growth. These were institutions that focused the allocation of resources and subsidies 
to a small number of economic organizations that could drive growth. They included 
the licensing rules that allocated scarce foreign exchange to growth sectors, 
overvalued exchange rate policies that made machinery imports cheap at the cost of 
the rupee income of peasant exporters of raw jute, provided subsidies for exporters of 
manufactured products and allocated bank lending to favoured investors in new 
manufacturing industries. These formal institutions could be enforced to a greater 
extent because the political settlement prevented those opposed to these policies from 
organizing effective resistance, while the economic and political organizations that 
benefited did not have significant incentives to informally modify these institutions in 
ways that hampered their enforcement. For almost a decade, the institutions 
supporting extensive growth achieved rapid growth with the development of new 
sectors that had previously not existed in the country (Khan 1999, 2008b). This is 





Figure 11 Growth and Crisis under Authoritarianism 1958-71 
 
In contrast, the improvement in the trade-off curve for the institutions that were 
required for intensive growth was much less favourable, as shown in the lower set of 
curves in Figure 11. As in the India of the same period, powerful business groups 
were strongly networked with particular politicians and in the case of Pakistan with 
particular bureaucrats or generals. This meant that from the growth rate of A2, further 
improvements in growth could not be achieved through learning-by-doing and 
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productivity growth because the enforcement of discipline faced very steep declines 
in stability. Alternatively, the institutions responsible for disciplining would be 
informally modified so significantly that growth improvements would not be 
achieved. The operation of banks, licensing rules and other institutions that should 
have enforced discipline on poor performers were informally modified so that growth-
enhancing outcomes were not achieved. If these institutions could have been enforced 
(whether through formal or informal mechanisms) growth could have been pushed 
significantly beyond A2 in Figure 11. But more significantly, the extensive growth at 
A2 was not sustainable without productivity growth making economic organizations 
viable without subsidies. The failure to achieve the enforcement of the second type of 
institution resulted not only in lower growth rate, but also eventually the collapse of 
extensive growth.  
 
The political settlement was not sustainable for several reasons. First, the failure to 
make the growth sectors self-sufficient meant that subsidies could not be freed up to 
spread the growth to new sectors. Economic organizations that failed to achieve 
competitiveness appeared to be crony capitalists living off public resources. This 
delegitimized the ruling coalition and its strategy and allowed political entrepreneurs 
to organize new intermediate class groups who had been left out of the growth and 
could now be mobilized to organize even broader groups in society. Secondly, the 
skewed regional pattern of growth had further delegitimizing effects. The absence of 
an East Pakistani capitalist class and the absence of a sufficiently autonomous ruling 
coalition that could develop East Pakistani economic organizations as a long-run 
strategy of stabilizing the polity meant that the major beneficiaries of policy-induced 
industrial growth were West Pakistani owned economic organizations. There were 
some attempts to redress the balance both by promoting some East Pakistani 
capitalists in the 1960s as well as using the public sector to promote industrialization 
in the East, but these steps were too limited relative to the scale of the problem. The 
economic imbalance created a ready and legitimate grievance for excluded political 
organizations in the East to coalesce around issues of economic and political 
exploitation of the East. The mobilization of political organizations in the late 1960s 
meant that the distribution of power across political organizations no longer 
approximated vulnerable authoritarianism. As this happened, authoritarian institutions 
could not be in operational equilibrium with this underlying distribution of power. 
The result was a growth of instability and violence within the political subsystem and 
the consequence was that the political settlement as a whole began to collapse into a 
broad-based crisis. As the first diagram in Figure 11 shows, the result was a collapse 
in the trade-off curve for the operation of all institutions including the institutions 
supporting extensive growth. In fact by the late 1960s the level of instability and 
violence had reached a point where the minimum economic and political viability 
conditions for system reproduction could not be met. It was out of this violence that 
Bangladesh was born. 
 
13. The Rise and Fall of Dominant Party Authoritarianism 1972-1975 
The victory of the excluded Bengali political organizers in 1971 created a new crisis. 
The Awami League, which won virtually every seat in East Pakistan in the 1970 
elections, was clearly for the moment a dominant party. The party had also included 
within its ranks the majority of political entrepreneurs and their organizations. By the 
time independence was achieved in December 1971, there were few significant 
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organizations that remained outside the broad umbrella of the party and its related 
organizations. The patrimonial nature of its subsequent rule was based on this 
inclusion of all relevant and powerful organizations directly or indirectly within the 
movement led by the party. In terms of our categories, the distribution of power 
across political organizations immediately after independence approximated that of 
constrained patrimonialism.  
 
But the inclusion of so many diverse organizations under the umbrella of the 
nationalist movement led by the Awami League was not based on a unified 
ideological position on which a disciplined party had been constructed. Many if not 
most organizations had joined the Awami League to ensure that they were not 
excluded from access to power in the new political arrangement that was likely to 
follow after the breakdown of the authoritarian regime in Pakistan. The incentive to 
work under the umbrella of the Awami League was magnified after the election 
victory of the Awami League in 1970 and even further after the breakdown of 
negotiations in early 1971 that made the independence of Bangladesh inevitable. By 
late 1971 therefore, only political entrepreneurs who were strongly opposed to the 
partition of Pakistan and a few ideological parties like some Marxist factions 
remained outside the broad umbrella of the Awami League and its allied parties. 
Thus, when Bangladesh was born the ruling coalition consisted of a broad coalition of 
almost every politically significant organization in the country, but it was also a 
coalition that was particularly weak in terms of its internal discipline. 
 
Initially, the concerned patrimonial description of the political subsystem meant that 
the leadership of the Awami League began to believe that they could rule indefinitely 
as long as the inclusive character of the dominant party could be maintained. But this 
inclusion was actually not based on shared political objectives but rather on the 
calculations of a large number of diverse organizations that their opportunities for 
economic and political advantage were larger within the party than outside it. The 
political leadership also did not have a disciplined party apparatus that was adequate 
for maintaining discipline in a context where significant resources were to be 
allocated to entirely new groups of the social structure that had previously been 
excluded. How would the political beneficiaries of the new system of power be 
selected and how would their relative claims be assessed and satisfied? It is not 
surprising that violence within the party steadily increased. The number of 
organizations and therefore political entrepreneurs within the party had vastly 
increased and now almost all powerful political entrepreneurs were within the ruling 
coalition. Given the limited rents that were available for distribution or capture, the 
allocation could not be settled to everyone’s satisfaction.  
 
Central party control over its own competing political organizers could not be easily 
established. Individuals and groups who received less than they expected threatened 
to leave the party and engage in opposition or violence from outside. At the same 
time, accommodating all individuals and groups on the terms that each thought 
reflected their bargaining power would add up to more resource redistribution than the 
economy could possibly sustain. The dissatisfaction within the party was rapidly 
represented in a number of ideological debates: between those who had fought or 
claimed to have fought in the war of liberation and those who for various reasons had 
not or could not, and between slightly different versions of the now dominant 
‘socialist’ ideological consensus. Behind these debates over nationalism and socialism 
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was in most cases primarily a concern about who would have the power to decide or 
limit the allocation of rents. 
 
An analysis of the logic of patron-client politics in developing countries can help to 
explain this crisis. Twice in the last fifty years in East Bengal, massive political 
victories were followed by the virtually immediate disintegration of the winning 
party. The Muslim League, which won a landslide in Bengal in 1946 and was 
instrumental in achieving Pakistan, fell apart in East Pakistan in a matter of months. It 
lost the 1954 provincial elections to the secular United Front, never to recover (M. G. 
Kabir 1995: 122-39). Now, once again, the Awami League had won a landslide 
victory in East Pakistan in 1969 and its victory was instrumental in creating another 
independent country but now it began to disintegrate within months of independence 
(M. G. Kabir 1995: 183-95). Some aspects of these disintegrations can be explained in 
terms of the economic logic underpinning the competition between organizations 
within a ruling coalition in a clientelist political settlement. The paradox of political 
success is that when a political organization is too successful in attracting primary 
organizations to join it, it faces a problem. It achieves significant holding power in 
contests with other organizations and can potentially win to become the ruling 
coalition, but in victory it finds it does not have sufficient resources to satisfy all the 
aspirants who have joined as faction leaders. In East Bengal in 1947, and then in East 
Pakistan in 1971, the problem was even more dramatic. The coincidence of communal 
or ethnic identities with factional ones meant that in 1947 the defeated factions 
preferred to leave the country and in 1971 they were forced to leave. Thus, at the 
same time as demands for redistribution increased, the resources that could be 
redistributed shrank. In 1947 the aspirations of East Pakistani political organizers 
were blocked by new constitutional problems and eventually the imposition of martial 
law. But in 1971, these aspirations broke out in an intense competition for resources 
that threatened to tear apart the ruling party.  
 
The situation within the ruling coalition in 1972 was clearly unsustainable and the 
ruling party, the Awami League, attempted to re-assert central authority over 
competing political organizations by resorting to authoritarian means. Authoritarian in 
this context refers to the imposition from above of rules that restrict the activities or 
choices of political organizations. The Awami League could not impose martial law 
after having fought so long against it, so instead it tried to use a constitutional 
amendment to introduce a one-party state and a presidential system of governance that 
would concentrate powers in the hands of the president. The hope was that this would 
reduce the intensity of competition between competing political organizations and 
enable the president to impose discipline from above, if necessary by using repressive 
enforcement. In particular, the threat of leaving the dominant party and competing 
with it from outside was removed by requiring that all political activity had to be 
carried out within the party. This too was expected to reduce the bargaining power of 
constituent organizations within the party and to assist the president in enforcing a 
distribution of benefits across organizations from above.  
 
In January 1975 the fourth amendment to the constitution was pushed through despite 
misgivings amongst many party members. Mujib, the leader of the liberation 
movement, had to threaten to resign to make his party fall into line on the vote (Karim 
2005: 348). The constitutional amendment created a presidential system, with power 
concentrated in the hands of Mujib who became the president. The amendment also 
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provided for the creation of a ‘national party’ with the sole power to engage in 
political activity, and all members of parliament and the president had to belong to 
this party. In February all other parties were suspended and the national party 
launched. This was the Bangladesh Krishok Sromik Awami League (Workers and 
Peasants Awami League) or BAKSAL (Mascarenhas 1986: 57). The plan had the 
strong support of the pro-Moscow faction of the Communists as it fitted in with the 
blueprint of similar one-party experiments in other parts of the developing world then 
supported by Moscow. Socialist ideology aside, this was clearly also an attempt to 
reassert central control over rent allocation within a defined dominant coalition, in 
other words, to create a one-party version of an authoritarian ruling coalition.  
 
The problem for the Fourth Amendment was that this institutional solution could not 
find an operational equilibrium with the actual distribution of power across 
organizations as the latter was rapidly evolving. The actual distribution of power 
across organizations no longer reflected a constrained patrimonial structure. This is 
because alternative most powerful organizations were formally within the ruling 
coalition; most organizations within the one-party structure did not perceive 
themselves to be part of the ruling coalition. The party simply did not have that kind 
of ideology or discipline to make organizations feel included nor could it offer most 
organizations the resources that would satisfy them. Many organizations within the 
party felt that they were excluded and indeed many were leaving all the time, which is 
why the constitutional change happened. In the absence of the constitutional 
amendment, the departure of large numbers of organizations would demonstrate that 
the real distribution of organizational power approximated that of competitive 
clientelism. The institutional change on its own did not change this fact. It simply 
meant that excluded organizations formally within the ruling coalition now had less 
power to bargain for rents provided the actual ruling coalition had the capacity to 
enforce the constitutional rule on the organizations that were dissatisfied. The 
authoritarianism in this arrangement was therefore not directed at excluding outside 
organizations but at imposing discipline on organizations that were formally within 
the ruling coalition. If the enforcement capability of the actual ruling coalition over 
the other organizations was sufficient to overcome their likely resistance, an 
operational equilibrium may have been possible. It soon turned out that it did not have 
this enforcement capacity. On the contrary, a number of individuals from the army 
with the collusion and support of factions within the ruling party acted to remove the 
top leadership of the party in an act of violence.  
 
The events leading up to the constitutional amendment and the bloody debacle that 
followed demonstrate this analysis. The opposition to the constitutional amendment 
was, of course, not expressed in terms of the implications for the competition over 
rents between the constituent political organizations of the ruling party. Instead, 
disquiet was expressed (and some of this was undoubtedly genuine) about the 
possibility that this was the thin end of the wedge that would convert the country into 
a planned economy of the Stalinist type with its attendant authoritarian characteristics. 
No doubt, the pro-Moscow communists also supported the plan on the same 
expectation that subsequent developments would be likely to favour them. 
Nevertheless, the failure of this proposal to win the support of many of Mujib’s key 
lieutenants was significant. Many people inside and outside the party saw the move as 
a logical culmination of steps towards an authoritarian protection of the power of the 
actual ruling coalition composed of Mujib and his close associates. In the absence of 
89 
 
well-understood and shared rules for sharing rents within the party (which a more 
disciplined party may have had), many political leaders and their supporters within 
the ruling party felt justifiably threatened.  
 
Already by 1973, it had become clear that the rule of the dominant party could not be 
taken for granted and many constituent organizations were threatening to leave. As 
early as 1972 a significant section of the ‘left-wing’ of the Awami League left to form 
the Jatiyo Shomajtantrik Dal (the National Socialist Party), JSD on the grounds that 
the party was no longer socialist enough. The 1973 elections, though it resulted in a 
huge victory for the Awami League had revealed the vulnerability of many of the top 
leaders whose re-election was widely believed to have been achieved through 
administrative interventions in the electoral process (Karim 2005: 305-8). Many of 
Mujib’s henchmen and relatives were already deeply unpopular for their acts of 
appropriation and their blatant immunity from all legal restrictions. As the opposition 
National Awami Party put it: ‘Pakistan’s 22 families have become Bangladesh’s 
2000’ (Karim 2005: 290). They could have added that the rents of the 2000 were 
based entirely on expropriation and were not even remotely associated with 
technology acquisition or industrialization. The paramilitary Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini 
(National Protection Force) or JRB was increasingly used to protect Awami Leaguers 
from attack and also to intimidate voters during elections (Karim 2005: 273). It was in 
this context that the introduction of BAKSAL and the one-party state has to be 
assessed.  
 
While there was little public demonstration against the constitutional amendment, the 
climate of fear was not appropriate for the free expression of views. In secret, many 
different groups began to plot Mujib’s violent removal (Mascarenhas 1986: 64). 
Mujib himself was aware that the fourth amendment could not represent a permanent 
solution and was at best an emergency response to a situation going out of control: 
‘This one-party arrangement is purely temporary. Once I have saved the country from 
counter-revolution I will restore multi-party democracy’ (quoted in Karim 2005: 258). 
Mujib’s enemies were not convinced. They were not only based in other parties and in 
the army, but within his own party. Many ‘rightist’ members of his cabinet and indeed 
some foreign embassies were aware that a strike was being planned against him 
(Lifschultz 1979; Mascarenhas 1986). The silence of a number of key political leaders 
within the party was essential for the assassination to have been successful. And so it 
was that on the 15th of August 1975, less than four years after achieving 
independence, the founding father and president of the new country was assassinated.  
 
Independently of the secret betrayals and conspiracies, it is clear that the plan to 
create a one-party state was deeply unpopular with many of the very elites that the 
party hoped to bring together into an authoritarian one-party ruling coalition. The 
viability of an authoritarian ruling coalition is only assured if any significant 
organizers of violence outside the party can be effectively repressed and lower-level 
coalitions within the party are sufficiently satisfied to have no incentive to rebel or 
can be repressed if they do. The more credible the threat of repression becomes the 
less likely it is that repression will have to be exercised. From the perspective of 
credibility, the BAKSAL experiment was demonstrably a failure. The threat to 
impose discipline and repress those who disagreed was in the end not credible 
because the underlying distribution of power across organizations already represented 
a competitive clientelism. There were too many powerful organizations that did not 
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feel they were part of the ruling coalition and they were too powerful and too 
numerous to be credibly repressed given the instruments of enforcement available to 
the actual ruling coalition.  
 
The interesting question is why the attempt to define the ruling coalition in an 
inclusive way did not find broad support amongst the competing political 
organizations that it wished to incorporate. The likely answers to this question have 
important implications for understanding the organizational characteristics of 
clientelist political organizations in Bangladesh. The essential problem with an 
attempt to impose order on formal and informal rent allocation in developing 
countries using a one-party authoritarian structure is that there are no well-defined 
criteria for allocating resources across organizations of varying size and power. 
Political accumulation by political entrepreneurs is a dynamic process where 
sequential layers of political entrepreneurs are continuously emerging at all levels. 
One way of imagining this is to think of a multitude of patron-client political 
organizations with conveyor belts in each taking enterprising individuals higher up 
and with individuals at higher levels occasionally branching off to construct their own 
factions. A single authoritarian party is simply a coalition of a large number of patron-
client organizations which have been brought together in a larger coalition. 
Attempting to define rent allocation in a coherent way in this context faces two sorts 
of problems.  
 
The first problem is to determine the distribution of rents between the different 
factions (or constituent organizations) that are part of the ruling coalition. If each of 
these organizations was generating its own rents and the question was only about 
protecting existing rents, the problem would be a lot simpler and the ruling coalition 
could collectively provide third-party enforcement for its member organizations. This 
could happen if all factions within the ruling coalition were productive organizations 
or if the patrons of each faction were only extracting rents from their own clients. But 
if a significant part of the rents of factions are based on redistribution from elsewhere 
in society, each faction is targeting the same pool of resources for capture. In this 
case, the distribution of rents between factions cannot be guaranteed by the factions 
themselves. Only the supreme leader can do the arbitration of rent allocation between 
constituent organizations and that too only if the leader has the support of most 
organizations most of the time. If the distribution of rents between internal factions 
depends on the decisions of a supreme leader, all factional leaders have to be 
confident of their access to the supreme leader, and the leader has to have sufficient 
authority to impose decisions once taken. Clearly, a number of internal factions were 
already refusing to accept Mujib’s decisions within a year of independence and some 
had already left to oppose and unseat the ruling coalition. Mujib’s decision that a one-
party system using the authoritarianism of a constitutional amendment could force all 
these factions back to the fold and force them to accept the rent allocations he offered 
was a significant gamble. It would only work if most organizations accepted the rent 
allocation that was offered, in other words, if most organizations were actually part of 
the ruling coalition. In that case repression would only be required against a minority 
of organizations outside the ruling coalition, and in the case of constrained 
patrimonialism, the excluded organizations are of negligible strength. Unfortunately, 
in the case of Mujib’s constitutional experiment many if not most of the organizations 
formally within the ruling party were unlikely to accept rent allocation from above 
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and were also sufficiently strong to resist the repression that was available to the 
ruling coalition.  
 
The second problem for a dominant party is to define the limits of the ruling coalition. 
In the South Asian context, the number of political organizers who believe they have 
enough disruptive capacity to deserve inclusion within the ruling coalition and claim a 
share of political rents is potentially vast. It may have appeared for a moment after the 
victory of 1971 that all political organizers in Bangladesh were united in one party, 
but this was an optical illusion. The more organizers the ruling coalition 
accommodated, the smaller the rents for each organizer. The problem for well-defined 
ruling coalition as in a one-party state is that it defines insiders and outsiders clearly. 
Not only is the group of insiders too large as discussed earlier, the outsiders, however 
defined also have strong incentives to unite against insiders. Successful one-party 
authoritarian regimes usually have some special features that allow them to keep 
insiders in, outsiders out, and to absorb outsiders at a manageable rate. For instance, 
they could have significant natural resource rents that could be used to finance an 
acceptable distribution of rents for major factions and a credible control of violence at 
the centre. Some oil rich one-party states provide examples of this variant. Still, the 
calibration of the frontiers of the party is critical to ensure that the available force is 
sufficient to deal with potential dissent. Of course, the combination of force and rents 
required to make a one-party system of this type viable is not defined in absolute 
terms, but rather in relation to the strength of potential organizations (within and 
outside the ruling coalition) who demand rents based on their relative power.  
 
The danger of using rents to construct a large single party ruling coalition is that the 
ruling coalition has to have access to significant rents and the rent allocation is likely 
to be unproductive. Dominant party states often suffer from this constraint, as well as 
the constraint that they may be unable to re-allocate rents within the economy that are 
protected by powerful constituent organizations of the ruling coalition. However, 
these constraints are not always binding. A possible variant of a one-party ruling 
coalition that can overcome some of these problems is a disciplined authoritarian 
party that does not immediately offer significant rents to leaders and organizations 
lower down the organizational chain, but does offer credible career paths for 
individual party members to move up the pyramid. The credibility of such a party to 
offer future rents to individuals implies that it has a developmental strategy that can 
provide steadily growing rents over time. This may be credible strategy for keeping 
lower-level clients disciplined if the party is well-organized party and has a credible 
developmental strategy. Contemporary China provides an illustration of a one-party 
ruling coalition that does not immediately have to allocate so many rents to its internal 
supporters that the overall social rent allocation is destructive. On the contrary, the 
disciplined control over rent allocation at the social level allows the Chinese 
Communist Party to play a significant developmental role. In contrast, Mujib’s party 
had neither the natural resource rents nor a disciplined party hierarchy running a 
credible development strategy. Indeed, the party did not even control the army, as 
Mujib’s assassins were dissident young officers who operated with the knowledge of 
factions within the Awami League.  
 
The relationship of the evolving ruling coalition with economic organizations during 
this period is also interesting. Most Bengali economic organizations were of low 
capabilities but the few high-capability Bengali economic organizations were not seen 
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as allies of the regime in its attempt to achieve economic viability. This is partly 
because the departure of Pakistani capitalists left behind significant abandoned assets 
like major factories and these offered significant rent opportunities for the ruling 
coalition. These assets had to be nationalized by the state because there were no 
obvious Bengali entrepreneurs who could take them over and even if there were, it 
would be very disruptive to allocate them to private owners after a long fight against 
economic exploitation. The nationalizations increased the state’s share in modern 
industry from 34 to 81 per cent. But even this was not enough for the new ruling 
coalition. The Presidential Order of March 1972 brought the few high-capability 
Bengali-owned economic organizations in the jute, cotton and sugar sectors into 
public ownership raising the public sector’s share to 92 per cent with a corresponding 
increase in the rents the state could allocate to its supporters (Sobhan and Ahmad 
1980: Table 10.1; K. A. S. Murshid and Sobhan 1987: 3-4). Why this was done has 
been much debated. To some extent ideology played a part, but more prosaically, 
nationalization brought more rents under the control of the state which needed rents to 
keep its fractious coalitions together.  
 
The quality and capabilities of bureaucratic organizations also suffered a significant 
decline during and after the war. The top echelons of the civil service during the 
Pakistan period was staffed by an elitist group of mandarins selected by examination. 
They constituted the Civil Service of Pakistan, the CSP. Very few Bengalis found 
positions in this elite service and the CSP were generally perceived to be antagonistic 
to the interests of East Pakistan. The new state opened up employment in the civil 
service on much easier terms to a new swathe of aspirants, frequently accommodating 
political clients of the ruling coalition on an informal basis. Employment in the public 
services witnessed a dramatic expansion at a time when the examination process was 
in any case informally weakened to ensure the admission of particular individuals and 
groups. At the time of liberation in 1971, there were 450,000 employees of all grades 
in the public services, of which only 320 were officers at the level of Joint Secretary 
or above. By 1973 total employment in the public services had increased to over 
650,000, with officers in the higher grades increasing to 660 (World Bank 1984: 109). 
Some of this growth was due to the change in coverage from the inclusion of new 
industrial units within the public sector which brought their administrative staff within 
the ambit of the public services. But the number of white collar staff in Bangladesh’s 
small industrial sector would only account for a fraction of the increase. The informal 
institutional modification that allowed examinations to be ‘fixed’ so that clients of the 
ruling party could achieve easy entry into the civil service proved to be a very 
difficult informal institution to alter. It achieved a rapid operational equilibrium with 
the actual distribution of power in the political subsystem because the ruling coalition 
needed clients in the bureaucratic organizations and had the political power to ensure 
that these clients could be rapidly created. It is a problem that continues to affect 
attempts to improve the capabilities of bureaucratic organizations. 
 
The rent and resource capture during this period can be described as intense primitive 
accumulation. The most important economic organizations that were politically 
connected and benefited from rent allocation were set up by low capability new 
entrepreneurs who were closely connected to political organizations. A new class of 
entrepreneurs rapidly began to emerge rapidly bypassing the handful of older Bengali 
capitalists who had emerged during the Pakistani period, and whose assets were now 
nationalized. Interestingly, the new accumulators rapidly went beyond primitive 
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accumulation and wanted to change the limits of the ‘socialist’ policy framework that 
restricted private investment. Pressure from this group had already resulted in a 
revision of the government’s socialist industrial policy. They demanded the 
legalization of property rights over their potential investments. They would no doubt 
still prefer to have some types of rents to assist their investments but no longer 
supported the destructive rent capture of other primitive accumulators. Under pressure 
from this group in 1974 the ceiling on private investment was increased from two and 
a half million to thirty million takas. Partnerships with foreign private investors were 
allowed, and the moratorium on nationalization was increased from ten to fifteen 
years. These emerging capitalists were not at all excited at the prospect of a ‘socialist’ 
one-party state which could reverse these changes.  
 
Nurul Islam, an economist in the Planning Commission at that time describes some of 
the processes of asset and rent capture: “By 1974 there were a number of factors 
which had contributed to an accumulation of surplus funds in private hands. For one 
thing, high profits were earned in domestic and import trading activities, including 
illegal trade such as trade in contraband goods and in smuggling jute and other 
exportables across the border. Since these transactions were illegal, the risk premium 
was high and hence profits, once realised, were high. In addition, many residential 
buildings and trading or commercial enterprises, abandoned by Pakistanis, were 
illegally occupied by private persons. The ‘caretakers’ of such commercial 
enterprises, hastily appointed by the government in 1972 immediately after 
independence, made large fortunes through the undeclared sale of assets. Moreover, 
there were gains to be obtained from rental or sales proceeds of the abandoned houses 
which were illegally occupied by private persons. Those who had accumulated 
financial resources were pressing the government to commit itself to a more 
substantial and permanent role for private enterprise in the economy of Bangladesh” 
(Islam 1979: 225-6). 
 
The anarchic process of rent capture during this period had the expected negative 
effects on economic performance. An assessment of 1970-1975 is difficult because of 
the very real disruptions caused by the war, and the short life of the regime. 
Productivity in manufacturing was on average less than 50% of the level reached in 
1970 and real wages in manufacturing, around 60% of their 1969/70 level (World 
Bank 1978: Vol. II Annex I.6 p. 173, 1984: Vol. II Table 9.12 p. 118). In addition, in 
1974 Bangladesh suffered from a serious famine that took place without any 
significant decline in aggregate food availability (Sen 1983). The causes were largely 
state failure in managing distribution and ensuring purchasing power in a context of 
hoarding and smuggling. More than a million people died in the famine, which 
according to some estimates was probably more than in the war of liberation (Sen 
1983: 134-41; Karim 2005: 335-40). When finally an attempt was made to rein in the 
unproductive rents through a ‘Second Revolution’ (the one-party state) many factions 
within and outside the dominant party had no faith that this would be in their interest. 
Mujib’s assassination ended this experiment.  
 
Overall, however, the types of rents that political organizations were creating in 
Bangladesh during this period were largely unproductive and purely redistributive 
rents. The vulnerability of the economy was both a cause and a consequence of the 
fact that the rents generated by the political process were almost entirely value-
reducing (Umar 1980; Ahmed 1986: 27). Formal institutions had collapsed to the 
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point that informal rent capture was not simply sharing the returns created by 
productive activities but were in many cases simply asset capture and the creation of 
monopoly rents through different types of restrictions, over-invoicing opportunities 
and so on. Faction leaders were involved in grabbing abandoned assets, appropriating 
public resources through the creation of excess employment, making excessive 
margins on construction contracts, import contracts, and so on (Islam 1979: 225-6). 
These rents were zero-sum at best and had no positive effect on productive 
investments. In fact, they were mostly value-reducing. Major targets of appropriation 
were the assets of departing Pakistanis and of groups who could be associated with 
them, such as the (non-Bengali) Biharis. But assets of Bangladeshis were also targeted 
as were the assets of many Hindus (who had never been supporters of Pakistan) 
(Karim 2005: 283-90).  
 
Figure 12 summarizes the poor enforcement prospects of growth-enhancing 
institutions in the context of the collapsing political settlement from 1972 to 1975. 
The period began with constrained patrimonialism in the political subsystem in the 
immediate aftermath of independence. The Awami League and its allied political 
organizations dominated the political subsystem. This allowed for a time an 
operational equilibrium with democratic political institutions as the latter still ensured 
the political dominance of the Awami League. However, the internal fragmentation of 
the Awami League began to lead to the departure of disgruntled organizations from 
within the Awami League. This began to transform the political subsystem into a 
competitive clientelist one. The consequence was both a threat for the continuing 
dominance of the dominant party under the existing institutional rules as well as a 
worsening trade-off for growth institutions. In particular, the intensification of the 
competition for rents and of primitive accumulation led to more extensive informal 
modifications of formal institutions and worsening growth prospects.  
  
 




It was in this context that the Awami League leadership attempted to reinforce its 
patrimonial claim by changing the institutional rules in the political subsystem to set 
up the one-party state. However, given the competitive clientelist distribution of 
power this simply further increased instability and contestation. The incompatibility 
of these institutional rules with the underlying distribution of power across 
organizations was the source of a sharp increase in potential violence and a deeper 
economic crisis. This is shown in Figure 12 as a collapse of the political settlement. 
With enough instability in politics, the minimum economic and political viability 
conditions of the system are unlikely to be met. The political settlement effectively 
collapses under these conditions and some type of discontinuous adjustment is likely 
to happen. In 1975 this took the form of a revolt by young army officers that wiped 
out the top leadership of the Awami League.  
 
Some aspects of the emerging crisis in Bangladesh in the early 1970s were 
unavoidable. The economy had been severely disrupted by war and conflict. The 
bureaucratic organizations of the state had been thoroughly disrupted as a result of 
politicization and the departure of West Pakistani personnel. It is unlikely that even a 
limited developmental strategy could have been properly implemented even in the 
absence of any organizational resistance. In addition, the hunger of excluded political 
entrepreneurs and their organizations should not be underestimated and it would be 
unrealistic to assume that any political leadership could have fully contained the 
primitive accumulation that was unleashed. The failure of the Awami League 
leadership to stay on top and manage this social eruption therefore has to be placed in 
context. But the leadership and its policy advisors also appeared to be entirely 
unaware of the processes that were going on and took no steps that could ameliorate 
some of what was happening. On the contrary, some of their steps, like nationalizing 
Bengali-owned economic organizations, trying to develop ‘socialism’ defined as 
public ownership and job creation in a crushingly poor economy, repressing political 
competition and finally attempting to set up a one-party state against the grain of the 
evolving distribution of organizational power were a series of avoidable mistakes that 
contributed to make the problems much worse than they need have been.  
 
14. The Transition Period of Clientelistic Authoritarianism 1975-1990 
The violent end of the first Awami League regime was followed by a period of 
political turbulence. The distribution of organizational power in the political 
subsystem now approximated competitive clientelism as a number of competing and 
powerful patron-client organizations had emerged and none could be excluded for 
long by any institutional arrangements that strictly attempted to enforce exclusion. At 
the same time the institutional arrangements for organizing a democratic contest 
between these organizations could not immediately emerge given the context of 
violence and the absence of any shared conception of rules of the game to regulate 
such a contest. A gradual transition towards such an institutional structure did 
however take place, ironically under military leaderships. The transition period was 
marked by the creation of first one and then a second alternative party to the Awami 
League based on the principle of clientelist inclusion of powerful organizers under a 
dominant leader, initially from the army. Formal multi-party competition was 
introduced under these parties. While it was clear that informal power would make the 
ruling party undefeatable, political competition established the relative power of 
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competing political entrepreneurs and their organizations in a way that they could 
bargain for inclusion into the ruling party. These principles of inclusion into clientelist 
political parties based on terms determined by the holding power demonstrated by 
constituent organizations in turn established the informal rules for the organization of 
competing clientelist political parties, which in turn enabled the transition to 
democratic competition under competitive clientelism after 1990. 
 
The re-establishment of a greater degree of political stability took time. The entry of 
the armed forces into the political arena with significantly greater violence potential 
compared to the contesting political organizations did impose a truce on the 
deteriorating law and order situation in the political subsystem. However, initially the 
violence simply shifted within the army as competing officers vied to establish their 
leadership within the armed forces which had themselves been politicized by the war 
of liberation. Mujib’s assassination was thus followed by a series of bloody coups and 
counter-coups led by competing officers and supported by their informal 
organizations within the army and supporters outside. It was only in November 1975 
that General Zia-ur-Rahman, the army chief appointed by Mujib, emerged as the 
supreme leader. But the military leadership knew by now that neither the authoritarian 
model of the Pakistan period based on the exclusion of all autonomously powerful 
intermediate class organizers nor the authoritarian one-party model of Mujib that 
attempted forced inclusion under centrally determined terms would work in 
Bangladesh. General Zia was a decorated freedom fighter and enjoyed wide 
popularity. When he formally became president in 1977 he took care to construct a 
strong constituency of supporters for his rule by moving swiftly to construct a 
political party that eventually became the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). It 
remains one of the two dominant parties in contemporary Bangladesh. The new 
strategy for constructing the ruling coalition had a number of important features 
distinct from earlier phases.  
 
First, the terms on which individual coalition leaders joined the ruling coalition were 
individually bargained. The terms were effectively to offer inclusion on terms that 
were proportional to the holding power of the organization that the political 
entrepreneur could bring into the ruling coalition. The national leader wanted to 
incorporate the largest number of the most important organizers and their political 
organizations at the lowest price in terms of the rents that they demanded. A broad 
ideology of development and nationalism allowed organizers from the far left to the 
far right to seek terms for entry. The price they could extract in terms of their access 
to future rents depended on their proven organizational capabilities and therefore the 
significance of their departure for weakening their erstwhile parties. As alternative 
parties were no longer banned, organizers had the chance of proving their abilities 
outside the BNP before negotiating incorporation. Opposition parties were allowed to 
set up, operate and contest elections. The only (informal) limitation was that the top 
job was not up for grabs because the dominant party was unlikely to be defeated given 
its control over the administration. This informal administrative restriction is 
nevertheless sufficient to define the ruling coalition as authoritarian, even though 
multi-party democracy was formally reintroduced with the repeal of the fourth 
amendment that created the one-party state.  
 
Secondly, no attempt was made to define ex ante the boundaries of the ruling 
coalition. The regime maintained the right to calibrate the size of the ruling coalition 
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through a competitive process of assessment and negotiation. This too ensured that 
excluded elites had an expectation that they may be included on appropriate terms in 
the future if they played according to the rules of the game. The combination of these 
two characteristics ensured that the minimum required rents were competitively 
allocated to the most important political organizers. Implicitly, this party formation 
process identified and established the most important principles for constructing 
effective political organizations in a clientelist political settlement. The coalition that 
could put together the greatest number of powerful organizations within a feasible 
‘budget’ in terms of rent allocation to client organizations would actually be the most 
effective coalition to govern within the constraints of maintaining political stability. 
The transition to a multi-party democracy in a clientelist political settlement could not 
happen till the principles for constructing a plurality of effective clientelist parties had 
been established.  
 
Finally, economic viability required that the cost of constructing a coalition that could 
viably rule should not be too high. This meant that at the same time as encouraging 
political organizers to reveal their holding power and their terms for inclusion, it was 
also necessary to check their ambitions by encouraging countervailing political 
organizations. Both Zia, and General Ershad who succeeded him, attempted to check 
the claims of established political organizers by creating new rural voices through 
‘decentralization’. These strategies were quite similar to the Basic Democracy 
strategy of the Pakistani period, but now they were a complementary part of a broader 
strategy of competitive party formation and not part of a strategy that sought to 
permanently exclude established political organizations. Even so, these strategies, 
particularly Ershad’s attempt to create a new class of political representatives in the 
newly created ‘upazillas’ (a tier of government constituting a small number of 
villages), was strongly opposed by urban political organizers. They had a limited 
effect in enhancing overall political stability, and the attempt to force these strategies 
of decentralization through possibly had a negative effect on political stability during 
the Ershad period.  
 
The period as a whole remained one of considerable instability even though the 
extreme instability of the early years of independence gradually declined. Violence 
continued for a while, particularly within the army, where coups were frequently 
attempted. Nevertheless, some signs of a viable political settlement began to emerge 
and these elements would be built on in the fourth phase. First, the strategy of 
ensuring entry to political organizers through individual negotiations to determine the 
‘price’ that was demanded in terms of access to rents proved to be a viable strategy 
for constructing parties as coalitions of organizations. It remains the strategy through 
which competing political parties in the fourth ‘democratic’ phase continue to 
construct coalitions to form governments. By its nature, a ruling coalition put together 
in this way is likely to be turbulent with constant internal renegotiations and 
infighting. Violence is likely to sometimes break out, both within the ruling coalition 
and against factions currently out of power. But in the absence of a better method of 
determining the distribution of rents for constructing a ruling coalition, this has 
emerged as the operative default mode for constructing coalitions during the 
democratic period.  
 
Second, the openness of the boundaries defining the ruling coalition has proved to be 
extremely useful in managing the perpetual entry of new aspirants into the ruling 
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coalition and the orderly departure of those who are dissatisfied. The ‘clientelistic 
authoritarian’ period allowed new entry into the ruling coalition even if not to the top 
job. This restriction would of course eventually prove to be unsustainable in a 
competitive clientelist political structure because eventually a coalition of 
organizations could hope to challenge it. On the one hand the restriction created 
strong incentives for ambitious officers within the army to try to violently replace the 
supreme leader. There were frequent coup attempts against General Zia who was 
eventually killed in a coup in 1981. On the other hand, the effectively indefinite 
reservation of the top job for a single individual also resulted in strong opposition 
from ambitious civilian political organizers from other parties. The futility of 
elections to replace the top leader became apparent under General Ershad and resulted 
in a growing mobilization against him. As the BNP (Zia’s party) was now in 
opposition, this mobilization brought together the BNP with Mujib’s Awami League 
against the Jatiya (National) Party that Ershad had created. From 1987 onwards the 
country was under almost perpetual political instability with street demonstrations, 
strikes and frequent hartals when the excluded political organizations prevented 
movement on the streets of big cities including the capital. Ershad was overthrown in 
1990 by a popular uprising when the army refused to continue to support him if it 
meant shooting at thousands of demonstrators. The return to ‘democracy’ kept intact 
many features of the system that had been established during the clientelistic 
authoritarian period. The major change was that not only the membership but also the 
leadership of the ruling coalition was now contestable in a competitive multi-party 
system. Both would now be determined through competitive demonstrations of 
relative organizational power. 
 
The transition period also saw a significant change in the capabilities and strategies of 
economic organizations. The most predatory types of primitive accumulation began to 
die down after most abandoned assets were appropriated. The beneficiaries of the 
primitive accumulation and the older capitalists gradually regrouped during this 
period and established political connections with factions within the ruling parties. As 
many of the new ‘capitalists’ were direct beneficiaries of political accumulation, they 
were closely networked into existing factional structures. While primitive 
accumulation continued but economic organizations that had accumulated enough 
now began to invest in capability development and to learn the use of new 
technologies that would allow them to achieve global competitiveness. The 
breakdown of full-fledged authoritarianism as well as of dominant party 
authoritarianism was beneficial for this process in a number of respects.  
 
First, the breakdown of a single hierarchical political structure, whether based on 
military authoritarian or a dominant party, created more room for manoeuvre for 
political leaders and economic organizations. In hierarchical political systems where 
political and economic organizations that matter have a well-defined place in the 
hierarchy it is often more difficult to change the allocation of subsidies and benefits 
because the true holding power of inefficient economic organizations (and therefore 
the political cost of re-allocating resources) is difficult to determine without 
significant political disruption. Relatively weak organizations can continue to claim 
resources and block change because most organizations have an interest in 
maintaining the status quo and threatened organizations can find many allies if their 
interests are threatened. In addition, the Awami League’s dominant party system 
formally subscribed to the ideology of ‘socialism’ which made it easy for opponents 
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of any change in the direction of greater efficiency to present the restructuring as a 
threat to jobs or a move in the direction of capitalism. The breakdown of the 
centralized political hierarchy allowed the ruling coalition to pick and choose 
organizations for support with a greater degree of freedom. In this context, gradual 
and slow moves towards privatizations began in the late 1970s, as well as policies 
targeted to support private sector investments in emerging sectors like garments.  
 
Secondly, from the perspective of economic organizations, maintaining their relative 
position within a centralized political hierarchy of rent allocation became less relevant 
and this increased the incentive for investments in achieving competitiveness. 
However, the achievement of competitiveness was only feasible for economic 
organizations that were relatively close to the frontier because the competitive 
clientelist distribution of power meant that long-term sustained support from the 
political system was an unrealistic expectation. Economic organizations could expect 
to make relatively short-term alliances with political organizations to create and share 
rents, and if they were relatively close to the competitiveness frontier, it could be a 
feasible strategy to use these rents to achieve global competitiveness and seek profits 
in the marketplace. As Bangladeshi economic organizations were of relatively low 
capability in terms of their technological and entrepreneurial expertise, an economic 
takeoff could only happen if relatively low technology sectors became available for 
investment and if rents could be created to support learning and technology 
acquisition in these areas. Fortunately for Bangladesh, precisely such a conjuncture 
opened up in the 1980s with the opportunities for investment in the garments industry.  
 
However, business-government links that drive productivity growth to achieve 
competitiveness are only likely to work if economic organizations are within striking 
distance of achieving competitiveness and the time scale for which they can feasibly 
rely on policy-induced rents (given the short-term nature of political commitment in a 
competitive clientelist polity) is sufficient for them to attempt to achieve 
competitiveness. Given the initial capabilities of Bangladeshi economic organizations 
in the 1980s and the types of policy-induced rents that could be created, this was a 
credible and profitable strategy of rent-creation for sectors like the garments sector. 
Once such sectors achieve competitiveness, they do not need the support of rents to 
finance their learning. Thus, when sectors and firms close to the frontier achieve 
competitiveness, the ones that are left are likely to be further and further away from 
the competitiveness frontier. Business-government links with economic organizations 
that are far from the frontier are unlikely to result in favourable outcomes in a 
competitive clientelist political context. Political organizations are willing to pursue 
policies that create rents for economic organizations because they need the kickbacks 
that economic organizations can then provide. But economic organizations that are far 
from the frontier are unlikely to be able to use rents for productive purposes to 
achieve market-based profitability. In these contexts, business-government links are 
likely to result in many types of unproductive rent creation and rent capture that do 
not add to social productivity. The garments industry takeoff outweighed 
unproductive rent creation for a while but after the easy low technology sectors had 
been developed, rent creation under competitive clientelism could not in general 
create many new competitive economic sectors. This challenge became more severe 




Finally, the rapid decline in the capabilities of bureaucratic organizations that had 
happened as a result of the ravages of the war and the subsequent politicization of the 
bureaucracy and their involvement in primitive accumulation were to some extent 
stopped and even reversed during this period. To some extent this was driven by the 
exhaustion of very significant rent capture opportunities as time went on. For 
instance, abandoned Pakistani assets and industries were eventually allocated and 
after almost everything had been nationalized it became clear that the next movement 
would be in the direction of privatization. The entry of personnel from the armed 
forces into leadership positions within the administration also introduced a semblance 
of discipline for a time, though the armed forces personnel often became incorporated 
into the political rent creation and rent capture processes. Finally, the return of 
political stability allowed normal processes of recruitment and capacity-building 
within bureaucratic organizations to be resumed. 
 
An important change compared to the Pakistan period was that rents were no longer 
created or defended on the basis of general policies of development. The state stopped 
trying to create or allocate rents as part of an explicit formal industrial policy to 
develop infant industries. At best some general subsidies were temporarily justified on 
welfare grounds, for instance to safeguard employment in public sector enterprises 
that were recognized as inefficient. Market failure justifications for infant industry 
protection or technology acquisition almost disappeared. This was partly because of 
the memory of the political fight against the statist pro-capitalist policy of Pakistan 
and against the statist ‘socialism’ of the Awami League, and partly because 
international economic opinion informing policy in Bangladesh had also changed 
radically in the 1980s. Not surprisingly, Zia was an advocate of privatization. The 
rents that public sector industries and some of the newly privatized industries 
continued to receive was because the state was too weak to remove these rents from 
powerful organizations, not because the ruling coalition believed that this would 
accelerate the modernization of the economy.  
 
However, sector-specific and firm-specific rents did not disappear and indeed were 
unlikely to disappear given the political and economic requirements of organizations 
in a developing country. A more open and competitive economic and political 
environment meant that individual capitalists were free to link up with the leaders of 
political organizations to identify mutually beneficial strategies. An excellent example 
of this was the policy support that was made available to the garment industry, which 
played a critical role in ensuring its takeoff. The achievement of competitiveness in 
this sector required a critical set of international rents and domestic rents based on 
institutional innovations that Zia undertook in order to support the sector (Khan 
2008b, 2009b). The characteristics of the new political settlement, in particular the 
breakdown of a centralized political structure allowed the rapid introduction of these 
vital institutional innovations like the back-to-back LC and the bonded warehouse 
system without strong opposition being fielded by organizations who may have 
wished that the status quo should be maintained and protected. 
 
The change in the political subsystem also allowed a gradual movement towards 
privatizations that in turn changed the characteristics of economic organizations over 
time. The process began very early in General Zia’s tenure. Between 1976 and 1983, 
a total of 217 public sector enterprises were wholly or partly sold to the private sector 
or returned to their former Bengali owners from whom they had been nationalized 
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without compensation in the aftermath of liberation. However, significant 
denationalizations only began under the regime of General Ershad. Under the New 
Industrial Policy adopted in 1982, denationalizations of large-scale public enterprises 
were given priority. Privatization faced substantial political opposition, particularly 
from the trade unions of white collar workers who benefited most from the over-
employment in the public sector (Bhaskar and Khan 1995). Although white collar 
workers were potentially very powerful and were part of the intermediate classes that 
provided the political entrepreneurs who led all political organizations, the 
fragmentation of political organizations had significantly reduced their ability to 
organize concerted opposition to economic changes. The government was able to 
divest 110 large units in little more than a year, including jute mills that had 
previously been owned by Bengalis, after which the programme continued at a slower 
pace (World Bank 1984: 149).  
 
The privatizations initially had a very limited economic impact on the economy. The 
large-scale enterprises that had been created under the Pakistani industrial policy of 
the sixties had never achieved full global competitiveness. After they were 
nationalized in the seventies they built up vast additional liabilities because of over-
employment, looting and mismanagement. This did nothing to help their future 
viability when they were gradually privatized in the eighties. The new owners took 
over the liabilities as well, wrongly believing that political arrangements could be 
worked out to sustain subsidies into the future. Some of the privatized firms limped 
on and were lucky to become moderately profitable. Many eventually closed down, 
particularly in the jute and cotton textile sectors. However, the privatizations began to 
reduce the unproductive rent allocations that the permanent losses of these industries 
represented, freeing up the state to engage in the ad hoc and sector-specific policy 
support that had a greater chance of supporting growth in a few sectors.   
 
 




The growth takeoff under clientelistic authoritarianism was based on new low-
technology sectors where the political settlement created the space for new ad hoc 
institutions and policies of support that could be implemented in growth-enhancing 
ways. This is shown in Figure 13. The institutions that could be implemented could 
only provide limited support but this was sufficient in the case of a number of low-
technology sectors, in particular garments. Here, the assistance for learning new 
technological capabilities was significantly assisted by the existence of globally 
generated MFA rents, which allowed disciplined learning in the garments sector. The 
political settlement was thus much more promising for growth than before, and for the 
first time a Bengali-owned capitalist sector began to grow. This is reflected in the 
growth figures for manufacturing and industry in the 1980, as shown in Table 1. The 
growth-stability trade-off was favourable for the support and promotion of a limited 
range of formal institutions supporting specific accumulation strategies. Examples 
include the rapid implementation of changes in banking laws and customs rules that 
provided targeted assistance to growth sectors. In a break with the authoritarian 
military period, there was also a new consensus that policy should not support general 
industrialization strategies like import-substituting industrialization or general support 
for exports. There was no general policy that sought to use rents to create more 
sophisticated organizations or to absorb more sophisticated technologies. Rather, the 
focus of rent allocation was much more about the management of political stability. 
However, sector-specific and firm-specific policies did emerge on an ad hoc basis that 
implicitly created rents for businesses and sectors that were close to the technology 
frontier and the growth dividends they offered were attractive to political 
organizations and the political leadership.  
 
At the level of politics, the clientelistic authoritarian period established that brute 
force to enforce restrictive political rules could not be used to stay in power. The 
ruling coalition needed to incorporate significant numbers of political organizers. But 
it could not absorb all potential organizers either. In other words, neither the 
authoritarianism of the Pakistan period nor that of the Awami League one-party state 
was judged to be feasible in Bangladesh. The actual practice of the clientelistic 
military rule established the norm that political stability has to be based on a 
competitive system of rent allocation to allow the most important political organizers 
and their organizations to be brought into the ruling coalition at the cheapest price. 
The links of the supreme leader with the army meant that this position was not 
available for re-allocation. Competing political organizations could at best expect 
some of their most important organizers to be incorporated into the ruling coalition on 
attractive terms. This arrangement provided political stability for a while but 
eventually the major political parties united to reject an arrangement that deprived 
them of access to the most significant political job. The growing strength of excluded 
political organizations can be represented as an intensification of competitive 
clientelism to a point that the operational equilibrium with clientelist authoritarianism 
was no longer feasible. By the late 1980s there was a significant increase in political 
instability, regular strikes and hartals. The much more significant political instability 
in the latter half of the 1980s had significant effects for the enforcement of growth-
enhancing institutions, and this too is shown in Figure 13. Eventually General Ershad 




15. Vulnerable Democracy 1990- 
The overthrow of Ershad and the holding of elections under a caretaker government 
converted the authoritarian clientelistic system into a (weakly) institutionalized 
democratic one. By now the distribution of power between political organizations 
described by competitive clientelism had reached a degree of intensity that it could 
not be in any equilibrium with political institutions that permanently excluded any set 
of political organizations. The ruling coalition could only achieve stability if it 
accepted the right of excluded organizations to replace them in power through the 
democratic process. The problem (in all developing countries) is that the formal 
institutions of democracy (like any other formal institutions) cannot be fully enforced 
in a clientelist political settlement. There are bound to be informal modifications of 
formal rules that powerful political organizations can be expected to make, so there 
also have to be informal limits to these modifications to ensure that excluded political 
organizations do not engage in excessive violence because they perceive that state 
power will be used to exclude them from power. Democracy in Bangladesh remained 
vulnerable because these complex informal rules did not fully emerge more than two 
decades after the fall of Ershad. The ruling party periodically attempted to fix the 
formal and informal rules in a way that would perpetuate their power, in effect 
attempting to revert back to clientelist authoritarianism as an institutional system 
under the guise of formal democracy. But every time the result was an outbreak of 
intense political instability that inevitably led to the replacement of the party in power 
with an opposing coalition in the next election. Yet, even as late as 2011, the major 
parties did not appear to have learnt the futility of trying to modify institutional rules 
of political competition to their advantage in ways that would not be accepted by 
excluded political organizations.  
 
Economic organizations were by now relatively developed, not only in the garments 
and textile sector, but in a range of medium-technology manufacturing sectors. 
Industry overtook agriculture in terms of share of GNP in the 2000s (Table 2). Some 
leaders of industry were by now rather well-organized and closely networked with 
political parties, often keeping good relationships with more than one, as parties 
regularly cycled in and out of power. Collective organizations like chambers of 
commerce and industry played a part in engaging in the policy process though their 
formal influence was often far less than the informal access that they sometimes 
enjoyed depending on the individuals and organizations involved. The Federation of 
Bangladesh Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FBCCI) played an important role 
in the political crisis of 1996. The ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) held and 
election in which the major opposition parties including the Awami League refused to 
participate. They had demanded a continuation of the caretaker system where a 
neutral bureaucratic interim government conducts the elections after the term of a 
sitting government ends. The boycott of the opposition ensured that the first 1996 
elections lacked legitimacy.  
 
If the opposition alone had to dislodge the ruling coalition the process may have been 
protracted and violent. The FBCCI along with a number of other business and 
professional organizations took the stand that a caretaker system had to be introduced 
and their open declaration assisted in the rapid introduction of the thirteenth 
amendment that made the caretaker system mandatory. Ironically, the Awami League 
that had successfully demanded the caretaker system (and won the 1996 elections 
under it) felt that it could get rid of the system when it was in power. This it did in the 
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fifteenth amendment of 2011, pushing the country into a new electoral crisis as the 
opposition BNP immediately made it clear it would not contest the 2013 elections if 
the caretaker system was not reinstated.  
 
But while the capabilities of some economic organizations were by now fairly 
sophisticated, the evolution of the political settlement had some adverse implications 
for industrial policy, infrastructure development and general governance. Competitive 
clientelism with vulnerable institutions of democracy has, ceteris paribus, a relatively 
adverse growth-stability trade-off for many institutions supporting long-run growth. 
This is both because the permanent presence of significant excluded factions that are 
always building up their oppositional strength serves to reduce the time horizons of 
incumbents and focuses their minds on making quick money to fight the next election. 
In addition, the competitive context increases the power of lower-level factions within 
the ruling coalition and makes policy implementation difficult and the enforcement of 
formal institutions relatively poor. Strong operational equilibria with developmental 
institutions without significantly damaging informal adjustments are only likely if the 
institutions a) create enough rents for political organizations for the enforcement of 
these institutions to be attractive and b) at the same time the institutions create enough 
rents to create opportunities for learning and investment but not so much that the 
incentives for learning and investment are destroyed. This combination of conditions 
is not likely to be satisfied for many sectors, but was satisfied in a few. In Bangladesh 
these were typically low technology sectors like garments and in these sectors the 
growth-stability trade-off for growth-enhancing institutions was relatively promising.  
 
On the other hand, institutions required for supporting long-term investments are not 
likely to provide significant rents to political organizations with short time horizons. 
As a result, these powerful organizations are likely to make informal modifications to 
these institutions to extract short-term benefits in ways that are likely to damage the 
growth supporting aspects of these institutions. Overcoming these informal 
modifications and enforcing growth-supporting institutions in these contexts is 
therefore likely to face a significant stability cost, implying adverse growth-stability 
trade-offs. This is a paradoxical result for many good governance policy 
recommendations where the assumption is that the introduction of democratic 
institutions will make it easier to enforce growth-enhancing institutions. In reality, 
institutions like those supporting industrial policy or infrastructure development are 
likely to face adverse growth-stability trade-offs in developing countries with 
vulnerable democracies.  
 
However, this analysis does not necessarily imply that authoritarian political 
institutions will achieve better growth-stability trade-offs for growth-supporting 
institutions. Apart from being desirable for itself democracy in developing countries 
may allow better economic outcomes if we set up the counterfactual properly. If the 
underlying distribution of power across political organizations resembles a 
fragmented competitive clientelism with intense competition, the vulnerable 
institutions of democracy may offer a more stable operational equilibrium in the 
political subsystem compared to the alternative of authoritarianism or even 
clientelistic authoritarianism. The latter may result in a weak and contested 
operational equilibrium in the political subsystem characterized by significant 
political instability and violence. The instability can directly reduce time horizons 
across the system so that growth-stability trade-offs for important productive 
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institutions may be even more adverse than if vulnerable democracy had been 
introduced. In other words, from a purely economic perspective, authoritarianism or 
clientelistic authoritarianism can only result in more favourable growth-stability 
trade-offs if the underlying distribution of power is, or can be changed to become, a 
patrimonial one (whether constrained or vulnerable). This is why the transition to 
democracy in Bangladesh in 1990 was marked by reduced political instability and an 
improvement in the growth-stability trade-off in a few sectors.  
 
Figure 14 shows the changes in the prospects of sectors where growth-supporting 
institutions were potentially feasible in a context of competitive clientelism. The 
growth-stability trade-off even for potentially effective institutions had become 
adverse by 1990 and is shown as PS1. The growing operational disequilibrium 
between the institutions of clientelistic authoritarianism and intensifying competitive 
clientelism created a crisis in the political subsystem. The sustained political 
instability of the late 1980s affected the operation of all institutions including 
potentially growth-supporting ones and the trade-off curve for these institutions 
became adverse. The growth that could be sustained by potentially effective 
institutions declined to a position like A1. The democratic revolution of 1990 
introduced political institutions that were democratic compared to clientelistic 
authoritarianism because now the top political job became contestable and it became 
credible for an opposition party to fully replace the ruling coalition.  
 
 
Figure 14 Growth with Vulnerable Democracy 1990- 
Democratic political institutions that gave excluded political organizations a realistic 
chance of becoming the ruling coalition potentially offered a more stable operational 
equilibrium with competitive clientelism and therefore greater stability in the political 
subsystem. Greater political stability in turn allowed the enforcement of institutions 
that supportive of growth provided they were also consistent with the interests of 
powerful organizations. The result was a more favourable growth-stability trade-off at 
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PS2 and the possibility of better growth outcomes shown by A2 for sectors that were 
relatively close to the competitiveness frontier and which either did not require any 
further assistance in learning or required support for very limited periods. The 
vulnerability of the political subsystem during this period meant that the operational 
equilibrium was not very stable and was periodically thrown into disequilibrium as a 
result of repeated attempts by the ruling coalition to fix the rules of the political game 
to disadvantage excluded organizations. Whenever this happened the result was an 
upsurge of violence and instability as excluded organizations successfully contested 
the formal or informal limits that adversely restricted their chances of winning. 
During these periods of instability, the growth-stability trade-off would once again 
become adverse, moving to positions such as PS3 with growth declining to positions 
such as A3.  
 
Bengali versus Bangladeshi Nationalism and Democratic Vulnerability  
If the distribution of power across political organizations is sufficiently dispersed 
(competitive clientelism is entrenched), an attempt by a ruling coalition to exclude 
others using institutional rules and enforcement is likely to be met with stiff resistance 
and instability till the limitations are lifted. Therefore, the achievement of even a 
moderately stable operational equilibrium in a competitive clientelist polity requires 
institutions that limit the ruling coalition from constraining the chances of victory of 
excluded political organizations. The futility of attempting to institutionally constrain 
excluded political organizations under competitive clientelism was repeatedly 
demonstrated in Bangladesh after 1990 in the failure of successive attempts by ruling 
parties to alter institutions in ways that reduced the probability of excluded political 
organizations achieving political power.  
 
The interesting question is why this experience did not result in a recognition by the 
two dominant parties, the Awami League and the BNP that the only mechanism for 
achieving stability and sustained growth (and therefore for sustaining their own long-
term interests) was to have shared informal rules that supported ‘live and let live’ 
strategies of political competition. Part of the answer lies in the path-dependent 
development of the antagonistic ideological positions of the two major parties. These 
differ not on substantive policy issues but on existential questions relating to the 
origins and fundamental characteristics of the country. These ideological differences 
served to establish two mutually exclusive claims to be the natural party of rule in 
Bangladesh. From the perspective of each of the two major parties, the other is 
portrayed not just as a fraudulent claimant to the right to rule but also a potential 
threat to the survival of Bangladesh as an entity with the characteristics defined by the 
party in question. The ideological positions as they have developed are thus inimical 
for the development of a live-and-let-live set of compromises. Indeed, each is a bid to 
establish a patrimonial right to rule on an exclusive basis. The ideologies of the 
parties therefore did not adapt to the new operational equilibrium in the polity and 
indeed periodically served to disrupt that equilibrium in the direction of new crises. 
 
The history of these ideological positions is important to understand because they 
explain the path dependent problem that they generated for the post-1990 attempts to 
institutionalize democracy. Core aspects of the ideologies of both main parties had 
developed in the context of zero-sum conflicts against a ruling coalition that in each 
case had attempted to exclude others using ideology, institutional rules and substantial 
violence. In each of these contexts, excluded organizations had to develop ideological 
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positions that united them in a life-and-death struggle against the ruling coalition. In 
the case of the Awami League, its ideology of Bengali nationalism developed in the 
course of the fight against the ruling coalition in command of the Pakistani state. In 
the case of the BNP, its ideology of Bangladeshi nationalism developed in the 
aftermath of the violence unleashed by the attempt by the Awami League’s to 
institutionalize a one-party state. The purpose of this ideology was to unite political 
organizations that had been excluded by the Awami League in the aftermath of its 
violent overthrow to ensure that it could not come back to power. In both cases, the 
ideologies were deliberately constructed to be exclusive and to brook no compromise. 
Unfortunately informal institutions allowing compromises were essential for 
maintaining the operational equilibrium of democratic political institutions with 
competitive clientelism. The path-dependent development of these ideologies 
provides part of the explanation for the vulnerability of democratic institutions under 
competitive clientelism in Bangladesh.  
 
Once social forces are mobilized around exclusivist ideologies they tend to get more 
entrenched because if political strategies of one side are based on exclusion, the other 
side has no option but to drum its ideological position more stridently. The path 
dependence follows. One illustration of the problem was that the behaviour of both 
main parties in the democratic period suggested that the main object of their politics 
was to save the nation from the opposition. In the 1990s and into the 2000s the zero-
sum attitude of the two major parties came to be known in the reflective sections of 
the Bangladeshi media as the ‘battle of the begums’, referring to the two ladies who 
led the rival parties. Sheikh Hasina, daughter of the assassinated President Mujib, led 
the Awami League, and Khaleda Zia, wife of the assassinated President Zia led the 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party or BNP. Their implacable opposition to each other was 
manifested in a range of different ways. The two leaders refused to talk to each other 
and their political strategy in opposition was generally to boycott parliament and to 
rapidly call for mass political agitation to overthrow the government, including the 
use of hartals or general strikes.  Their mutual attitude often appeared to be that to rid 
the country of the menace posed by the other party would be the most positive 
contribution to development.  
 
It is in this context that we have to understand the debate in Bangladesh on the 
question of nationalism. The Awami League has defined itself as the protector of 
Bengali nationalism, while the BNP emerged as the defender of Bangladeshi 
nationalism. For nationalisms to differ from each other politically, they must each 
have a different project of state building with different borders and definitions of who 
is included and excluded in the state project. A close look at the content of the two 
nationalisms shows that they do not in fact have separate state-building projects. Yet 
in the political discourse in Bangladesh, these ideologies are mutually exclusive and 
there can be no compromise between them. Their incompatibility is real but this has 
to be understood instead in terms of the function these ideologies performed at an 
earlier period in building coalitions against a particular ruling coalition. The logic of 
coalition building requires ideologies that can serve as convenient pegs for structuring 
coalitions though the ideologies themselves may not describe their interests. The 
definition of two mutually exclusive variants of nationalism for the country served to 
distinguish two implacably opposed coalitions even if the ideologies did not describe 
any significant differences in their interests or policies. However, by defining their 
differences in terms of ideologies that were linked to past struggles where no quarter 
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was given and no compromise was possible, the parties committed themselves to 
similar strategies in the future. Connected to these definitions of nationalism was the 
related position of the two parties on secularism and Islam. Here it may appear that 
there really are fundamentally opposed positions of the parties, but again a closer 
examination suggests that this is not the case. No significant material differences exist 
between the parties in their commitment to secularism or the practice of religion or 
even on the absolute separation of religion from the state. There are undoubtedly 
small differences between the parties on these issues but they are hardly significant 
enough to explain the sharply uncompromising positions they have taken in politics. 
For that we need to look at other functions that ideologies perform and have 
performed in the past in the context of coalition-building in a clientelist political 
settlement.  
 
Many contemporary ideas about the progressive role of secularism can be traced back 
to the European experience with the Reformation and the separation of Church and 
state. The conflict between the Church and secular social forces during the 
Reformation is rightly recognized as one of the defining moments in Europe’s 
transition to modernity. This was because in Europe the Church was blocking the 
material interests of the classes that would eventually lead the industrial revolution. 
This was a fundamental reason why the opposition of the progressive bourgeoisie to 
the Church was implacable until the Church had been significantly reformed (Tawney 
1938). The specific features of the Reformation differed from country to country in 
Western Europe but some broad features were shared in common. Productive 
capitalist classes were emerging based on long-distance trade, and states were being 
constructed that could exercise territorial jurisdictions within which capitalism could 
grow. The social forces that were often opposed to them were organized around the 
wealth of the Church and the political ambitions of a Church-based empire. The social 
coalitions organized by the Church often incorporated older elites who were opposed 
to many of the changes that merchants and capitalists were bringing about because 
these changes threatened the stability of the old order and in particular the dominance 
of the Church in the ideological sphere. As a result, there were relatively sharp 
economic conflicts between monarchs, the Church and emerging capitalists that put 
the Church on one side and a collection of progressive economic forces on the other. 
 
An important economic conflict between reforming monarchs and the Church 
concerned the vast amounts of land owned by the Church. These assets not only 
reduced the access of the monarch to revenues but also created a powerful competing 
political force allied to Rome, which could prevent the centralization of political 
authority in local states. Secondly, there was a conflict between merchants and the 
Church over the theological acceptability of income from interest in Christianity. Here 
capitalist accumulation which was driving growth faced obstacles from a pre-
capitalist Church-based system of maintaining social order based on notions of justice 
that were no longer appropriate. Finally, there was a conflict between Church and 
state over their respective jurisdictions when it came to appoint officers to lucrative 
administrative and judicial positions. In this case too, territorially defined emerging 
modern states faced competition from a parallel set of jurisdictions organized around 
the Church. Thus the economic interests underlying the ideological conflict between 
Church and secular social forces were based on radically different ways of organizing 
production. This is why religion and secularism represented conflicting social 
interests in Reformation Europe. This in turn ensured that the victory of one side or 
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the other would have economic consequences for the mode of organizing production 
in Western Europe over a period of several centuries.  
 
The emergent economic supremacy of the secular interests challenging the Church in 
the course of the Reformation resulted in stronger local states and an acceleration of 
economic growth. The material interests of new productive classes ensured that the 
relevant aspects of secularism defined as the political separation of Church and state 
began to be reflected in the practice of politics across Western Europe. This is despite 
the fact that in many European countries, including England, the formal constitutional 
separation of Church and state has not emerged to this day. The Western European 
story is important because the theoretical association of secular movements with the 
liberal bourgeoisie and therefore with social progress is based on a reading of this 
history. But the political economy of religion in contemporary developing countries is 
very different and the developmental attitudes of different parties cannot be so readily 
read off from their attitudes towards religion and secularism.  
 
In the Indian subcontinent neither Hinduism nor Islam had an organized church with 
significant land-holdings and incomes along the European pattern either in pre-
colonial or colonial times, or indeed subsequently. Nor has there been any ongoing 
competition between “church” and state over their respective jurisdictions in 
appointing office-holders along the European pattern. The weakness of religious 
control also meant that rules about interest could be ignored altogether, or evaded by 
defining it as profit-sharing as in many applications of Islamic banking in 
contemporary Pakistan and Bangladesh. This meant that the restrictions on usury in 
Islam did not lead to intense conflicts between emerging merchant-financiers and the 
“church”. In independent Pakistan or Bangladesh, the merchant and capitalist classes 
have certainly not felt threatened by the anti-capitalist elements implicit in the Islamic 
ban on usury. Similarly, while some aspects of Hinduism, such as the caste system, 
appear to be anti-capitalist, emerging Hindu traders and capitalists have not felt 
threatened by these and have certainly not been in the forefront of secular movements 
in India. 
 
In the absence of a fundamental cleavage between religion and emerging capitalist 
economic interests, the political use of religion in Bangladesh has reflected very 
different interests. Clientelist coalitions have used religion, language, caste and other 
long-standing beliefs and identities as pegs around which to establish differences 
between themselves and their opponents or to invite new factions to join particular 
coalitions. As a result, parties with an apparent ‘position’ on religion have been 
willing to change their positions far more readily than if particular religious 
institutions or practices had fundamental implications for their economic interests. 
The Bengali nationalist movement led by Mujib and the Awami League against the 
policies of the Pakistan state in the 1960s mobilized against the ostensibly Islamic 
state backing the policies of the ruling coalition. In this context, the ‘secular’ aspects 
of Bengali nationalism were highlighted. However, as we have described earlier, the 
economic interests of the upwardly mobile Bengali Muslim intermediate classes were 
not blocked by the equivalent of the Church or by Islamic values but by the 
preeminent position of a non-Bengali ruling coalition unwilling to incorporate 
excluded political organizations. The victory of the Awami League in 1971 led to 
Bengali nationalism emerging as the dominant ideology of the country. The break 
with Pakistan was followed by the adoption of a secular constitution and the 
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definition of the nation in terms of a secular Bengali nationalism. But because 
secularism was not essential for protecting any fundamental economic interests of the 
ruling coalition, the Awami League was ready to ally with Islamic political 
organizations when this was necessary for its coalition building.  
 
This is best illustrated by the overtures that Mujib made to Islamic groups 
immediately after the victory of secular Bengali nationalism over the Islamic republic 
of Pakistan. An important religious party, the Jamaat-e-Islami, had supported Pakistan 
and opposed Bangladeshi independence. Many of its members, and indeed members 
of other smaller Islamic parties had fought on the Pakistani side. In this context, 
Mujib’s decision in 1973 to release without trial or investigation the 33,000 alleged 
war criminals who sympathized with, or were members of, Islamist parties was 
significant. Shortly afterwards, in 1974, Mujib travelled to Pakistan to attend the 
Islamic Summit at Lahore and returned home proudly proclaiming Bangladesh to be 
the world’s second largest Islamic nation, bigger than Pakistan (B. M. Kabir 1988: 83-
4). In the same year a Madrasah Education Commission was formed to report on how 
religious education could be improved. And in 1975 the Islamic Foundation was set 
up to promote Islamic studies and to manage mosques (M. G. Kabir 1995: 188-90; T. 
M. Murshid 1996: 362-3). Even in terms of the narrow definition of secularism in the 
new constitution, some of these moves, at least, were suspect. 
 
It is possible to comprehend these actions if we recognize that for the Awami League 
and other clientelist parties taking positions for or against secularism, the practice of 
Islam or secularism did not have a direct material significance for their organizations 
or constituents. Reaching out to Muslim political organizations was simply an act of 
restructuring the ruling coalition. It allowed the Awami League to neutralize or 
incorporate groups whose members were in any case very similar to those who were 
already part of the ruling coalition. Religious beliefs are important and clientelist 
organizers and politicians are likely to have their own preferences and prejudices, but 
subject to these, their main concern is to maintain the ruling coalition. The ruling 
coalition is always searching for allies who will join or support them at the lowest 
cost, and this logic can shed some light on Mujib’s possible motivations when he 
made these concessions to Islamic political organizations. In the aftermath of 
independence, it was cheaper for the ruling group to acquire potentially powerful 
organizational allies from amongst the defeated Islamist groups rather than from 
within the left. The left was growing in mobilizing ability, and its leaders could and 
were demanding much bigger payoffs for their allegiance. It was already becoming 
clear that many of these powerful organizers and their organizations would soon leave 
the ruling coalition to oppose it from outside with the objective of dislodging it. In 
that context it is not at all surprising from the perspective of the logic of maintaining 
the ruling coalition that Mujib was making overtures to his old enemies in the Islamic 
movement, while increasingly using violence on his old allies on the left. 
 
Clearly, Mujib’s manoeuvres for sustaining the holding power of the ruling coalition 
against those who were outside and those who were leaving to join them began to 
rapidly unwind. The ruling coalition failed to maintain enough support to sustain its 
patrimonial desire to rule indefinitely. Eventually, the disastrous attempt to stop its 
decline with the institutional solution of the one party state and the enforcement of 
this with formal and informal power led to Mujib's assassination in 1975. Those who 
united against the Awami League at that time did not do so as a normal act of political 
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opposition but perceived their fight to be a life and death one against a ruling coalition 
that was organizing to wipe them out politically. This context has to be understood to 
see why the ideology of the new ruling coalition was designed to signal an irrevocable 
break with the supporters of BAKSAL, the one party state. This was the context in 
which Ziaur Rahman and his Bangladesh Nationalist Party or BNP developed the 
counter ideology of Bangladeshi nationalism. This was defined as the nationalism of 
Bengali Muslims, and distinguished their nationalism from the Indian nationalism 
supported by the Bengalis of West Bengal. The implicit signal was that the supporters 
of Bengali nationalism had let down the country because they were pro-Indian as 
Bengali nationalism implied a close alliance with if not unification with West Bengal.  
 
In fact, Bengali nationalism as Mujib had understood it was never about attempting 
the reunification of Bengal, nor did Mujib’s definition of Bengali nationalism deny 
the Muslim identity of the vast majority of Bangladeshis. The distinction between 
Bengali and Bangladeshi nationalism was not a division based on different material 
interests or even deeply felt beliefs about the practice of secularism, or a debate about 
the borders of Bangladesh. Indeed, the supporters of both nationalisms recognized 
that reunification with West Bengal was not on the cards, and that while India was a 
big neighbour, there were many conflicts of interests with the Indians. Moreover, both 
parties recognized that as a Muslim-majority Bengali nation-state some recognition of 
its Muslim identity was necessary to justify its borders, and neither camp supported a 
sharia version of Islamic law. Rather, the real purpose of the vaguely defined 
distinction between the two nationalisms was really to sharply distinguish the core 
supporters of the ruling coalition of 1975 who supported a one-party state from those 
who participated in opposing and overthrowing it to create an alternative ruling 
coalition in the following years.  
 
Indeed, the military governments which succeeded Mujib and the civilian parties they 
created absorbed many defectors from the Awami League who saw no contradiction 
in adopting the new definition of Bangladeshi nationalism. They also attracted old 
Maoists like Kazi Zafar and JSD socialists like Abdur Rab who argued that the 
developmental agenda of the ex-military leaders was more in tune with the 
developmental agenda of their own socialism. Even though constitutional changes 
were introduced which recognized the privileged status of Islam, the left-leaning 
organizers and organizations that now subscribed to Bangladeshi nationalism did not 
see any significant difference in the practice of secularism as a result. Nevertheless, 
the secular agenda of separating religion from the state, to the extent that it was ever 
implemented, was now somewhat attenuated. By the end of the 1980s the main lines 
of factional conflict were drawn between the Bangladeshi nationalist BNP (the 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party set up by General Zia) and the Bengali nationalist 
Awami League. While the conflict between the two was often implacable they did 
occasionally cooperate. The two joined forces in the late 1980s in their fight against 
the ruling Jatiyo Party of Ershad that was ideologically indistinguishable from the 
BNP. Indeed in the early 1990s, it was the ‘secular’ Awami League that entered into 
an alliance with the Islamist Jamaat against the then-ruling BNP government. 
Inevitably, over this period the Awami League’s secular claims became much more 
muted. By this stage it had become difficult to identify any important issues of 
concrete political practice affecting secularism on which the three major parties 
actually differed. For instance, BNP and Awami League governments were very 




The Awami League government that took office in 2009 identified as one of its most 
important priorities the trial of the war criminals of 1971. This process had been 
abandoned by Mujib and later governments but the new Awami League government 
took up a demand that had been voiced by many of its supporters and by a wider 
constituency for some time. The demand reflected not just a nagging perception 
amongst many sections of the population that justice had not been meted out to many 
people who participated in crimes during the war. But the Awami League government 
was soon criticized by international observers for choosing as targets for prosecution 
only prominent members of the opposing camp (for instance in a series of articles on 
the war crimes trials in the Economist magazine throughout 2011). The trial process 
began very slowly and with many questions about procedures but its most salient 
feature was that by 2011 only a handful of individuals were finally charged and they 
were all members of the Jamaat-e-Islami party, together with one individual from the 
BNP. Nevertheless, by then the issue failed to polarize society into supporters and 
opponents of the trials in the way the Awami League perhaps expected because there 
was very little underlying difference in the broader society about the desirability of a 
proper trial.  
 
The Awami League’s claim that those who did not support the war crimes trial were 
opponents of Bengali nationalism and thereby supporters of Pakistan who had aided 
and abetted the Pakistanis no longer rang true. The repeated pronouncements of the 
ruling party that many people were trying to disrupt the trials suggested that they 
actually expected the trial to be implacably opposed by the opposition. In fact the 
BNP’s electoral alliance with the Jamaat-e-Islami was an opportunistic alliance, no 
less than the Awami League’s alliance with the same Jamaat against the BNP in the 
mid-1990s. Nevertheless, the Awami League probably expected a much more spirited 
opposition by the BNP based on their refusal to adopt Bengali nationalism which in 
their mind should have made the BNP protectors of war criminals. In fact despite the 
government’s attempts to portray all opposition to its policies as a hidden attempt to 
disrupt the war crimes trials, these claims soon began to lose credibility amongst the 
general public. Opposition to the trials was actually almost non-existent except for 
occasional criticisms levelled in Bangladesh and in the international press that pointed 
out that the procedures were not as transparent and robust as they should be, and that 
the choice of the first batch of accused was politically motivated. There is perhaps 
hope that whatever the outcome of the trials, it will become more and more difficult to 
sustain the myth that the parties represent truly irreconcilable positions on secularism, 
nationalism or the sovereignty and independence of Bangladesh. That can only be for 
the good for any attempt at enabling a stable democracy.  
 
Thus, despite the absence of any significant differences in practice or in their real 
interests as revealed by their practice, the conflict between the Bengali nationalism of 
the Awami League and the Bangladeshi nationalism of their rivals defined 
irreconcilable differences between competing camps in the democratic political arena 
of Bangladesh after 1990. The reference to nationalism was obviously misleading 
because a substantive difference between Bangladeshi and Bengali nationalism would 
really imply different views on the desirability of the reunification of Bengal. But in 
fact, the supporters of Bengali nationalism in Bangladesh, and in particular the 
Awami League, have no political intention of redrawing the borders of India and 
Bangladesh. This should have made the debate between Bengali and Bangladeshi 
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nationalism politically redundant but it did not. Going back even further, the ‘Bengali 
nationalism’ of the 1960s in East Pakistan was about autonomy or independence for 
the part of Bengal that was East Pakistan, not about the reunification of Bengal. In 
that sense, it was indistinguishable from what later came to be known as Bangladeshi 
nationalism. The later constitutional debate in the 1990s about the role of religion was 
an important debate but here too there were very few irreconcilable differences 
between the parties because they were actually agreed on most issues and their 
practice of secularism was very similar. Nor was there any significant difference 
between the parties on the desirability of the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, 
and both parties had similar numbers of freedom fighters within their ranks.  
 
The misrepresentation of the differences between them as irreconcilable issues about 
nationalism and secularism is significant because it is a manifestation of the fact that 
Bangladesh’s political leaders still want to talk in the uncompromising language of 
decisive battles appropriate to a different context. As a result, the development of the 
informal institutions that would enable democratic politics in Bangladesh to ‘mature’ 
into a sustainable equilibrium with competitive clientelism has been slow to happen. 
Instead, the ruling coalition claims, and from its actions apparently also believes, that 
the opposition is not only troublesome but also dangerous. The ruling coalition is 
therefore justified in taking upon itself the task of blocking the opposition or even 
attempting to politically wipe it out. The perpetual confrontation between the two 
uncompromising ladies in the 1990s and 2000s was organized with the same life-and-
death intensity that marked the conflicts of 1971 and 1975. However, the real context 
was now entirely different and what was required was the emergence of a series of 
informal rules that would allow the coalitions to cycle into and out of power smoothly 
through democratic contests where their relative holding power was revealed. 
Unfortunately, the division of parties into mutually exclusive “nationalist” coalitions 
recreated two implacably opposed camps locked in a life-or-death battle. While 
clientelist coalitions do need distinguishing characteristics, the ways in which the two 
dominant parties sought to define their differences appears to be the result of a 
misreading of their own history and a misunderstanding of what a substantive debate 
about nationalism or secularism today should mean. The repeated descent into zero-
sum games has prevented a stable operational equilibrium in the polity and as a result 
the growth-stability trade-offs for all institutions have been affected.  
 
The Absence of (Informal) Rules for Live-and-Let-Live Cycling  
The intransigence of the two parties during the 2000s appeared most directly during 
elections when it repeatedly threatened the viability of the democratic system under 
competitive clientelism. A fair election in a clientelist political settlement means that 
the political outcome reflects the balance of power between organizations on the 
ground without ‘excessive’ interference from bureaucratic or military officials. While 
all interference in the administration of elections cannot be ruled out in a developing 
country, for viable democratic institutions, the interference cannot take place to the 
extent that the electoral outcome fails to reflect the balance of forces. If that happens, 
the outcome of the election will not be stability but more intense contestation and 
perhaps eventually violence by the losing side. A sustainable solution requires that the 
voting outcome roughly reflects the balance of organizational power and the object of 
the electoral campaign is to reveal this. The primary objective of a fair election in 
competitive clientelism is therefore not to discover the true preferences of the 
electorate, partly because true preferences may not exist given the absence of serious 
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differences in the policies that the parties are likely to implement. Rather, elections 
are processes through which the organizational strengths of competing coalitions are 
revealed. For stability to be achieved, a coalition of factions with significantly greater 
holding power has to be allowed to form the ruling coalition.  
 
The critical requirement therefore is that no party should be able to artificially 
leverage its strength by using the administrative apparatus to repress or limit other 
organizations to give it an electoral advantage that is unrelated to it real relative 
organizational power. If a ruling coalition uses administrative power or institutional 
rules to disadvantage the opposition, this is effectively a return to the institutional 
system of clientelistic authoritarianism with the inevitable conflict it generates in the 
context of competitive clientelism. Thus, Figure 14 shows that democratic institutions 
did generate greater stability and therefore better growth-stability trade-offs for some 
growth-supporting institutions but only when the democratic institutions were 
perceived to be fair by opposition political organizations. Whenever the ruling 
coalition attempted to change institutional rules or implement them in ways that the 
opposition perceived would disadvantage them, this amounted to a de facto 
introduction of clientelistic authoritarian institutions. An upsurge of instability 
inevitably followed with a corresponding collapse of the growth-stability trade-offs 
for institutions from PS2 to PS3 in Figure 14.  
 
A solution to this problem appeared to have emerged in the aftermath of the 
overthrow of Ershad’s ‘authoritarian’ rule (clientelistic authoritarianism in our 
classification) in 1990. As Ershad’s government had effectively fallen, the elections 
had to be held under a caretaker government led by a Supreme Court judge. The 
outcome was an election where the charges of rigging and repression were relatively 
muted. The victory of the BNP in this election led to demands from the opposition 
Awami League to institute the caretaker system for future elections. It was at this time 
that the Awami League was in alliance with the Jamaat. Initially the BNP did not 
accept this demand, but as a result, the 1996 election was boycotted. It had to be re-
run after a constitutional amendment was passed by the BNP that institutionalized the 
caretaker system for conducting elections. The 13th Amendment set up a Caretaker 
Government system to organize elections. It was to be set up at the end of every 
government’s term with the last Chief Justice of the Supreme Court becoming the 
interim head of government. Its sole task would be to organize the elections to 
determine the next ruling coalition. This was a unique formal institutional experiment 
to create a credible electoral process for selecting a ruling coalition. If it had been 
sustainable this could have created a stable operational equilibrium of democratic 
institutions with competitive clientelism. 
 
However, this institutional arrangement was clearly not buttressed by a deeper set of 
informal political agreements that would ensure that the formal arrangements would 
not be informally modified as they can always be in a clientelist political settlement. 
The balance of power between the two parties had not yet established in their 
collective minds the fact that the cycling of their parties was now the normal state of 
affairs. Their subsequent actions suggested that both parties harboured a desire for a 
decisive victory that would establish one of them as the natural party of government 
and lead to the unravelling and disappearance of the other. The caretaker government 
system worked for two subsequent elections, despite minor attempts by both parties to 
interfere. However, the constitutional arrangements collapsed in the run-up to the 
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2007 elections when the incumbent BNP interfered with the dates of retirement of 
Supreme Court judges, apparently to ensure that its preferred candidate could head the 
next caretaker government. The result was an increasingly violent standoff which 
resulted in a series of general strikes (hartals) and violent street confrontations. In a 
context of increasing uncertainty a group of bureaucrats backed by the military and 
the international donor community took over power on the 11th of January 2007 as a 
new emergency interim government. Under the constitution, the caretaker government 
has to organize an election within two months, but this caretaker government stayed 
in power for two years under emergency powers it gave itself.  
 
The emergency caretaker government turned out to have been a significant wasted 
opportunity. The emerging system of democratic institutions and competitive 
clientelism had clearly not yet acquired a stable operational equilibrium to be fully 
self-sustaining. The emergency could have been an opportunity for delivering a 
political shock to the system that may have helped to establish that the army could be 
deployed as third party enforcement by a caretaker government to enforce an implicit 
rule of law for governing elections. But instead, the caretaker government headed by 
an ex-World Bank bureaucrat and backed by the army took a ‘good governance’ 
perspective on how to solve the problem. Their interpretation (no doubt strongly 
influenced by dominant international policy perceptions) was that the political 
instability in Bangladesh was caused by the involvement of political elites in 
corruption and by the personalization of politics.  
 
The Emergency Government drew on the argument that the opportunity for political 
corruption created distorted incentives for politicians to interfere with electoral 
outcomes. This suggested that if political corruption could be rooted out and if parties 
could be made to compete on the basis of alternative manifestos of delivering public 
goods the problem of electoral violence and standoffs could be rooted out. The second 
argument was that the monopolization of the leadership of the two parties by the 
families of the dead presidents was damaging and was the source of the implacable 
hatred between the two parties. So they also sought to change the leadership of the 
two main parties (the so-called ‘minus two’ strategy). Both strategies dismally failed. 
 
On anti-corruption, the two-year emergency caretaker government took a series of 
radical steps to achieve a large number of convictions for high-level corruption. The 
underlying thinking was that the source of political violence was the engagement of 
political leaders in corruption. Hundreds and possibly thousands of political activists 
were arrested and incarcerated, including the leaders of the two main parties, on 
charges of corruption. Hundreds of businessmen were also arrested and some of them 
handed over millions of dollars to the new government as ‘ill-gotten gains’ under 
pressure (which later on turned out to include torture and extortion). Based on 
evidence that was itself dubiously and hurriedly collected, thousands of cases of 
corruption and extortion were introduced in the courts. The whole exercise was 
deeply flawed not only from the perspective of its flawed understanding of a 
clientelist political settlement but even in terms of the formal legal procedures that 
were followed. In the end, almost all the cases had to be abandoned on the grounds 
that evidence was missing or inadmissible. Many witnesses who came forward 
(perhaps under pressure and perhaps under promises of protection) during the 
Emergency period disappeared and refused to continue to give evidence when the 




More significantly, the caretaker government and its international advisors had failed 
to understand the nature of a clientelist polity. Political leaders running mass 
clientelist coalitions do not have sufficient resources from formal sources to finance 
the organization of politics and the redistributions that are required. A significant 
degree of informality in financing and in redistributive arrangements is therefore a 
characteristic of clientelist political settlements. Effectively, the caretaker government 
was trying to replace a clientelist political settlement with a Weberian-type capitalist 
one without changing the material conditions that have generated clientelist political 
settlements in every developing country. This was a failed enterprise in the way it was 
set up. Not surprisingly, the military caretaker government’s attempt to address this 
problem failed dismally. The two arrested leaders of the main political parties 
eventually had to be released, and one of them was elected prime minister in the 2009 
elections.  
 
The strategy to replace the two leaders (‘minus-two’) also failed and this too 
represented a failure to understand the nature of clientelist politics. The leadership of 
clientelist parties is not based on a choice between different policy positions 
represented by different leaders. The most appropriate leader of a clientelist party is 
someone who has the best credentials for being able to construct the biggest coalition 
for the party by organizing a distribution of benefits that is both economically viable 
and acceptable across all factions and organizations within the party. Who is the 
person that all party factions are likely to trust the most? If a leader of an organization 
internal to the party were to become leader of the whole party, their own 
organizational or factional supporters would be likely to benefit compared to 
supporters of other internal organizations and factions. The promotion of such an 
individual therefore would be strongly resisted by other organizations and factions 
within the party. In contrast, the wife or daughter of a dead president could be 
expected to have the best interests of the legacy at heart and be the most fair in 
adjudicating the relative power and therefore the claims of competing organizations 
and factions when disputes break out. If one of the most important tasks that the 
leader of a clientelist party plays is the regulation of the rent distribution across 
factions, ‘the family’ is likely to have an advantage over other individuals in gaining 
trust across factions. In the absence of a better alternative the parties may well have 
sought and identified an alternative leader, but as long as a ‘natural’ leader existed, 
the experiment of the interim government was almost doomed to fail. Indeed at the 
end of the experiment, the two ladies retained control over their own parties.  
 
Not surprisingly, family control of clientelist parties is very common across the Indian 
subcontinent, including India and Pakistan. This does not mean that all developing 
country parties are of this type. More disciplined ideological parties can achieve 
greater internal discipline and can select their leaders through rule-following 
procedures. On the other hand, disciplined parties based on ideologies like Marxism 
or Islam are likely to remain relatively small in terms of their following because most 
people in poor countries prefer to belong to parties that can provide them with 
immediate material benefits, however small. Clientelist parties can gather large 
followings based on a pyramidal absorption of client organizations but the price is 
that there are no external criteria like seniority or commitment to an ideology that can 
determine the relative benefits for different constituent organizations. Leaders of 
powerful groups within the party can threaten to leave and join other parties unless 
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they can be offered benefits proportional to their power. Sometimes Communist or 
Islamist parties in developing countries can become mass parties but usually this 
requires very special circumstances like prolonged wars against colonial powers as in 
the case of the Communist Parties of China and Viet Nam or the FIS in Algeria. The 
emergency caretaker government in Bangladesh did not understand that clientelist 
parties will not convert into internally disciplined ideological parties if only their 
leadership could be changed.  
 
An interesting feature of this caretaker government period was that it demonstrated a 
significant change in the organization and aspirations of the Bangladesh army. In the 
past a political crisis of this magnitude would have provided ambitious generals an 
opportunity to organize a coup, perhaps with a genuine desire to salvage the situation 
but no doubt also to pursue their own ambitions. This time they stayed in the 
background but actively backed a civilian caretaker government, making it clear that 
they were the power behind the scenes. And unlike previous interventions where the 
justification was to pursue economic development, this time the army joined forces 
with civil society champions to justify their indirect intervention in terms of 
promoting good governance. A significant change in the resource base of the army as 
an organization could explain some of these changes. It was now closely tied to the 
‘international community’ through its lucrative involvement in international 
peacekeeping missions. It was dependent on formal international rents and did not 
want to jeopardize them with a domestic adventure to generate informal rents for the 
army through the political process. Its own recent history had also demonstrated the 
limits of authoritarianism and clientelistic authoritarianism. However, the army as an 
organization was not as centralized and coordinated as it would like to be. There were 
allegations from businessmen and politicians that different groups within the army 
acting in the name of the high command used the opportunity to arrests individuals in 
uncoordinated ways, often to extort payoffs in exchange for their release. These 
experiences suggested that the army too was no longer a centralized and coordinated 
organization. This was a problematic message for the political parties as the most 
important potential ‘third-party’ mediator and enforcer who may have been relied 
upon to intervene in the case of a real impasse was shown to be itself fragmented and 
relatively weak. 
 
The main effect of the two-year experiment was a collapse in investor confidence. 
The two main parties whose intransigence and violence had caused the problem in the 
first place did indeed receive a shock, but the abject failure of the strategy of anti-
corruption and leadership change had a negative effect on the impetus for reform. 
Even more important than the problem of political corruption (which is unlikely to be 
eradicated as long as the informal aspects of the clientelist political settlement are 
reproduced) was the failure to develop a credible mechanism for organizing elections. 
The core activity of the emergency government was to improve the formal aspects of 
the electoral process such as creating a much better voter list and identity cards. These 
were necessary but not sufficient requirements for enabling a democratic system to 
operate in a clientelist polity. The critical missing element was of course the absence 
of the informal limits on the activities of the ruling coalition that is essential to make 
the electoral process a credible one in these contexts. The caretaker government 
appeared to have no conception of how to bring about what the Bangladeshi media 
described as a necessary change in the ‘political culture’ and which we would 
describe as the informal understanding of the limits to the modifications in formal 
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rules beyond which the system is likely to descend into violence and instability. After 
two years in office the overall legacy of the caretaker period for developmental 
reform and institutional change are very likely to have been negative.  
 
The Awami League won a resounding victory in the elections of late December 2008, 
winning 230 out of the 300 parliamentary seats. The landslide gave the Awami 
League more than two-thirds of parliamentary seats (though with less than half the 
votes cast). It was in a position to carry out constitutional amendments on its own and 
soon proceeded to do so. In 2011 it won a Supreme Court judgement that the 13th 
Amendment that had introduced the caretaker system of governance for conducting 
elections was itself unconstitutional. The brief judgement that was initially delivered 
said that the caretaker system may be continued for a further two terms given the time 
it would take to build confidence in alternative arrangements. However, without 
waiting for the full judgement to be delivered which would have shown the arguments 
the court considered in recommending the caretaker system for the next two elections, 
the Awami League rushed through the 15th Constitutional Amendment to remove the 
caretaker system with immediate effect. The opportunistic nature of this move and the 
possible opportunities it would give the Awami League in the next election was not 
lost on the BNP, which immediately announced that it would boycott the elections 
unless the caretaker system was reintroduced. The absence of informal limits to the 
use of power by the ruling coalition could not have been more robustly expressed. In 
early 2012 negotiations were continuing between the Awami League and the 
opposition BNP on this issue. A possible compromise that was under discussion was 
to have a ‘political’ caretaker government to oversee the elections, composed of 
elected nominees from both parties, possibly headed by the President. But the formula 
would have to convince the opposition that administrative power would not be used 
during the elections to give an excessive advantage to the ruling coalition. 
 
Economic Organizations under Vulnerable Democracy  
As Figure 14 summarized, the failure of democratic institutions to achieve an 
operational equilibrium can result in a spike in instability and violence and a more or 
less serious collapse of the growth-stability trade-off facing potentially growth-
enhancing institutions. The possibility that the approach of elections will result in a 
crisis is likely to disrupt the normal operation of the economy. The failure to organize 
an election or an election that achieves a stable result can lead to violence and strikes 
that inflict broader economic costs, attacks on the economic interests of opposition 
supporters and finally retribution against the economic interests of supporters of the 
current government if and when it is finally deposed. All of these possibilities can 
obviously reduce the time horizons of investors and politicians in a competitive 
clientelist system. The enforcement of growth-enhancing institutions becomes much 
more difficult at times of crisis as does contract-enforcement, particularly contracts 
involving the government. Thus, the electoral crisis is likely to result in a collapse in 
the trade-off curves of different institutions and sectors, but the effects are likely to be 
different across sectors and institutions.  
 
Long-term investments are likely to suffer if electoral uncertainty is likely long before 
any instability actually emerges because the expectation of future instability is 
sufficient to make investors procrastinate. Institutions supporting long-term 
investments are likely to suffer, particularly where government contracts involving 
significant sums are involved. For instance, it has proved to be very difficult to raise 
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private financing for investments in the power sector in Bangladesh. This is an area 
where future income streams depend on governments honouring contracts made by 
previous governments. But if the opposition is being constrained by the incumbent 
government, and are eventually likely to have to force the incumbents out, investors 
are likely to be wary that the opposition may challenge the legality of some contracts 
if they come to power. At least they can expect further demands for payoffs on top of 
the first round that they have probably already paid to the incumbents, and this can 
significantly increase the cost of doing business. Thus, vulnerable democracies under 
competitive clientelism can face high transaction costs for some types of contracts and 
some investments may not be possible at all. Since infrastructure and power sector 
investments do require government guarantees for future payments, a vital set of 
investments are adversely affected on which the economic performance of other 
sectors ultimately depends.  
 
For sectors that have already achieved competitiveness, the failure to enforce growth-
enhancing institutions is likely to have less adverse effects compared to sectors like 
power and infrastructure or compared to sectors where global competitiveness is yet 
to be achieved. In established sectors like garments, competitiveness has already been 
achieved through the investment of significant time and effort in learning-by-doing. In 
garments, learning opportunities were created by a combination of rents together with 
strong incentives created by fortuitous conditions and institutions that ensured high 
levels of effort in learning. Once competitiveness was achieved, the need for special 
institutional support is no longer required. In already competitive sectors, political 
instability affects growth in more usual ways: by delaying investments, by disrupting 
exports when ports and transport systems are affected by strikes and hartals, and 
ultimately persuading risk-averse buyers to move their business elsewhere. Much of 
the contract enforcement in competitive export sectors involves the banking system 
and these formal institutions are unlikely to be significantly modified as a result of 
political instability unless the latter reaches very high levels. Business organizations 
that are export competitive and stand to lose orders have periodically organized 
collective action to campaign against hartals and to bring political instability to a 
rapid end. These collective organizations have included the Bangladesh Garment 
Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA). While some of these initiatives 
have had some marginal effect on the intensity of conflicts, their interventions have 
not had any decisive effect. Ultimately, the resources that the business sector could 
generate were insufficient for this sector to dominate the political system and to set 
the conditions for acceptable political conduct. 
 
More serious have been the effects for sectors that have not yet achieved 
competitiveness but are close enough for learning-by-doing to be a potentially 
effective strategy. These sectors require more specific institutional support to reduce 
the costs of the loss-making period when learning-by-doing needs to be financed. This 
requires institutions that can regulate the provision of financing and the enforcement 
of conditions that create incentives for high levels of effort during the learning 
process. But the provision of financing and the enforcement of conditions for ensuring 
effort are both particularly difficult to ensure in a context of instability and political 
fragmentation. The financing required for investing in new sectors and then investing 
in the learning-by-doing process is likely to involve a cycle longer than one or two 
years. The institutions providing the financing and defining the conditions for 
recipients of the financing have to remain effective over the lifetime of more than one 
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government and this cannot be ensured under these conditions. The collapse of the 
trade-off curve for institutions supporting learning is likely to be quite steep. The 
garment industry developed as a result of a fortunate conjuncture of rents created by 
the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) organized by the USA, domestic political 
support in Bangladesh at the highest level, the availability of domestic investible 
resources for driving these investments and strong incentives for foreign technology 
providers to transfer the appropriate technologies to Bangladesh. This conjuncture 
also happened during the earliest phases of clientelistic authoritarianism when the 
time horizon of investors and institutions financing the learning process could be long 
given the stability of the new regime. The lesson that emerges is that the extension of 
this success to new sectors and under conditions of vulnerable democracy requires 
developing new institutions and governance capabilities. A necessary condition is that 
democracy at least achieves a moderate operational equilibrium with competitive 
clientelism so that the probability of electoral crisis is reduced.  
 
The agencies and institutions that could assist Bangladesh to move up the value chain 
in new areas could take a variety of forms ranging from direct government policies of 
support for critical sectors to the development of a new generation of industrial banks. 
However, given the weak operational equilibrium of democratic political institutions 
it is not surprising that no significant institutional measures were taken to develop 
new sectors during the period of vulnerable democracy. A few new sectors did begin 
to emerge, like electronics manufacturing, but investments and financing for learning 
in these sectors were driven by enterprising entrepreneurs who took huge personal 
risks in financing learning on their own. The challenge for the future is to develop 
both the institutions that can support these initiatives as well as initiatives to develop 
specific governance capabilities to ensure that institutional support is not captured by 
politically connected but inefficient entrepreneurs. Neither the ambitious industrial 
policies of the East Asian countries nor the ‘good governance’ agenda set by western 
development partners provides a feasible set of governance reform targets for 
countries like Bangladesh. But even a limited and very specific set of governance 
targets that are aimed at building competitiveness in progressively more sophisticated 
sectors faces an adverse growth-stability trade-off in the context of short time 
horizons and periodic political crises. Provided that a moderate operational 
equilibrium of democratic political institutions can emerge with the emergence of the 
appropriate informal institutions, the challenge for Bangladesh will be to devise 
institutions that can support catching-up in new sectors. A more stable operational 
equilibrium requires the acceptance of informal and perhaps some formal limits on the 
powers of the ruling coalition to limit the chances of excluded organizations in the 
competition for power. It is surprising that this has not emerged despite the repeated 
failure of every ruling coalition that attempted to limit the organizational capabilities 
of excluded organizations. Perhaps a few more salutary failures will be required 
before the voluntary adoption of limits by the major parties to emerge.  
 
Finally, the collapse of time horizons and the slow development of competitive profit-
making opportunities can also have adverse effects on the incentives of powerful 
entrepreneurs. By the end of the first decade of this century a number of economic 
organizations in Bangladesh had emerged with significant technological and 
entrepreneurial capabilities. The problem that faced many economic organizations 
was that apart from areas like garments, pharmaceuticals and ceramics where 
significant capabilities were built, even high capability business houses lacked 
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competitiveness in many sectors, including relatively low technology areas. For cash-
rich big business groups like Salman Rahman’s Beximco the problem was even with 
their relatively high entrepreneurial and technological capabilities in some sectors 
they could not competitively enter most areas of production. For big business houses, 
this created incentives for unproductive and speculative investments in areas outside 
their usual areas of competitiveness. Big business houses were likely to have close 
political ties with at least one major party and sometimes with several. These 
connections are mutually beneficial, providing the political party with economic 
resources when needed and providing business houses with politically created 
profitable opportunities to recoup their outlays with significant profit. As political 
uncertainty reduced the time horizons of both economic and political organizations 
and made it more difficult to develop competitiveness in new sectors, it increased the 
attractiveness of creating unproductive profit opportunities. We would expect 
business-government relationships to move towards the creation of value-reducing 
rents. There was indeed evidence of politically-assisted profit-making by big business 
houses close to ruling parties in ways that were not in the public interest and were not 
driving learning-by-doing in new sectors.  
 
The democratic competitive clientelist period after 1990 has thus had a mixed record. 
Paradoxically, in Bangladesh, the introduction of institutions of political democracy 
did not even achieve sustained political stability despite the existence of a fragmented 
competitive clientelism that made the institutions of clientelistic authoritarianism 
unviable (Figure 14). The difficulty lay in the failure to evolve credible formal but 
primarily informal rules for the removal of the ruling coalition. This made the 
operational equilibrium of democratic institutions vulnerable because the result was 
repeated periods of intense conflict and instability. The instability reduced time 
horizons and raised the transaction costs facing some types of vital long-term 
investments, in particular in the power and infrastructure sectors, and thereby directly 
harmed growth. On the other hand, economic activities in other sectors where 
competitiveness already existed, and significant public institutions for enforcing 
complex contracts were not required, were not so significantly constrained. More 
damaging was the effect on sectors that needed institutional support for addressing the 
market failures constraining their learning-by-doing and their technology adoption. 
The immediate challenge for sustaining democracy under competitive clientelism is to 
achieve more credible and less violent methods of ensuring the replacement of the 
ruling coalition. If this can be achieved, the longer term challenge is to transform the 
organization of coalitions to the extent that this is possible (for instance through the 
organization of more disciplined parties) and to devise institutions that are compatible 
with this political settlement so that investments in new sectors and the financing of 
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